Naval War College Review

Volume 30
Number 2 *Spring*

Article 1

1977

Spring 1977 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Spring 1977

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate and challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to servicewide readership and timeliness. Reproduction of articles in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

Manuscripts must be submitted in typewritten form, double-spaced or triple-spaced. Manuscripts are submitted at the sender's risk, and the *Naval War College Review* assumes no responsibility for the return of the material, although as a matter of practice every effort will be made to return manuscripts not accepted for publication. No financial compensation is paid for articles accepted for publication. In submitting an article, the sender warrants that it is original, that it is the sender's property, and that it has not been published elsewhere.

The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. Published quarterly, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands and activities; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the grade 0-3 and senior; military officers of other services, foreign officers, and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; and selected U.S. Government officials. Correspondence concerning *Review* matters should be directed to its editorial offices.

CONTENTS

Volume XXIX, Number 4/Sequence Number 263 Spring 1977

Cover: The Tall Ships in Newport harbor, June 1976, with the bowsprit, USCGC *Eagle* in the foreground. Photo by Lt. Comdr. G.G. Riggle, U.S. Navy.

BOARD OF ADVISORS
TO THE
PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

DR. DAVID M. ABSHIRE	*Chairman, Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University*
VICE ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALVERT, USN (RET.)	
MR. RICHARD BEVERLEY CORBIN, JR.	*J. Walter Thompson Company*
ADMIRAL CHARLES K. DUNCAN, USN (RET.)	
MR. MALCOLM S. FORBES	*President, Forbes Incorporated*
LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM K. JONES, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RET.)	
DR. CARL KAYSEN	*School of Humanities & Social Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR.	*Professor of Political Science Brown University*
ADMIRAL HORACIO RIVERO, USN (RET.)	
DR. ROBERT E. WARD	*Professor, Department of Political Science Stanford University*

PRESIDENT'S NOTES

By the time you read this 1977 Spring issue of the *Naval War College Review*, I will have taken leave of the College after having served as its President for nearly three years. My successor, Rear Admiral Huntington Hardisty, is a much decorated combat commander who has had high-level staff assignments in the Fleet and in Washington. Having previously served at the College as Dean of Academics, he understands the institution, the policies in force and the initiatives now underway. I am proud to turn over my responsibilities to him, knowing that the College and, most importantly, the students will be well served by this appointment.

When one reflects on the wonderful associations and rich experiences of a tour as President of the College, thoughts turn to the heritage left to us all by such greats as Luce, Mahan, Sims and Spruance -officers who had pivotal influences on the College from its inception, through the formative years and following the largest and most devastating war in which our nation has been involved. One thinks of the splendid officers, academicians, and civilian employees who breathe life and spirit into the day-to-day activities of the College. But, most of all, it is the students who are in one's thoughts—those superb officers representing all our Services and many international navies. Those who have gone before can note with satisfaction the quality, the high intelligence, the sense of service and the energy of our future maritime leaders. They are a source of inspiration to all who are assigned to the College.

As the helm is turned over, I believe the faculty can take great satisfaction in having produced challenging and dynamic curricula for the several courses offered. Especially significant is the concentration on concepts and principles useful for the remainder of an officer's service. The practical case studies by which these concepts and principles are illustrated lend a high degree of pertinence and currency to the curricula, thus reinforcing the student's grasp of the timeless guideposts to future action. I am confident that the College is on the right course insofar as the resident courses are concerned. There are, however, three other issues which will influence the future of the College and its role in the professional military education of the officer corps: Continuing Education, War Gaming and Advanced Research.

Only a small percentage of the Navy's officers are able to attend the College—at the same time, what the College has to offer would improve the professionalism of those unable to

attend and improve the quality of their service to the Nation. Under the leadership of Professor Thomas Weschler, our program for Continuing Education has been revitalized in the aftermath of the Vietnam War to make available to the officer corps at large much of what is contained in the resident curricula. Seminar programs in Washington paralleling the resident courses have proven to be exceptionally well received. A new extension program of Professional Military Education is now in the pilot stage. We have also taken the Naval Operations course on a test basis to the nuclear submariners in New London since they cannot yet be spared from sea duty to attend the College. Through Continuing Education, we are on the verge of a major contribution to the competence of our officers.

The importance of War Gaming to our officers' professional development, to their decisionmaking ability and to their sense of strategic and tactical awareness is well known. Historically, the College has led the way in the development and use of gaming techniques. With the new and substantially improved Naval War Gaming facility scheduled, under the direction of Captain Herbert Cherrier, to come on line in 1980, a wide range of new and important capabilities suggests a renewed emphasis on war gaming at the College and throughout the Navy as an aid to professional development. The opportunity for 20 students to be exercised simultaneously as Fleet Commanders will exist. Ultimately, we envisage remote terminals in Norfolk, San Diego and Pearl Harbor so that Fleet Commanders may test operation plans and develop their subordinates' tactical proficiency without the necessity to leave their headquarters. Terminals aboard ships are also being considered. The future of war gaming at the College will be limited mainly by our ability to use imaginatively the capabilities which will soon exist.

But, most of all, I am encouraged by the prospect of a major contribution by the College to the readiness of our maritime forces to meet the demands of the future as the result of a burgeoning program of Advanced Research now underway at the College under the leadership of Professor Hugh Nott. Several of the most recent and forward-looking tactical research products have been issued Navy-wide as CNO Tactical Notes, and other current projects are exploring the nature of future Navy missions and force employment concepts.

These promising initiatives in Continuing Education, War Gaming, and Advanced Research have been undertaken by the College in support of its expanding role in the creative development of the Navy's strategic and tactical thought. Success thus far is encouraging but, like all initiatives, these ventures must be supported and nourished.

I could not have asked for wiser or more enthusiastic support than I have received from Navy leaders and friends, and I am particularly grateful to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, my associates here at the College, and the Naval War College Foundation for their understanding and commitment to our professional military education goals.

To all of those who now inherit both the past and the future of the Naval War College, I extend my deepest thanks, best wishes, and warmest confidence.



Julien J. LeBourgeois
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Maritime strategy has always been concerned with the use of the sea for a purpose. In the modern world political and economic factors, the emerging international legal consensus, and the advances of technology affect the historical use of navies as instruments of national policy. Professor MccGwire explores the impact of contemporary developments on naval operations in this article which will appear in the forthcoming book, The Limits of Military Intervention, Ellen Stern, editor.

CHANGING NAVAL OPERATIONS AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

by

Michael MccGwire

Navies have long been a means of bringing military force to bear in distant parts of the world, and the purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of contemporary developments on this traditional instrument of great power policy.

In a naval context, military intervention can include a cocktail party in Mombasa, a show of force in the Caribbean, naval interposition off Iceland, carrier airstrikes on Hanoi, or the landing of marines in the Persian Gulf. I have chosen to concentrate on the application of force as opposed to the display of force, for two reasons. First, our understanding of the processes underlying political influence building is still unclear,[1] and becomes even more so when we introduce the diffuse concept of "a naval presence."[2] And second, to the extent that a naval presence *does* have any political influence, this must stem from the ultimate possibility that the forces involved will actually be used.

This discussion of military intervention both at sea and by sea stops short at the beachhead, and military activity on land is only addressed to the extent that it is relevant to maritime operations. Similarly, although I touch on the political costs of naval intervention, the more general question of the political utility of military force is not addressed because of limitations of space.

However, so many assumptions about the contemporary role of force at sea stem from centuries past, that it is worth spending a moment on the relevant changes in the international environment. Mahan, who chose the term "seapower" for its evocative ring

rather than its usefulness as an analytical term, saw it as one of three interlocking circles, the other two being colonies and commerce. His theories about seapower and command of the sea derived from an historical analysis of the years 1660-1783, the height of mercantilism and monopoly trade, and were thought to have been validated by what G.S. Graham terms "The Illusion of Pax Britannica" in the 19th century.[3] But British naval power was not the sole or even the most important reason for the Pax Britannica, which resulted from a combination of various factors. Of these, the most important was "Britain's industrial supremacy, which made possible a phenomenal commercial development."[4] The period of the industrial revolution provided both the means and the stimulus for Western nations to establish more or less effective dominion over a world which seemed to lack viable political entities. The process was accompanied by the spread of a Western administrative infrastructure (part government, part commercial), throughout much of the world, and was supported by a belief in "la mission civilatrice" and "the white man's burden," and Victorian ideas about child rearing and colonial government. Among the most important were the will to empire, the readiness of the imperial authorities to use force, and the knowledge of their subject people that resistance would lead to certain retribution, even if delayed. God was white and to spare the rod, spoiled the child.

Navies were prime instruments of such imperial retribution, and in those days of coal-fired ships and manually operated gun mountings, sizable bodies of well-armed men could be landed at short notice, while the warship lay virtually invulnerable offshore. As recently as the Boer War, it was still practical to dismount naval guns and drag them by oxcart to the battlefront. By World War I, attitudes toward empire were already changing, and the Western imperial tide had begun to recede. But even in the thirties it was thought unexceptionable to bomb villagers in the Aden Protectorate as a form of collective punishment, and on the shores of the Malaysian Archipelago and the China Seas, villages were razed as a discouragement to piracy.

Since the last war, attitudes and circumstances have changed radically. Of the latter, the most significant would seem to be the proliferation of nation-states and their membership in the United Nations. The corollary of this has been the progressive dismantling of the infrastructure of colonial occupation, which played such an important role in bringing imperial retribution to bear. There has also been a change in general attitudes towards the acceptability of coercive force. The circumstances in which long-range intervention is likely to be acceptable have been progressively circumscribed, and in the last 30 years, large-scale coercive intervention by major powers has been successful only within their respective contiguous national security zones, where power gradients and political commitment are both high. Effective intervention overseas now requires an initial favorable balance of political forces in the "host" country, as well as sufficient weight of sustained response. But even if attitudes had not changed, warships would no longer be able to serve as the autonomous wielders of graduated retribution. The specialized demands of modern warfare mean that naval units now lack the military flexibility of the prewar general purpose cruiser, with its numerous guns and comfortably large ship's company. Meanwhile, the proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems means that no longer are warships necessarily invulnerable when lying offshore. Sensors may have to be manned continuously with weapons ready at standby alert, and it may be hard to spare a landing party

without hazarding one's ship. The modern equivalent of the cruiser with its landing party is the carrier task force and its marine battalion landing team. But while the political effect that each could achieve may be comparable, the political stake is obviously very different.

None of this means that military intervention by sea is no longer likely or possible. But it has placed constraints on the almost casual use of force which used to be the norm. And it does mean that the economic and political costs are likely to be very much higher, and that the chances of a successful outcome are far less. However, while the utility of coercive force is increasingly in question, the threat of such force remains a powerful diplomatic weapon. Irrespective of whether it ultimately achieves its goals, coercive intervention is an unpleasant experience for the target country, and a credible threat is likely to introduce some element of deterrence to its political considerations.

There are two separate calculations involved in assessing the level of capability required for a successful intervention overseas. First, there is the level and type of force which is to be brought to bear on the target ashore, whether it be naval bombardment, carrier airstrike, or men and tanks. And second, there is the capability required to get such a force to the target area by sea, and to sustain offshore operations as necessary. Our concern is with the second category, which includes the possibility that passage may be deliberately obstructed, and may require the use of force to secure such passage. The policymaker will want to know the political costs of such ancillary operations, and how they compare with the political benefits that the major intervention is supposed to achieve.

Maritime intervention is a complex subject, and I therefore begin by developing a discussion framework which allows us to consider the level of capabilities and the types of cost involved. I then look at the major operational developments and their likely effect on military intervention by sea, before turning to review the different types of intervention and why they could occur. Finally, I consider certain differences between the Soviet and the U.S. approaches to overseas intervention.

The Use of the Sea—A Theoretical Framework. The sea's strategic quality derives from the access it provides to nonadjacent areas. Maritime strategy is therefore about the *use* of the sea; using it for one's own advantage and preventing its use to one's disadvantage, in peacetime as in war. This navigational use of the sea breaks down into two main categories: (1) the conveyance of goods and people, and (2) the projection of military force against targets ashore.

The first category of use covers seaborne trade, which in a strategic context spells maritime communications. It also covers the movement of military cargoes in merchant ships, although this shades into the second category, particularly when a war is actually in progress. The shading is inevitable, since the military and commercial uses of the sea form a continuum. While we can identify what is purely military, there are few commercial cargoes which have no military value. For analytical purposes, therefore, it is impractical to distinguish between military and nonmilitary uses of the sea, except in the broadest terms, whereas the projection of force, and the conveyance of goods and people are functionally distinct.

The second category has two forms: the traditional one of bringing military force (actual or latent) to bear on coastal states; and the deterrent form of targeting distant land areas with nuclear weapons. We are here only concerned with the traditional form. This may involve the landing of troops or may be

limited to standing offshore and striking targets with shipborne weapons such as guns, missiles or aircraft.

There is also a third, instrumental category: (3) the deployment of naval forces in order either (a) to *prevent*, or (b) to *secure* the two main categories of use. We all know that certain types of naval units also embody the capability for projecting force ashore, but the analytical distinction between categories (2) and (3) is worth preserving. It serves to emphasize that maritime strategy is wholly about the *use of the sea* and only incidentally about the *use of force* at sea. Naval forces are only necessary to the use of the sea if attempts are being made to prevent it.

The ease with which use can be prevented depends on maritime geography and the type of use involved. A waterway (defined as any stretch of sea used for passage) can be described in terms of its geographic characteristics, lying somewhere on the continuum between narrow, shallow waters and the deep ocean. Narrow waterways, where ships must pass close to shore-based weapons, are relatively easy to obstruct, particularly if they are shallow and hence minable. It is much harder to prevent passage across an ocean waterway, out of range of land and with opportunities for evasive routing. By the same token, different types of use involve different capabilities and lengths of time at risk. It is usually easier to interrupt a flow of merchant shipping, than to prevent the passage of a naval task force.

As a general rule, it is also easier to prevent the use of the sea than it is to secure such use. This is partly because the means of *preventing* use are not limited to naval forces, and in narrow waters they include the simple blockship, the mine and a whole range of shore-based weapons. Naval forces are more important on the ocean waterways, the submarine being the most universal long-range weapon, but even here the task of preventing use can be shared by land-based strike aircraft and supported by satellite and shore-based surveillance systems.

However, *securing* the use of the sea against opposition remains a predominantly naval task, at least the military means are primarily naval. There are, of course, other ways of securing use, including diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.

We are now in a position to draw a box diagram, plotting the type of waterway against the type of use, and in each box we can show the minimum capability needed to *prevent* the use of the sea in such circumstances. We are not able to show the level of capability needed to *secure* the use of the sea, since this will also depend on the type and scale of opposition, which will vary between cases. However, we can show the *type* of costs which will be incurred in using military force to secure the use of the sea against opposition.

These costs can be economic, in the sense of increased demands on the domestic economy for defense expenditure; or they can be political in the sense of adversely affecting relations with other states. The type of cost is determined by the strategic quality of the waterway. In the case of narrow waters, it is geopolitical, in the sense that it stems from a combination of geographical configuration and the political control of the adjacent coasts. A military response to an attempt to prevent passage through narrow waters therefore cannot avoid political costs and these will tend to be heavy, because it will usually require attacks on national territory.

The strategic quality of ocean waterways is primarily military, and stems from the reach and geographical distribution of maritime forces, and their relative capabilities in the encounter zone. The costs of the military response to an attempt to prevent passage across the ocean are primarily economic and

in the international context, the response can usually be contained politically, unless it becomes essential to attack shore-based support facilities.

Between these two extremes lie those waterways which traverse open seas within range of land-based weapon and surveillance systems, where the strategic quality will be some mix of military and geopolitical, and the costs part economic and part political.

In the same context of securing use, there is a distinction to be made between the "terminal" and "passage" legs of a waterway. Obviously, the terminal of one voyage can be the passage of another, and the distinction will lie in the mind of the user. But it is somewhat akin to the distinction between ends and means and, depending on which applies, it influences the relative ease with which use can be prevented, the range of options open to the user, the costs of securing use, and the levels of political commitment.

The point of immediate interest is that very rarely is the passage leg the only route between two terminals. It is therefore usually possible to divert round obstructions to narrow waterways, and although ocean waterways are more difficult (because the obstructions are mobile) some form of evasive routing is often practicable. This means that there is usually an alternative to insisting on passage, and consideration can be given to the relative costs.

The extra distance involved in accepting diversion can be expressed in time and money, and this also will translate into economic and political costs. But in this case, the political costs will reflect lost opportunities to influence events, or the inability to meet an important commitment. Political costs of this type will only be incurred when timeliness is an issue, as, for example, if it involves the deployment of military force in response to a sudden crisis, or the supply of a distant battlefront by sea at the outbreak of a war.

Our diagram is now complete. The boxes for Trade in the Terminal area have been left blank to show that in most cases the coastal state will be concerned to secure rather than prevent such use of the sea. Where local conflict prevents such use, Trade and

MINIMUM CAPABILITY NEEDED TO PREVENT USE: COST OF SECURING USE

Types of Waterway	Types of Use	The Conveyance of Goods and People		The Projection of Military Force	
		Trade	Military Supply	Stand Off Strike	Land Ashore
Passage	Ocean	II : e		I : e	
	Narrow	VI : p		IV : p	
	Diversion	e	e/p*	e/p*	
Terminal	Open	-	V	III	IV
	Narrow	-	VI	IV	V

*Political costs are only incurred when timeliness is a critical factor.
Legend: Level of Capability—I (high) to VI (low)
Cost: e - economic, p - political

Military Supply would have the same indexes. The political costs of securing use in Terminal areas are not shown, since they cannot be separated from the larger costs of the military intervention.

The diagram shows the *minimum* level of military capability needed to prevent use in the different situations. The assessment is intuitive, and I have arbitrarily divided military capability into six levels, reflecting both the range to which violence can be projected, and the degree. Level I (the highest) implies the capability for sustained attack on naval forces in midocean, and is possessed only by the United States and, in certain sea areas, by the Soviet Union. Level II implies a lesser capability which could attack a strong naval force, but not sustain an engagement. Britain has this capability in much of the Atlantic, and China is moving towards this in the Asian-Pacific. Moving to the bottom end of the scale, Level VI implies the ability to prevent the passage of merchant ships through narrow shallow waters, perhaps using contact mines laid by junks or dhows and protecting them from being swept with field artillery. Level V would be able to prevent passage through less constricted waters and might include torpedo and gun-armed coastal patrol craft. Levels IV and III lie in between these two pairs. Level IV could cover broader, deep-water straits and would include missile-armed craft and coastal installations, and a measure of shore-based air support. Level III implies a greater offshore capability, either including submarines or else reasonably effective surface forces, backed by shore-based airstrike.

These descriptions are deliberately vague, because military forces tend to be unbalanced and do not lie tidily along a smooth continuum of capability. The levels do however give some idea of the leverage provided by maritime geography, and the extent to which passage can now be controlled by coastal states in general, and straits states in particular.

Operational Developments. Turning to the operational factors affecting maritime intervention, there have been significant developments in four main areas: advances in weapons technology, the dispersion of weapon systems among nonindustrialized states, the Soviet Navy's shift to forward deployment, and international attitudes towards the rights of maritime passage. The last of these is of a different kind to the other three, and will be disposed of first.

(1) **Erosion of Rights of Passage.** Since the first two U.N. Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, there has been a remarkable shift in world opinion concerning the balance between exclusive and inclusive use of the sea. In 1958, the "traditional maritime powers" were still fighting for a 3-mile territorial limit, and the South Americans claim for 200 miles was seen as preposterous. In 1960, the compromise proposal for a 6-mile Territorial Sea, with an additional 6-mile Exclusive Fishing Zone failed by one vote to get the necessary two-thirds majority. And yet by 1974, most nations, including the major maritime powers, had come to accept the much broader concepts of a 12-mile Territorial Sea and a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, and argument focused on the scope of national jurisdiction within that zone. This tendency has been reinforced by claims that archipelagic seas should be considered as internal waters, and that marine pollution could threaten the security of a coastal state. The dominating principle of "freedom of the seas" has now been seriously eroded, and specific claims have undermined both the concept and the right of "innocent passage" through territorial waters.

A new regime of "transit passage" may yet emerge, but the net effect of these developments has been to make it more likely that in the future, coastal states will challenge, or even deny the right of passage to certain categories of ship, through waters coming within their various jurisdictions. It is also likely that such action will be seen as legitimate by many other countries, including perhaps the hundred or so members of the Group of 77. Passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran were denied to Israel in the past, and would serve as a precedent in the future.

(2) **Advances in Weapons Technology.** Such challenges to passage will be all the more threatening because of advances in weapons technology and the dispersion of sophisticated systems among coastal states. The former have enabled quantum jumps in such fundamental weapon characteristics as range, accuracy, payload and systems reliability. These have been matched by an exponential increase in the capabilities of sensor and surveillance systems.

By depriving the seas of their capacity for concealment, the improved surveillance systems have simplified the problems of ocean interception by warships. They can also provide the target location data which allow long-range weapon systems to be brought to bear. Tactical systems with ranges from 300 miles (cruise missiles) to 1,500 miles (aircraft) have been in service since the end of the fifties, but the emerging capability to strike moving targets with ballistic missiles at intercontinental ranges is introducing a new dimension to maritime warfare. As long ago as 1972, the Soviet Union claimed that "naval groupings" were targeted by the Strategic Rocket Forces,[5] and we know that they are developing a homing reentry vehicle for a medium-range ballistic missile.[6] We are now moving into an era where maritime warfare will be fought as much by land- as sea-based weapon and sensor systems, and it is becoming necessary to distinguish between the "reach" of different systems and to think in terms of "global" and (for want of a better term) "local" systems. In the middle ranges, such distinction will be somewhat arbitrary, but it becomes clearer if we allow that "reach" covers response time as well as range. Thus an IRBM would come within global systems, while a medium-range bomber would be at the high end of the local systems. Perhaps more important is the concept that "global" systems are of a kind that can be launched from national territory (or from a strategically located submarine), to strike like a bolt from the blue at maritime targets in distant sea areas, across intervening seas or territory, whereas "local" system implies a more direct relationship between adversaries. Global systems will be extremely sophisticated and expensive, and in the main they are likely to be limited to the superpowers. Several components for such systems are already in service, and it seems clear that the Soviet Union (at least) intends to adopt an integrated "all arms" approach to maritime warfare.

While the global systems introduce a new dimension, improvements in local systems have been equally dramatic. The main instrument has been the terminally guided cruise missile, which allows a patrol craft to pack the punch of a battleship, and can be fitted to aircraft, surface ship, submarine or coastal defense installation. As important as the accuracy and payload of this weapon, is its range. This not only extends a coastal state's reach to seaward, but the greater the range, the smaller the number of weapon platforms needed to cover a given sea area or stretch of coast.

The homing cruise missile can be a deadly weapon against an undefended or unalerted target. But once the threat was properly assessed, it was

appreciated that in many ways the cruise missile simplified the defense problem. Early missiles were transsonic, and provided a reasonably homogeneous target which, within the existing state of the art, could be shot down or seduced. In many ways this compared favorably with the previous situation, where the weapon was a torpedo, shell or bomb, whose flight could not be arrested. Effective defense was therefore predicated on the destruction of the weapon platforms (submarine, surface ship or aircraft) prior to weapon launch, which was a very demanding requirement. The weakness of these systems had been their inaccuracy, but in the case of bombs and shells, this can now be overcome by the use of precision-guided munitions (PGM), which home on the designated target. Of course, the terminally guided cruise missile remains a serious threat, and later generations are supersonic, harder to detect and more difficult to decoy or shoot down.

So far, only strike systems have been referred to, but there have also been considerable advances in counterstrike or "protect" systems. These include electronic countermeasures (ECM), image masking and so forth, as well as weapons designed primarily for shipboard self-defense. We have here the classic contest between attack and defense, and up to now it has been fairly evenly matched. But the advent of the tactical ballistic missile and the prospect that it may be mounted in surface ship, submarine and ashore for use against maritime targets, raises the requirements for shipboard self-protection to new levels which will be hard to achieve. These ballistic strike systems will be expensive and therefore reserved for high-value targets, but it does prompt the question of whether traditional surface warships will be able, in the future, to survive in a hostile maritime environment.

(3) Dispersion of Weapon Systems Among Coastal States. These high technology developments relate mainly to confrontations between the two superpowers in the context of general war. But since 1955, the industrialized powers have provided a steady supply of sophisticated weapons to emerging nations. Whatever the motives behind this supply, the effect has been to increase the ability of these nations to defend themselves against external intervention and, in several cases, to prevent the use of their coastal seas. As an indicator of the latter capability, by 1976 about 23 nonindustrialized states had been supplied with missile-armed surface units (or missile systems for retrofitting), 10 by the Soviet Union and 13 by the West; 14 such states had been supplied with submarines, 4 by the Soviet Union and 10 by the West, 6 of the latter being in South America.[7] These are by no means the only type of weapon which can be used to prevent the use of the sea, and besides other naval forces like torpedo boats and gun-armed surface units, there is the whole range of shore-based systems such as aircraft, missiles and coastal batteries, and fixed obstructions such as mines. And all these weapons are being progressively upgraded. In the case of supplies from the West, this is largely for commercial reasons. In the case of Russia, this is a byproduct of her economic system, which allocates a fixed share of resources to weapons procurement, resulting in the periodic replacement of all equipment by improved versions. In this context, the Soviet SS-N-3 300-mile surface-to-surface antishipping cruise missile will be superseded by the end of the seventies, and may become available for selective supply to client states for coast defense purposes.

The supply of weapons is one thing, their effective use is another, and this is why maritime geography plays such an important role in determining a coastal state's ability to prevent the use of its waters. It requires an experienced

submarine commander to bring a diesel boat within torpedo range of a target in open waters. And while range is not so great a problem to missile-armed patrol craft, they are very exposed to counter-attack when away from the cover of land, and the state of the sea affects their operational performance. Mines are a cheap and simple way of preventing use, but they can only be laid in relatively shallow depths, and are only effective if they cannot be circumvented or swept, factors which depend largely on the breadth of the waters.

There is also the complex matter of what is needed for a nation to maintain and operate the weapons it possesses. We have the example of the buildup and decline of Indonesia's Navy, and the limited effectiveness of the Egyptian force, even though both nations have a seafaring tradition. The rapid deterioration of the Indonesian Navy was mainly a failure of maintenance, the lack of spare parts being a subsequent cause, and this underlines the problems of keeping complex equipment operational, particularly in hot and humid climates. When this is coupled with such evidence as the apparent superiority of Israeli pilots over their Egyptian opponents, one begins to ask whether a country requires some minimal technological base in order to make effective use of the latest weapons. On the other hand, North Vietnamese air defense units inflicted heavy casualties on the latest American aircraft, which suggests that perhaps it is as much a matter of priorities and commitment, as of innate capability. Meanwhile, the trend in weapon design appears to be towards increasing internal sophistication, matched by a greater simplicity in operation and maintenance, and this may come to compensate for the technological constraints.

(4) **The Soviet Navy's Shift to Forward Deployment.** The fourth major development has been the Soviet Navy's shift to forward deployment. Although this has received the most publicity, in practical terms it seems to have had little real effect on either the capability or the willingness of the West to use their navies in support of military intervention overseas. If anything, the last 10 years has seen an increase in such activity. The presence of Soviet naval units in distant sea areas must obviously introduce a complicating factor to U.S. plans and impose costs in terms of higher states of readiness and increased surveillance requirements. But it has certainly not prevented America from active naval intervention, as we saw in the Jordanian crisis in 1970, the Indian Ocean deployments in 1971 and 1973, both Arab-Israeli conflicts and throughout the war in Vietnam. Commentators who insist to the contrary tend to disregard the rise of nationalism, the Western withdrawal from empire, and the diminishing utility of coercive intervention, and they ascribe the results of these historical trends to the presence of a few Soviet warships. Given the opportunities, Soviet gains have been remarkably few.

It is now generally accepted that the primary determinant of the Soviet decision that their navy should shift to forward deployment, was the sharp acceleration in strategic weapons procurement, ordered by President Kennedy on taking office, and the marked increase in the emphasis on sea-based systems. This generated a Soviet requirement to deploy a counter against this threat to Russia from the "maritime axes," and resulted in the radical restructuring of the Soviet Navy.

The carrier threat, which had been the Soviet Navy's primary concern since 1955, yielded precedence to the threat from Polaris, and since 1961, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) has received top priority in research and development and in warship design. Between 1957-1967, naval new construction entering service was heavily oriented

towards the antisurface role, with SSM as the primary weapon. Since 1967, the emphasis has swung sharply to ASW, with additional priority being given to self-protection weapon systems on the larger surface ships. Except for one class of four ships (the rump of a cancelled program), all new construction major surface units which have entered service since 1962 are now designated by the Russians as large antisubmarine ships, the *Moskva* and *Kiev* classes being called antisubmarine cruisers. Two older classes of SSM-armed surface ships have undergone major conversion and have been redesignated as large antisubmarine ships. U.S. officials now refer to both *Moskva* and *Kiev* as "ASW carriers," and they have also acknowledged that the missile launcher tubes in *Kara* (called a cruiser in the West) carry antisubmarine weapons and not SSM, as had previously been thought. I assess that this also applies to the other three classes of new construction large antisubmarine ships, which have entered service since 1966.[8]

Despite the shift to forward deployment, the Soviets are still building a navy for a narrowly defined, defensive mission, tailored for general war. If anything, this tendency is likely to increase as they continue striving to develop an effective counter to Polaris, Poseidon and then Trident. The construction of distant-water surface warships proceeds at a modest pace—about two cruiser-size and two destroyer-size large antisubmarine ships a year, and an ASW carrier every two—and one has the impression of an interim expedient, while the final answer to the problem is being developed. Submarines are a different matter and nuclear construction proceeds remorselessly at 10 units a year, while a new diesel program is also underway. The Soviet submarine force now comprises the primary antisurface capability and SSM-armed submarines operate in company with Soviet surface forces. This makes a powerful team, but its capabilities lie at the high end of the spectrum of force and it lacks any projection capability.

Although the presence of Soviet naval forces in distant sea areas increases the possibility of their use to hamper Western military intervention, the past 10 years provide evidence of Soviet caution on this score. Of greater significance is the future role of the new global weapon systems, and their potential as a deterrent to such operations.

The overall effect of these developments in the law of the sea, advances in weapon technology and proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems, has been to make the sea a much more complex and potentially hostile operating environment. Attempts to prevent use have become more likely, and the capability to do so is much more widespread. The near monopoly of naval power enjoyed by the West during the first two postwar decades has been steadily eroded. The reach of coastal states is being progressively extended and regional navies are beginning to emerge in such areas as the Arabian and China Seas, and the western South Atlantic. These developments do not imply that the U.S. Navy will lack the capability to project military power in distant parts of the world, or to secure the use of the sea for such purposes. Its ships were designed for war with Russia and should be able to operate in the face of Soviet hand-me-downs and suboptimal Western systems. But it does mean that the deployment of naval forces will need to be less of an instinctive reaction and will have to take more factors into account, including the possibility of losses. It also means that self-protection systems will need to be given higher priority in each ship's weapons outfit.

The Costs of Military Intervention by Sea. Military intervention can be coercive or supportive.[9] The distinction is not entirely clear-cut, since in the case of supportive intervention, the other

party can claim he is being coerced (e.g., North Vietnam), and in a coercive intervention, a third party may be supported indirectly (e.g., Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh war). The distinction is, however, useful, because of the different levels of capability required for the different types of intervention, both on land and at sea.

The proximate aim of maritime intervention is either to secure the use of the sea, or to prevent its use. *Preventing* use is a relatively simple concept and we have as examples the U.S. blockade of Cuba in 1962, the mining of Hanoi in 1972, and Britain's Beira patrol aimed at Rhodesia. These were all coercive. A supportive intervention of this type is the Guinea Patrol, established by the Soviet Navy in November 1970, to discourage further seaborne attacks on Conakry. Except for the Cuban blockade, all these interventions were by nonadjacent powers.

(1) The Terminal Area. The concept of *securing* the use of the sea is more complex, raising the question of "use for what?" and sending us back to the categories in our box diagram. Focusing first on the projection of force ashore in the terminal area, we need to distinguish between coercive and supportive intervention, and to know whether or not ground forces are involved. In the case of *coercive* intervention, the maritime environment will be hostile and where troops have to be landed and kept supplied by sea, it will be necessary for the Navy to secure command of the offshore zone and to be responsible for air superiority, until airfields are established ashore. In constricted waters, the need to cauterize possible threats and forestall a surprise attack, will inevitably incur additonal political costs, particularly if other states are close set, as for example in the Persian Gulf. However, if coercive intervention is limited to "punishment" by strikes from ships lying offshore, effective force defense systems may be all that is necessary, unless faced by a strong opponent and unfavorable geography.

Supportive intervention is a very different matter, involving much lower risks and costs, even when ground forces are engaged. The presence of a friendly coastline and the availability of shore facilities for coastal surveillance systems and air support are important assets. When ground forces are not involved, the Navy's role is to bring prepackaged firepower to bear on the area of conflict. At the present time, this mainly involves airborne systems, and these can be used in various ways ranging from air defense to reconnaissance and close ground support, with the carrier serving as an offshore airfield. But the advent of precision-guided weapons and rocket-aided shells may mean that gunfire support from surface ships will gain a new lease of life.

Involvement by third or more parties in the terminal area is becoming increasingly likely. When support is being given to one side of a local conflict, the temptation for the other side to attack the intervenor is very strong. Whether this temptation is kept in check will depend on the other side's capability for effective action, its fear of the consequences, and any external political constraints which may exist. Western "sanctuary" theory has never been very persuasive and the spread of potent weapons, the existence of leaders like Qdaffi and Amin, and, where submarines and missiles are concerned, the difficulties of pinning down responsibility, all combine to make it unwise for major powers to assume that smaller nations whose interests are threatened, will not dare to retaliate. Outside powers who are not parties to the local dispute may also become involved. For example, the emerging regional powers may react against external intrusion into an area where they themselves are competing for influence. But the more interesting case is involvement by other

superpowers, and the prospects for this type of confrontation and its consequences are discussed in the following section.

So much for the terminal area. But to intervene, one must first get there in time to achieve one's purpose, and then if necessary sustain the operation by sea. This brings us to the question of securing passage.

(2) **Securing Passage.** Narrow waters or straits offer the best opportunities for obstructing passage, and ignoring the question of plausibility for the moment, we can consider what ought to be done to secure use, should that happen. Ideally, the answer should stem from a comparison of the political costs and benefits of the possible courses of action. We start with the political *gains* that are supposed to accrue from the main military intervention in the terminal area. Against this we set the political *costs* of insisting on passage through the narrow waterway against the wishes of the littoral state(s), which may involve a subsidiary military intervention. And if there is an alternative way of getting to the terminal area, we assess the political and economic *costs* of accepting such a diversion.

The political costs of forcing passage must depend on the particular circumstances, but to some extent it will reflect the bloodiness of the battle. This will stem from military factors such as relative capabilities, distance from land, length of time within range of attack, capacity for point defense, depth of water, the likelihood of third-party intervention and the type of land-based weapons available to the littoral state. There is also the type of use. It is one thing to burst through deepwater straits with a carrier group; it is another to laboriously sweep a passage through mined waters within artillery range of land; and to secure a continuous flow of shipping through hostile narrow waters is very hard to achieve, and probably requires that key points on the coast be occupied. One can postulate a general relationship between the costs of forcing a passage in peacetime, and the depth and width of the waterway and the time in transit. To force a long passage through narrow, shallow waters is likely to have high political costs, which stem mainly from the need to take action against the national territory of the littoral states.

(3) **Accepting Diversion.** Setting aside questions of "prestige" and "precedent," the costs of accepting diversion will depend on the extra distances involved. This can be expressed in time and money, and will translate into economic and political costs. In most cases, the costs will be predominantly economic (although these may have domestic implications), but external political costs will be incurred in a time-urgent situation. Russia would be faced with such a situation in the event of war with China, since she would almost certainly have to supply her Far Eastern front by sea. The length of the delay before the regular flow of supplies began to arrive in the Far East would be directly related to the length of passage, and Russia has a vital interest in ensuring that the shortest route (Suez Canal and Malacca Strait) is not obstructed. The next shortest route (via Panama) is half as long again. In the case of the United States, it is more likely to involve the reactive deployment of a carrier force from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean, in circumstances where the fate of a client regime depends on support arriving within a limited period of time. But in this example, the political costs can be translated into economic costs in the longer run. If it were essential to be able to intervene in both the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, extra carriers could be procured and deployed on both sides of the archipelagic barrier.

In all other circumstances, time and

distance can usually be translated into dollars and cents straightaway. In preplanned military interventions, the extra distance can be covered by looking ahead and sailing earlier. Cyclical deployments like Polaris patrols can be handled by increasing the number of units, reducing time in rest and maintenance, or changing crews in the forward area. Continuous flow operations like logistic support and military supply can be met by placing additional bottoms in the shipping pipeline.

We cannot rule on the comparative cost-benefit balance without knowing the particular circumstances. But it would seem that when timeliness is not a problem and when an alternative route exists, even if it is twice as long, the costs of accepting a diversion while negotiating the use of a waterway, are likely to be considerably less than those incurred in forcing passage. Even when time is critical the costs must be weighed carefully against the benefits to be achieved at the far end.

For the same general reasons, the denial of passage to commercial shipping will rarely justify the costs of military intervention. Not only can the merchant ships usually be diverted, but it is also possible to send the goods by other means such as pipeline, rail or road. Where shipping continues to be used, it is the *relative* increase in distance which is important and its effect on shipping costs as a share of the final price of the product. It is hard to generalize about this, because although there is a direct relationship between the length of passage and the cost of providing shipping services, the extent to which the price of shipping actually reflects these costs varies between trades. However, shipping represents a comparatively small proportion of the total cost of imports, and as a general rule, the effect of making a major diversion is likely to be no greater than the effect of normal fluctuations in commodity prices and charter rates. For example, if we postulate that all the straits through the Indonesian Archipelago are closed, and all shipping from the Indian Ocean has to pass south about Australia, and then make the worst case assumptions about freight rates, this would only raise the cost of living in Japan by under 1 percent.[10] And yet 40 percent of Japan's imports normally pass through these straits, including 80 percent of her oil. There would, of course, be some dislocation of supplies while the first ships steamed the longer routes, but there are numerous examples of how rapidly international trade adapts to new circumstances, and dislocations are likely to be temporary.

(4) Obstructions to Passage. How likely is it that littoral states would seek to prevent the use of narrow waterways? In most cases, they have a vested interest in the continuous flow of trade and shipping through these waters, and their economies would be damaged by a prolonged diversion. The closest precedent is the blocking of the Suez Canal by Egypt in 1956, but this was in response to an Anglo-French assault. Littoral states may wish to use their monopoly power to extract rent from a geographical asset, and might threaten various restrictions if their demands were not met. But so far their position in this regard has been moderate, reflecting reasonable concerns for the dangers inherent in the passage of very large crude carriers and comparable ships through narrow waters, and the devastation it could cause to their shores. In this they can expect a fair amount of international support. But there would be little for a general toll on all types of cargo, because most countries now have a vested interest in lower shipping costs. An unprovoked attempt to hold the international community to ransom by preventing use of such waterways would be bound to leave the littoral states worse off

than when they started, and undoubtedly they appreciate this.

Provocation is another matter. National sovereignty is such a sensitive attribute among newly emergent nations that its infringement would be accepted as due cause by many of the less developed countries, even if their consequential actions damaged their immediate interests. For this reason, the passage of warships, amphibious forces and military supplies falls into a different category to normal trade, particularly when the forces are intended for use against some friend of the littoral state, or in support of some enemy. We have seen the use of the oil weapon to bring pressure on Western nations during the Arab-Israeli war, which had tactical as well as strategic consequences. Denial of passage through strategic waterways could be used in the same way. Whether it would is another matter. Turning off the oil did no damage to the supplying countries; rather the reverse. But a littoral state which sought to prevent the passage of U.S. forces would have to assume that its territory would be attacked. While it is true that not all states speak the language of interest, and that when international passions are roused, reactions tend to be unpredictable, that would still be a heavy price to pay in support of a distant state and the diffuse aims of a loose ideological bloc.

The degree of political commitment is central to the use of force, which is why attempts to prevent the passage of military supplies are more likely in the terminal area. The absence of such attempts in the past probably reflects a lack of capability rather than the will to make the attempt. And in the case of Vietnam, it seems likely that the Soviet Union did not wish to jeopardize her maritime supply line to Haiphong, lest Hanoi be forced to rely on overland support from China. However, the U.S. mining of Haiphong has now "legitimized" a whole new range of actions in the terminal area, and in future conflicts the client state may be provided with the means to interfere with the shipment of military supplies.

This leads to the question of whether military intervention is likely against the ocean waterways. To start with the more general case of international trade, it is sometimes argued that because the West is so dependent on the shipment of oil from the Middle East, therefore the Soviet Union will be tempted to attack the line of supply; this is a modern variant of the more venerable bogey that because Europe depends heavily on imports, therefore it would be in Russia's interests to initiate submarine commerce war in the North Atlantic. This is a classic example of the fallacy that what hurts oneself must help one's enemy, and can be shown to be implausible for a whole range of reasons. Outside the circumstances of world war, it is near impossible to identify circumstances in which it would be in the Soviet Union's interests to initiate commerce war, least of all in the Arabian Sea. The reasons range from comparative military capability to political and economic costs, and alternative instruments of policy, and include Russia's own interest in maritime stability and freedom of the seas, which still remain largely within the gift of the West.[11] In general, the diffuse nature of international seaborne trade is its own best protection, since most nations have an interest in the principle of safe passage for merchant ships in peacetime. Meanwhile, as the number of national merchant fleets grows, so too does the extent to which all ships are in hostage to each other.

The shipment of military supplies is a different matter. So far, the convention has been observed that attacks on the lines of supply have been limited to the territory and coastal waters of the primary belligerents or client states. With the growing number of states possessing submarines, it is not certain that this convention will hold. The United States

went close to breaching it during the Cuban missile crisis, but this could be justified by the nature of the Soviet initiative, and on the grounds that Cuba was within the American national security zone. But the latter justification can be claimed by China in its adjacent sea areas, and it now has a force of more than 70 submarines. While the midocean interdiction of military supply lines remains unlikely, the probability is therefore increasing that they will be liable to attack or other forms of interference as they near the terminal areas.

Maritime Intervention and the Superpowers.

(1) **The United States.** Russia and America have somewhat different approaches to overseas intervention, both in their historical experience and in their current assessments. I will not dwell on the American case except to note that she was both the offspring and the inheritor of Western attitudes, experience and tradition in this area, to which she then added her own. Since the end of the 19th century, the U.S. Navy has been an important instrument of policy, an instrument whose potential was vastly increased by its development during World War II. America ended the war as the world's paramount power, with a Navy second to none and soon found herself at the head of a Western maritime coalition which had a virtual monopoly of seapower, and this was used to some effect in the following decades. The U.S. Navy includes an organic Air Force which for a long time was the third largest in the world (after the USAF and the Soviet force), and a Marine Corps which is larger and better armed than most national armies. The "peacetime" employment of naval forces has been a dominant consideration and has generated its own substantial force requirements. During the past 30 years there has probably been a greater use of navies in this way than at any comparable period.

(2) **The Soviet Union.** Russian naval history goes back to before America gained her independence. But traditionally, the navy has been seen as an expensive necessity, rather than as an instrument of worldwide policy. From the first half of the 19th century, Russia's naval policy was increasingly dominated by the requirement to defend four widely separated fleet areas against maritime powers who could concentrate their forces at will. This same attitude persists in the present-day Soviet Union, where the defense establishment is dominated by ground force officers and where there appear to be considerable doubts about the value of military intervention overseas. This is reflected in the shape of the Soviet Navy, which lacks a distant-water intervention capability and is structured for the war-related task of posing a permanent counter to the West's seaborne strategic delivery systems. The primary maritime instrument of foreign policy is the merchant fleet, which carries trade, aid and arms supplies to client states and other countries, and whose well-disciplined crews project the Soviet presence ashore.[12]

(3) **The Overseas Role of a Soviet Military Presence.** It would, however, seem that between 1969 and 1973, there was a sustained debate within the Soviet Union concerning the use of armed forces in support of international goals.[13] The causes and the results of this debate are still obscure, but it appears that in 1969, under pressure of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Egypt, the political leadership agreed to commit Soviet armed forces overseas, thus taking the first step down the road of a traditional Western-style policy towards the projection of military power. This major policy decision was followed by the deployment of Soviet

air defense systems to Egypt in the spring of 1970. It would appear, however, that as events unfolded and as the costs and implications of such involvement became clearer, the arguments of those who opposed the original shift in policy were strengthened, until they were able to reverse the deployment decision. However, the final policy on the role of a "Soviet military presence" had yet to be agreed, and it seems that the debate continued for a further 12-15 months until a compromise was reached. By May 1973, it appears to have been decided that direct Soviet involvement overseas would be limited to the provision of advisers, weapons and strategic logistic support, the combat role being delegated to the Soviet-equipped forces of "revolutionary" states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba.

The outcome appears to be a policy which ensures the Soviet Union the best of both worlds; namely, being able to affect the outcome of an overseas conflict with direct battlefield support, while ensuring that political commitment and liability remain strictly limited. This is achieved by (a) facilitating the arrangements and providing the lift to bring cobelligerent forces to the zone of conflict; (b) ensuring that the client state or regime receives adequate military supplies in the course of the battle; and (c) remaining silent about Soviet involvement until success is assured. Of course, a corollary of such a policy is that it only allows the supportive use of Soviet military force; the coercive use must be achieved through proxies.

In terms of force projection, the major instruments of this policy appear to be the merchant fleet and the military and civil air transport fleets. The Soviet Navy has made some contribution, as for example the sealift of Moroccan troops by landing ship to Syria in April and July 1973, the use of landing ships to ferry military supplies from the Black Sea to Syria during the October 1973 war, and the use of the landing ships based on Berbera to move supporters of the Dhofari rebellion to Oman. This naval contribution is marginal by comparison with men and supplies shipped by other means, and the emphasis on the peacetime employment of Soviet naval forces is in other directions.

(4) **The Navy's Peacetime Role.** The 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which gave the Soviet Navy its much-needed access to Egyptian shore facilities, also marked the start of the second and more distant phase of the shift to forward deployment, as Soviet naval forces moved out into the Caribbean, off the west coast of Africa and into the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Thereafter, political exploitation of the presence of Soviet warships in distant sea areas steadily increased. In 1970 there was a marked change in the trend, with naval detachments being deployed specifically for peacetime (as opposed to war-related) tasks, but this activity leveled off in 1972-73. Soviet pronouncements refer to the navy's peacetime role in general terms as "defending (or securing) state interests," a nebulous formulation, whose scope has yet to be systematically researched. While not losing sight of the all-encompassing scope of this phrase, it is useful to discuss Soviet naval activity in terms of four major categories: establishing a strategic infrastructure; countering imperialist aggression; increasing prestige and influence; and protecting Soviet lives and property.

The first and most important category covers the task of establishing the physical, political and operational infrastructure required to support two quite distinct war-related tasks, namely: posing a permanent counter in peacetime to Western sea-based strategic delivery systems; and securing the safe and timely arrival of military supplies to

the Far Eastern front, in the event of war with China.[14]

The geographical extent of the first requirement can be seen by drawing 1,500 n.m. and 2,500 n.m. circles centered on Moscow, which show the arcs of threat from the Polaris A-2 and A-3 missiles. The smaller circle takes in the South Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean and explains the heavy pressure brought on Egypt from 1961 onwards, to provide base facilities to support the Soviet Navy's forward deployment.[15] The larger circle takes in the eastern half of the Atlantic and much of the Arabian Sea, running from the tip of Greenland to cut the west coast of Africa abreast the Cape Verde Islands, and crossing the Indian Ocean between the Horn of Africa and Bombay. This explains the Soviet Union's persistent interest in the politically insignificant West African states, and her initial move into Somalia in 1969, despite the latter's talent for acquiring political enemies both in Africa and on the Arabian peninsula.[16] Meanwhile, Cuba gives access to the departure ports on the east coast of the United States, and (with West Africa) covers the sea lines of communication with the Mediterranean.

The second strategic requirement, to secure the sea lines of communication with the Far East front, explains the increased involvement in Somalia which followed after Marshal Grechko's visit in February 1972. Concern about the Chinese threat in the Far East began to crystallize after the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969; this saw the emergence of what the Soviets perceived as a military-bureaucratic elite which was basically antagonistic to Russia. Following the series of incidents on the Ussuri River, the Soviet Union increased the buildup of its forces in the border region of China, and presumably this would have prompted a review of the arrangements for logistic support in the event of war. Reliance could not be placed on the Trans-Siberian Railway and supplies would have to be shipped by sea. The reasons for shifting the Soviet focus from Egypt to Somalia are likely to be similar to those which prompted the British to start constructing a major base in Kenya in the late 1940's, as an alternative to the existing one in the Canal Zone. The decision to build up the Somalian facilities was taken at least 6 months before the withdrawal from Egypt, and it seems likely that Sadat's request suited the Soviet's purposes.[17]

Turning to the second category of "countering imperialist aggression," we should note that in the Soviet lexicon "imperialist aggression" includes the deployment of U.S. sea-based systems within range of Russia. Because of the very different type of political commitment involved, it is important to distinguish between the war-related task of posing a permanent counter to such systems, and the peacetime task of opposing/challenging Western military intervention against "progressive states" and "national liberation movements." In areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, where additional naval forces were deployed during the 1967, 1970 and 1973 crises, this peacetime task is upstaged by the more important war-related task of countering the U.S. carriers nuclear strike potential and, until the dangers of escalation were past, Soviet naval units unmistakably had this as their only priority during the first two crises. During the 1973 crisis, in addition to the carriers, they targeted the Sixth Fleet's amphibious forces,[18] and this may have been intended to deter the United States from committing ground forces to the battle ashore. There is, however, an equally plausible war-related explanation. The Soviets plan to seize the Black Sea exits at the outbreak of a major conflict, and their Mediterranean squadron has the additional task of preventing the Sixth Fleet from reinforcing the defense of

the Turkish straits.[19] The primary mission during the 1973 crisis therefore remains uncertain.

The first clear example of the peacetime task of "countering imperialist aggression" was the establishment of the "Guinea Patrol" in December 1970, apparently to deter further Portuguese-supported seaborne attacks on Conakry. The next example was the dispatch of Soviet naval detachments to the Indian Ocean in December 1971, in reaction to the deployment of British and U.S. carrier task forces prior to and during the Indo-Pakistan war. The most recent example was during the Angolan affair, when a *Kresta* class large antisubmarine ship was deployed south of Guinea and on past practice, one would assume that it had SSM-armed submarines in company. This placed the detachment in a blocking position between Angola and U.S. naval forces in the North Atlantic.

The other two categories are of lesser interest to this discussion. The task of "increasing Soviet prestige and influence" assumed a new dimension in 1972, when the Soviet Navy undertook port clearing operations in Bangladesh, and it was also used to sweep the southern approaches to Suez in 1974. The navy's role in "protecting Soviet lives and property overseas" is best exemplified by the landing ships which take up station off Syria and Egypt when war breaks out with Israel, and off Angola in the 1976 conflict, and it appears that their task is to evacuate Soviet personnel if defeat is imminent. The only other example is the deployment of three warships to Ghanaian waters in 1969, which may have helped effect the release of two Soviet trawlers that had been held for over 4 months on conspiracy charges.

Any particular operation may further the objectives of more than one of these four peacetime tasks. The continuation of the Guinea Patrol after the Portuguese threat evaporated in 1974, suggests that its primary justification may in fact have been to "establish the geostrategic infrastructure" by securing access to base facilities on the west coast of Africa. The same general objective may also have prompted the Ghanaian episode in 1969 and the politically timed visit to Sierra Leone in 1971.[20]

(5) Political Commitment to Peacetime Tasks. It can be seen that the Soviet Navy's war-related task and its three main peacetime tasks are all intended to promote the two primary objectives of Soviet foreign policy. In order of priority, these are (1) to ensure the security of the Soviet Union, and (2) to increase the Soviet Union's share of world power and influence. It is useful to distinguish the peacetime employments of Soviet naval forces in this manner, because it clarifies the level of political commitment behind different types of interest and operation.

It is quite evident from their pronouncements, from the output of their defense production programs, and from the pattern of naval operations, that the Soviet Union gives high priority to the task of countering Western sea-based strategic delivery systems. To support this task they have been willing in the past to accept new political costs and commitments. Many of the paradoxes in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship since 1961 can be explained by allowing that the Soviet Union had a near vital interest in gaining access to shore facilities whereby to support her counterforce naval deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is possible that there may now be somewhat less willingness to accept large political costs on this score: partly because of SALT-generated changes in Soviet perceptions of the threat of nuclear war; partly because war with China is now the more likely contingency; and perhaps partly because the new global all-arms weapon systems will soon be entering service and will relieve the dependence on shore support

in the forward operating areas. But the task still stands, and since it contributes to the security of the Soviet Union, the level of political commitment to securing the necessary geostrategic infrastructure will be of a different order to other types of overseas involvement.

"Countering imperialist aggression" is a different matter, and the level of political commitment to this task has never been very clear. Certainly it is not worth risking war with America, which would violate the first priority objective of ensuring the security of the Soviet Union. But Soviet perceptions of the dangers of escalation may have been modified by the SALT negotiations, increasing their readiness to risk confrontation at sea, in pursuit of overseas goals. And this brings us back to the possibility and risks of involvement by the second superpower, in a military intervention initiated by the first. The later stages of the Angolan affair provide an example of one kind of situation. This was an overt, supportive intervention, initiated by the Soviet Union using proxy forces and shipping a large volume of military supplies by sea. The U.S. Navy certainly had the capability to impose a stop-and-search blockade on Angola in order to prevent this flow of supplies, but in fact took no action. Presumably to discourage any such interference, the Soviets deployed a *Kresta* and one or more cruise-missile-armed submarines in a blocking position. Certain points can be made. First, the nature of Soviet interests in Angola were not such as to justify the sinking of a U.S. warship on the high seas, particularly not a carrier, and a blockading force could have sailed through the Soviet patrol line with impunity. Second, the long-term political costs to the United States of imposing such a blockade would have been very high. It would have demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that Gorshkov was right when he argued that a powerful general-purpose fleet was the essential foundation of an independent overseas policy; it would have encouraged a shift in the allocation of resources in favor of increased naval building programs, and the construction of a large, balanced surface fleet, including aircraft carriers. Such costs could hardly be justified by the U.S. interests at stake. And third, in order to shape the Soviet Union's future expectations, what the United States could have done was to have dispatched a force of ships to sail through the Soviet patrol line, reverse course and return home, thereby showing that the U.S. Navy was not intimidated. As it happens, the Atlantic Fleet was engaged in other operations and was instructed to ignore the Soviet deployment; this was the next best thing, but still a long way short of optimal.

(6) **Soviet-U.S. Confrontation at Sea.** But besides political commitment, there is also the question of effective military capability. The deployment of a U.S. carrier task force to the Indian Ocean in December 1971 during the Indo-Pakistan war may have been counterproductive in political terms, but at least the force had a demonstrable military capability, which could be used if so wished. Not so in the Soviet case, despite the missile armament of their surface ships and submarines. Under what circumstances would these units have been ordered to attack the carrier? As soon as it readied its aircraft for takeoff to an unknown destination with an unknown weapon load? Or perhaps only *after* the aircraft had struck some target ashore? Perhaps the Soviet Union could claim they got some political mileage out of this operation, although they certainly risked being exposed as paper tigers. But their next deployment, in response to the mining of Haiphong was both militarily and politically pointless; a fairly substantial force of surface ships and submarines sailed to the South China Sea, hung around for a few days, and then returned home. There was

nothing effective that they could do.

I am not persuaded by the suggestion that there now exists a set of tacit "rules" for the peacetime employment of naval force, which apply equally to the Soviet Union and the United States.[21] The two powers have different levels of naval capability and very different interests and types of commitment. Special account must be taken of Soviet interests in those areas of geostrategic importance to the security of the Russian homeland. But in most other circumstances, I consider that Soviet action at sea is largely conditioned by their estimate of U.S. reactions, and as a general rule, the low level of Soviet commitment to "countering imperialist aggression" does not justify risking confrontation.

The Soviet impulse to "counter imperialist aggression" is a longstanding one, as can be seen by the pattern of Soviet arms supply in the 1950's and 1960's. So too is the Western impulse to react against the emergence of left wing regimes. And for many years, the situation could be described crudely in terms of the West conducting a dogged rearguard action against change, while the Soviet Union was the natural ally of historical trends. But we are now 30 years down the road, there are few colonial territories left, and whatever their political complexion, the newly independent states have national interests and wills of their own. The old ideological reasons for military intervention by the two superpowers have largely evaporated, and it now becomes a question of picking sides in a traditional civil or interstate war. Given the transitory nature of political alignments, this would seem hardly worth the risks and costs involved. In the future, we may find that the main role of superpower intervention is to protect smaller states from the hegemonic tendencies of the emerging regional powers.

There remains, however, the problem of Southern Africa. Although the West is unhappy with the dominant white regimes, kith-and-kin and cultural factors constrain the type of support it is willing to afford the movement towards Black liberation, an ambivalence which provides excellent opportunities for Soviet influence-building. The possibilities for their involvement are manifold, ranging from the supply of arms, to mounting a naval blockade to enforce a United Nations resolution on mandatory sanctions. Given that the area is remote from both Russia and the United States, and allowing that the Soviet Union may have downgraded the risks of escalation to general war, the pressures for an assertive policy will be strong, increasing the possibility of serious East/West confrontation.

Overview. The maritime aspects of military intervention is too diffuse a subject to draw together in a few well chosen words, and to have discussed the problem without having addressed the prior question of the utility of military force, is like describing the mechanics of a religion without referring to its God. Certain points can, however, be made.

The most obvious is that we now have a situation which is infinitely more complicated than that facing Palmerston in the heyday of gunboat diplomacy. For a start, the maritime environment is much more complex. We have the diffusion of sophisticated weapon systems; the increased "reach" of coastal states; a change in international attitudes towards the rights of passage and the ownership of the sea; and the appearance of new "global" weapons for tactical use.

The political environment is also much more complex. We have just passed through 30 years of radical change, which saw the dismantling of the Western colonial empires and an ideological competition for the favor of the newly emerging nations. We are now faced with an international system whose structure is hard to discern, with

a change in the nature of usable power and its distribution, and with a range of threats to human survival which are altering national and international priorities and goals. Attitudes toward the use of coercive force by Great Powers have altered fundamentally, and new states do not "respond" to the threat of violence in the formerly accepted fashion.

Missiles do not know their mums, and the proliferation of modern weapons means that an increasing number of coastal states has some capability to prevent the use of their seas by both superpowers; narrow, shallow waterways are particularly vulnerable. The change in political attitudes means that maritime powers can no longer count on being able to use the seas unhindered for maritime intervention, and the terminal leg of the sea lines of supply are now liable to attack. Meanwhile the political costs of forcing a passage through narrow waterways are likely to be so high that it is usually better to take an alternative route, where one exists, except when major interests are engaged and timeliness an issue. The economic costs of such diversion are generally less than would be expected.

The utility of *coercive* intervention is increasingly in doubt, except for short, sharp, small-scale, rectifying operations, and possibly at the other end of the spectrum of violence, where the scale of operations changes "intervention" into "overseas war." *Supportive* intervention has a better record, but the increasing costs and risks raise the question of whether navies are necessarily the most effective instrument for such purposes. Aircraft carriers have an unmatched capability for bringing flexible firepower to bear in distant areas, but their high political symbolism and their need for sea room, place constraints on their unfettered use. Meanwhile the Russians have shown what can be done with merchant ships and airlift, making use of facilities in the host country.

Many of the attributes which in former times were the monopoly of naval forces, and gave them their special value as instruments of foreign policy, have now been dissipated or are shared by other instruments. The international news media and satellite surveillance mean that knowledge of warship movements is no longer in the flag state's control, to be released (or not) as circumstances dictate. Naval units can no longer deploy the graduated range of violence that used to be at their disposal, and the level of force needed to achieve comparable results is very much higher. Violence (punishment) at the high end of the spectrum can now be inflicted on nonadjacent areas by aircraft and missiles, as well as by ship. In fact the air is often a viable, alternative means of gaining access to distant areas, and the response time is of quite a different order. Modern communications allow heads of state and other ministers to communicate their concerns, interests and intentions to their opponents in carefully chosen language, which compares favorably with the crude signaling of naval deployments. And this explicit language can now be backed by latent force emplaced ashore.

The latter is perhaps one of the more interesting possibilities which lie ahead. The advent of global systems which can deliver tactical weapons, opens up new ways of preventing the use of the sea or of providing direct support in distant parts of the world. In practical terms, there is not much difference between sinking a carrier with a salvo of torpedoes, a 300-mile SSM or a 3,000-mile terminally guided ballistic missile. It is illogical to be concerned about two of these possibilities and to ignore the third; the difficulty of countering the ballistic missile makes it the much more potent threat.

Despite these constraints and complexities, in the foreseeable future there will continue to be situations where the sea will be the most appropriate means

of bringing traditional military force to bear in distant areas of the world. Changing circumstances will encourage progressive developments in the size and characteristics of naval units employed in this capacity, with particular emphasis on reducing the vulnerability and political salience of individual units. While making it less likely that such units will be disabled, this will reduce the political costs if they are, and hence increase the general usefulness of this instrument.

These changes in hardware will probably be easier to achieve than the even more necessary changes in traditional attitudes towards the role of naval force as an instrument of peacetime foreign policy. "Send a Gunboat" can now do as much harm as good and the advantages of timeliness have to be weighed against the political costs inherent in forward deployment. The Soviet presence in distant sea areas such as the Indian Ocean demands a careful evaluation of the costs and benefits of matching such deployments, compared with those of doing nothing and using the Soviet presence as a stick in the psychological competition for world influence. There is an urgent need for more selectivity in the type of naval force deployed and the occasions on which it is deployed. Carriers, which will continue to be operational through the turn of the century at least, are likely to be reserved for use in major planned interventions, involving substantial forces and political commitment. Their more general role will be to contribute to the worldwide naval balance as a capability inbeing.

Military intervention by sea will persist as an instrument of Great Power policy, but there are likely to be considerable changes both in its character and in its relative importance.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Michael MccGwire is Professor of Maritime and Strategic Studies at Dalhousie University, Halifax. He has written extensively on naval matters pertaining to the Soviet Union. He is editor of *Soviet Naval Developments*, and with Ken Booth and John McDonnell, he has edited *Soviet Naval Policy Objectives*.

NOTES

1. The difficulties are immense, as can be seen from A. Rubinstein, *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1975), which represents a concerted attempt to address the problem of political influence building. See particularly Rubinstein's "Assessing Influence as a Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis." See also his "The Soviet-Egyptian Relationship Since the June 1967 War" in MccGwire et al., ed., *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

2. What seems likely to be the most substantial work in this field for some time to come is Ken Booth's *Navies and Foreign Policy* (London: Croom-Helm, forthcoming). Edward Luttwak addresses the question in *The Political Uses of Seapower* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), although the context is rather restricted. For a pioneering, but not entirely successful attempt, see James Cable's *Gunboat Diplomacy* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971).

3. G.S. Graham, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975). This is the title of the final Chapter IV, pp. 96-125. This compact book, subtitled "Studies in British Maritime Ascendancy," contains much wisdom about the role and influence of navies.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

5. A.A. Grechko, "A Socialist, Multinational Army," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 17 December 1972.

6. SS-NX-13—a submarine launched ballistic missile with a range of 750 km. with midcourse guidance and terminal homing. N. Polmar, "Thinking about Soviet Naval ASW," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1976, p. 126. For a full discussion of current Soviet naval weapon developments, see "Soviet Naval Programmes" in MccGwire & McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming 1977).

7. These figures are extracted from the tables in "Non-Superpower Sea Denial Capability," a paper prepared by H.S. Eldredge for the Conference on "Implications of the Military Build-up

in Non-Industrial States," Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 6-9 May 1976. Eldredge concentrated on presenting a global picture of the distribution of submarine torpedoes and surface-to-surface missiles fitted in surface ships.

8. "Soviet Naval Programmes," *ibid.*

9. There could also be a third category, "mediatory," but this is subsumed under "supportive."

10. For a summary description of the factors underlying these assertions see "The Geopolitical Importance of the Strategic Waterways of the Asian-Pacific Region," *Orbis*, Fall 1975, pp. 1058-1077.

11. For a summary statement of this argument see "The Submarine Threat to Western Europe" in J.L. Moulton, *British Maritime Strategy in the 1970s*, (London: Royal United Service Institution, 1968), which was based on a longer unpublished study.

12. For a discussion of the various maritime instruments of foreign policy, see "The Navy and Soviet Oceans Policy" in *Soviet Naval Influence*.

13. See "The Overseas Role of a Soviet Military Presence," *ibid.*

14. See "The Soviet Navy in the Seventies," *ibid.*

15. See G.S. Dragnich "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt prior to the June War of 1967," *Soviet Naval Policy*, pp. 237-277. After gaining access to these facilities, year-round deployment was achieved for the first time, the number of combatants on station rose by a factor of 2-3, and air support became available.

16. For the evidence underlying this geostrategic argument, see Annex A of "The Soviet Navy in the Seventies."

17. See "The Overseas Role of a Soviet Military Presence."

18. R.G. Weinland, unpublished manuscript.

19. This task prompted the basing of Soviet submarines on Valona in Albania from 1958 until they were ejected in August 1961. The present Soviet squadron, when not trailing Western units, spends most of its time at anchorages covering the Mediterranean approaches to the Aegean and Dardanelles.

20. See "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy" in *Soviet Naval Policy*, pp. 525, 528 and notes 55, 63-66.

21. J. McConnell and A. Kelly, "Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistan Crisis," *Soviet Naval Developments: Context and Capability* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 449-451. This article provides an excellent analysis of the 1971 deployments, but in going on to postulate the emergence of certain "rules of the game," I consider that McConnell makes the error of crediting the Soviet Union with interests which are comparable to the United States and makes insufficient allowance for the marked disparity in worldwide capability.

The United States emerged from World War II as a revolutionary power: we held that security, democracy and economic and social progress were everywhere or nowhere. Professor Kolodziej argues that these ideas represented a break with our traditional, historic concepts and that the limits of this revolution have now been reached at home and abroad.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:

REVOLUTIONARY POLICY

IN A CONSERVATIVE GUISE

by

Edward Kolodziej

We find it hard to understand sometimes why the United States and the American people are so misunderstood and maligned abroad. We find it hard to explain our rejection by large segments of the Third World. We find it hard to appreciate differences with our allies. We even find it hard, perhaps, to grasp why our adversaries are so steadfast and resourceful—and often so successful. Certainly much can be explained away by looking at the beam in the eye of others, that is, by looking at what they say and do. But much can also be learned by looking at ourselves as others see us, to see ourselves through our effect on other states and peoples when we exercise our enormous power.

I would like to advance two closely tied arguments: First, that the United States emerged from World War II as a revolutionary, not a conservative or status quo, power as it has so often been portrayed and, second, that the limits of that revolution have now been reached at home and abroad. Until recently, there was wide consensus, growing out of World War II and the experience of the postwar period on the principles that should guide the projection of American power and purpose and the role that the United States should play in building a new world order. That is no longer the case. We need to look at the principal reasons for the present disarray which grows, paradoxically, out of the very consensus on power and purpose we so widely held not so long ago—certainly within the conscious memory and personal experience of Americans today.

I use the word revolutionary in two senses. There is the obvious meaning, familiar to us all, that after World War II the United States abandoned its traditional diplomatic principles and practices. This view often, and mistakenly, identifies American policy with

isolationism and nonintervention and contrasts these characteristics with a policy of internationalism and intervention. These distinctions will be clarified below.

A larger meaning that can be attached to the word revolutionary, and the one which will occupy the second half of this discussion, refers to the impact of American power on other states and peoples, or more generally, to the impact of American power and purpose on the international system and the role of the United States within it.

In this latter sense, revolutionary refers to the efforts of American leaders, supported by a majority of Americans, to use the instruments of power and persuasion at their disposal to shape a world congenial to American security interests, political values, and economic and social well-being. Since World War II the United States has sought to define the global security relations that should prevail between governments and states and between them and their populations. It has sought to define the quality of political relations between foreign peoples and their governments, largely in terms of American conceptions of governmental practice. It has sought finally to define the rate, forms, and direction of economic development and social progress of other peoples, again largely in the coinage of American perspectives and interests that carried the familiar stamp of American experience.

Let me turn initially, and briefly, to the traditional principles and practices underlying American foreign policy before the revolutionary break with them during and after World War II.

Three principles defined American diplomacy. These were the principles of the *divisibility* of security, the *divisibility* of political regimes, and the *divisibility* of economic wealth and social progress between peoples and states.

These principles reflected a shrewd assessment of the interests and objectives of the American political community and the capacity of the nation to advance its interests and objectives within a global political system in which the fledgling nation was more the stake or prize sought by other states and governments than a respected participant in an international system, responsive to its influence or persuasion.

The divisibility of security stated that the security of the United States did not depend on the security of other states and peoples. Also, the United States had no obligation to assume their security interests. This principle was not widely accepted, much less permitted expression, in the 18th century. French aid to the colonies was premised on retaining them as useful tools in France's struggles with the other European powers. I emphasize the word tools since the possibility of fashioning a unified state from a ragtag collection of disparate, geographically separated colonies appeared doubtful even to those committed to the enterprise. The formal enunciation of the divisibility thesis in Washington's Neutrality Proclamation in 1793 signaled the repudiation of the Treaty of 1778 with France, and henceforward all entangling alliances. It also asserted a conception of world politics and a role for the United States within it different from that normally practiced in the balance of power politics of 18th-century Europe. Rejected was the notion that American security was necessarily a function of European power politics. This principle of the divisibility of security assumed that American power was too weak to affect the outcome of Europe's struggles. The new nation also risked too much in involving itself in those conflicts: the loss of blood, treasure, and territory, or, worse, domestic division and dissolution.

The external *and* internal security of the United States required, moreover, the elimination of foreign influence of its western borders. Hence there were

early moves against Britain and Spain to limit their sway and rights on the American continent. The Louisiana Purchase largely rid French influence from the New World. The Monroe Doctrine subsequently made virtue of necessity. Unable to intervene effectively in Europe's affairs, the United States announced it would not do so. In return, it notified the European powers that the New World was no longer open to colonization or intervention. Geographic separation, the balance of power in Europe, and the British Navy made the thesis that American security was divisible from that of European other states, appear plausible.

Insulation from Europe's politics and wars did not mean *isolation* from international relations. The West was our international relations. There is a tendency to believe, suggesting perhaps the lingering force of the notion of Manifest Destiny, that the West was *always* American. The history of the West and its conquest could have been different. Not until the 1840's, after the Mexican and Oregon crises, did we finally eliminate foreign presence, if not influence, from what are presently the geographic boundaries of the United States. If you include Hawaii, then you would have to push the date of the achievement of American territorial integrity to the 1890's. If you include the Pearl Harbor attack as a benchmark, you have a sense that the provisional realization of American territorial security has come within our own lifetimes and experience. A host of Indian tribes, Mexicans, Canadians, and sundry Central and Latin American peoples—Cubans, Nicaraguans, Panamanians, Colombians—were at the center of our international relations. And they still cannot be entirely ignored. Witness negotiations over the Panama Canal and proposals of statehood for Puerto Rico.

Isolation from European security and diplomacy freed our resources and

and for our repeated intervention into the affairs of those alien people who adjoined our borders or who, sad for them, lay astride our continental advance.

There was also wide acceptance by political leaders and by a majority of Americans on a *second* divisibility principle, viz, the divisibility of democratic regimes. Democracy at home did not necessarily depend on its success abroad. We might have rejected this principle. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were premised on an obverse principle. Repeated overtures for support of liberal causes, beginning with American refusal to assist the French Revolutionists against monarchical rule, were ignored throughout the 19th century. Offered, instead, was a beneficent and benign example. Secretary of State William Seward summarized the American position in a letter to France and other European states in which he declined to lend American support for their condemnation of Russian tyranny in Poland. Contrast his reply with those we have recently witnessed in the presidential debates: "In view of the location of this republic, the characters, habits, and sentiments of its constituent parts, and especially its complex yet unique and very popular Constitution, the American people must be content to recommend the case of human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances, intervention, and interference."[1]

Self-determination, national independence, and democratic institutions, however desirable they were for other peoples, did not generate a corresponding political or moral responsibility on the part of Americans to assure these goals for others. Indeed, intervention in the affairs of other states in Europe hampered the ability of Americans to secure these blessings for themselves.

Americans also widely accepted a third principle, viz, the divisibility of economic wealth and social progress of peoples and nations. American leaders applied the divisibility doctrine in economic and social affairs in two ways. Political and military relations were sharply distinguished from the commercial relations of states. These were to be free and open, affording equal access of all states to each other's markets. Unencumbered economic exchange was expected to benefit all parties on the condition that they were kept separate from diplomatic and strategic considerations.

The divisibility of economic relations was also applied in another, more general sense. Not only was American economic exchange to be considered separate from diplomatic and strategic ties with other states or peoples, but American economic development was considered separate from the material growth of other nations. American wealth and social progress did not depend on the simultaneous progress of other nations. Nor were Americans obliged, beyond humanitarian impulse, to assist their development. Enlarged trade, while obviously beneficial to all, was only one panel of a larger triptych of economic and social development in the United States that included Western expansion (based initially on agriculture), expanded commerce, and industrialization. American military and diplomatic isolation, on the one hand, and economic internationalism, on the other, were conditions of economic and social advancement of the American nation.

The genius of the divisibility formulae was their salutary effect on domestic politics. Application of these interwoven military, political and economic principles promised to minimize domestic conflict in an already divided nation. The possibility of foreign intervention and its adverse impact on domestic unity were a real problem at the inception of the Republic. This is suggested by the intrigues of Citizen Genet and Aaron Burr, the struggles between Hamilton and Jefferson to define American foreign policy, British maneuvering in the West, specifically in Texas and Oregon, and the efforts of the Lincoln administration to prevent European recognition of the Confederacy. Washington said it all in his Farewell Address. Marked out clearly is his concern with domestic faction and the tendency of segments of American life, divided by race, class, status, and section, to split over foreign policy and to the temptation of alliance with foreign powers for their particular advantage. These centrifugal tendencies were uppermost in Washington's mind when he observed in a seldom quoted segment of his Farewell Address:

> The inhabitants of our Western country . . . have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties—that with Great Britain and with Spain—which secure to them everything they could desire in respect to our foreign relations toward confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisors, if such there are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens.[2]

Thus the principles of the divisibility in the security, political, and economic affairs of states was applied by successive administrations to assure American security, democratic values and institutions, and economic and social welfare. These principles grew out of necessity and responded to American weakness, not strength.

The divisibility thesis died hard. Forces were at work, especially throughout the second half of the 19th century and first part of the 20th century to

undermine it. First was the rise of the United States as a global power. The conquest of the West, the creation of a liberal empire, and the defeat of the Spanish in 1898 signalled American ascendancy in North America and its rapidly rising arbitrating role in world affairs. As World War I demonstrated, American power could henceforward determine the outcome of Europe's struggles.

Second was the decline in power of the liberal democracies, specifically Britain and France, and the corresponding rise of authoritarian, expansionist states—Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. American physical security appeared threatened and its institutions under stress, at the same time, paradoxically, that its real and potential power appeared to be expanding.

The growth of collectivist movements, like the Bolshevik Revolution, and the worldwide economic dislocation of the Great Depression threatened liberal economies, like that of the United States. The Open Door economic policies of the United States, premised on the free flow of goods, services, capital, and even labor across state lines, could not be automatically counted upon to stay open.

The erosion of these favorable conditions in the 20th century prompted a revision of the traditional doctrines of divisibility. This revision assumed revolutionary proportions after World War II: First in terms of America's traditional approach to foreign policy and, second, in the impact that application of this revolutionary revision of principles and practices of American diplomacy had on the behavior of other peoples and states and on the structure and process of contemporary international relations.

American decisionmakers, reflecting thinking that can be traced at least to Woodrow Wilson, and, perhaps, even earlier to Theodore Roosevelt, stood traditional principles and practices on their heads.

For divisibility in security, the U.S. policy was predicated on the notion of indivisibility, viz, that security was everywhere or nowhere. For the divisibility of democratic institutions, U.S. policy substituted another principle of indivisibility, viz, that democracy had to be everywhere or nowhere. For the divisibility of economic development and social progress, Washington decisionmakers based American policies increasingly on yet a third principle of indivisibility, viz, that economic and social progress were everywhere or nowhere. The achievement of American security, democratic values and institutions, and economic and social development were seen to depend on their realizations abroad. Joined in marriage was national self-interest with universal mission within a global strategy that enveloped increasingly all spheres of American life and the lives of other peoples. This marriage encompassed a national ambition, matched but not exceeded by prevailing imperial and expansionist states to define the relations of states, the relations of governments and their peoples, and the terms of economic and social progress within and across state boundaries.

History is misread, however, if it is assumed that these principles were embraced all at once. Also unfounded is the thesis pressed by revisionist historians that they derive from conspiratorial plan. They crystallized slowly, hesitantly, in no necessary logical or sequential order. The timing of their emergence must be measured by a political, not a celestial, clock and must be seen to proceed more as the product of the disordered, unpredictable occurrence of crises than as the outcome of a structured debate over ideas or ideology.

This halting, haphazard process of exterior challenge and response, of decision and action, from the Roosevelt

through the Johnson administrations, had implications which were truly revolutionary for Americans and others.

The Roosevelt administration assumed that, after World War II, the United States and Soviet Union would join with France, Britain, and China as guarantors of a global security system working within the framework of the United Nations. The defeated powers would be permitted to join the international community after their leadership was purged and democratic institutions were firmly in place. As they were gradually nursed to political health, they were expected to contribute to the reconstruction and growth of a global liberal economic order. Reparations would be set at levels consistent with the ability of the defeated nations to pay them. Protective trade policies and competitive monetary devaluations, viewed as principal sources of global economic depression of the prewar era, were to be avoided by basing international recovery on free trade, expended private investment, and improved control of international monetary transactions. The U.S. role would be crucial, but not necessarily dominant, once economic recovery in war-torn countries had been completed.

The assumptions on which postwar security, political, and economic planning proceeded proved unrealistic. The United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on Germany's reparations or political rehabilitation, on ways to assure democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, or on the terms of what was later to be called peaceful coexistence between Capitalist and Communist states, including social and economic exchanges between states and peoples across national boundaries.

Two crises—the British evacuation from Greece in early 1947 and the larger economic breakdown in Western Europe—prompted the Truman administration to revise and extend the indivisibility thesis reflected in the policies of the Roosevelt administration. On the one hand, the Greek-Turkish crisis led to the break with the Soviet Union. Moscow was identified as the principal threat to global security. Suspended for the indefinite future was the prospect that the Soviet Government could be brought into a global security framework, resting on Big Five cooperation. The United States, leading the so-called free nations of the world, would form the nucleus of a world security system that would both contain what was perceived as expanding Soviet power and would redefine the structure of global security. The United Nations was implicitly downgraded as the proper vehicle of this new security system. The split between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the Western and Communist states, generally, made the United Nations more a battleground or stake than a participant or independent actor in defining international security.

The Truman Doctrine, announced in justification of the Administration's call for $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, accepted the indivisibility of national and international security and of democratic regimes around the world. The responsibility for global order *and* for the extension of democratic values and institutions was placed squarely on the shoulders of the United States:

> One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion . . . . We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples,

> by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.[3]

Threats to American and international security were equated. These arose both from the expansion of totalitarian regimes, like the Soviet Union, and from the attack on democratic institutions from within by "aggressive movements that seek to impose totalitarian regimes."

Security and democratic institutions had to be everywhere or they could not be maintained anywhere.

The Greek-Turkish crisis occurred in tandem with an even graver socioeconomic crisis in Western Europe. The West European states failed to recover economically after World War II, as expected, and were increasingly vulnerable to internal subversion and external political and military pressure. This crisis elicited what might be termed the Marshall Doctrine, the socioeconomic complement to the Truman Doctrine. In calling for a massive aid program to help Europe's recovery, Secretary of State George Marshall argued that economic deprivation and social dislocation abroad could not be insulated from their adverse effects at home:

> It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to assist the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.[4]

The outlines of the indivisiblity thesis were now sketched. Security, popular government, and economic well-being had to be achieved everywhere or they could survive nowhere. American national and international systemic interests were one. The governing responsibilities of the federal government were globalized.

The indivisibility thesis advanced by the Truman and Marshall Doctrines was selectively applied at first. Despite the military presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the large voting bloc strength of Communist support in Western Europe, especially France and Italy, containment essentially remained a socioeconomic response to the perceived Soviet threat. Greek-Turkish aid was modest when compared to later security programs or the $17 billion spent on European economic recovery. The Atlantic Alliance signed in 1949 was a guarantee pact, resting on the American nuclear monopoly. It was not designed to assault the Soviet Union frontally. Eastern Europe was conceded in fact, if not in rhetoric, to the Soviet Union. Its freedom from Soviet control was foreseen to be the eventual result of the gradual mellowing assisted by a patient containment policy, of the Soviet Union's dictatorial rule over its people and its Western Empire. Defense expenditures slipped sharply after World War II. The Soviet military threat was not considered significant enough to warrant a full-scale remobilization, even after the Berlin Blockade and the fall of Czechoslovakia in 1948. A ceiling of approximately $15 billion was placed on defense spending to maintain a balanced budget. Deficit financing was equated with economic collapse. American nuclear striking power, not ground troops stationed in Europe, was to establish a security framework within which European reconstruction could proceed. Europe's recovery was essential to its reassumption of the important role that it had previously played in the world economy based on liberal, capitalist principles. Meanwhile, American influence and presence receded in Asia with the fall of Nationalist China, the

assignment of responsibility for Southeast Asia to France and South Asia to Britain, and the announced self-limitation of the United States for the defense of South Korea.

A new crisis, the Korean War, militarized containment. The Soviet threat was now seen as a military threat, aimed principally at Europe. The Atlantic Alliance became NATO, with a unified command structure under American leadership. Over conservative protest at home, President Truman sent troops to Europe on his own authority. The military assistance program was augmented, and preparations for Germany's remilitarization were commenced. American military-political commitments were increased in Asia, reversing the trend of the immediate postwar period. The U.S. intervention in the Korean Civil War was occasioned by renewed American intervention in the Chinese civil war with the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa. South Korea joined Japan as protectorates of the United States.

Intervention into the domestic politics of other states centered principally on Europe, not Asia. The reinterpretation of the Soviet threat to West Europe as a military threat refocused American interest in a united Europe. Its integration was seen not only as a means of solving traditional national rivalries but as a mechanism to fight more effectively the cold war.

The European Defense Community Treaty became the centerpiece of American diplomatic efforts in the early 1950's. European union (under American protection) would also furnish the instrument to legitimize and to control effectively German rearmament. The importance of EDC to American cold war strategy was suggested in Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' threat of an "agonizing reappraisal" of the American security commitment to Europe if the treaty failed. For many Frenchmen, including Gaullists and Communists, the issue was more than a dispute over cold war strategies. The European Defense Community posed a profound intervention into the domestic politics of France and a challenge to its national independence and military security. In less than two centuries since its independence, the tables were now turned between American and European states. Now Europe, not America, was the stake of global politics; now Washington, not France, sought to organize the economic, political, and security structure of its client as a tool in its struggle with its adversaries.

Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration expanded American political-military commitments around the globe. The Truman administration had signed the Rio Treaty, the Atlantic Alliance, the ANZUS Pact, and a bilateral security accord with the Philippines. The Eisenhower administration added military agreements with Korea and Nationalist China and organized SEATO. It was also the driving force in the formation of the Baghdad (later the CENTO) Pact as a link in a worldwide security chain around the Soviet Union. The passage of the Formosa Resolution in 1955 and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 for the Middle East unilaterally extended American assistance to these areas. This augmentation of American security obligations (tied to large military and economic aid programs) was designed to build a barrier to overt military aggression on the Korean model.

The Third World was largely left out of the consideration of the Truman administration, notwithstanding the announced sweep of the Truman and Marshall Doctrines. The Suez crisis and subsequent internal flareups in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in the middle 1950's dramatized a seeming gap in American cold war strategy. The developing balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union nullified much of the relevance of the massive retaliation strategy as a check to

Communist advances in the Third World. It dictated that the "power of the United States and its allies to control events within the non-Communist portions of the world would . . . have to be based on more than the existing global distribution of military power."[5] Washington's alignment with Egypt and the Soviet Union against its allies and clients (Britain, France, and Israel) was advised by the changing structure of American strategic concerns with the perceived importance of the Third World in global politics. The pactomania of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations principally addressed the problem of external security. It did not touch the socio-economic substrata of national life. An expansion of American political-military engagements around the world did not respond to the emerging Third World need for national independence, socio-economic development (partly through outside assistance) and nonalignment in the Soviet-American confrontation.

The Eisenhower administration recoiled from a full acceptance of its own evolving conception of the new power requirements of the global struggle with the Soviet Union. It was also reluctant to widen the conflict to include a greater range of military confrontations with Soviet and other Communist forces than at the nuclear level. Massive retaliation remained the prevailing doctrine although it was inconsistent with the structure of American commitments. Ceilings were still kept on defense spending. Defense spending averaged below $40 billion each year. Air and seapower, based on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, was stressed at the expense of ground forces. Military disengagement in Asia proceeded in counterpoint to political engagement. Conservative economic doctrine, that the American economy could not support a greater global effort, dominated administration thinking.

Profound structural changes in international politics at the close of the Eisenhower administration provoked a wide-ranging debate, about the future course of American foreign policy and the role of the United States. The issues were fourfold: (1) The balance of terror and, after Sputnik in November 1957, the perceived ascendancy of the Soviet Union in the cold war; (2) enlarging concern for the stabilization of the arms race and military conflict; (3) the rise of an economically strong and politically restive Western Europe; and (4) the national assertiveness of Third World states progressively resistant to Soviet-American blandishments and threats. These foreign policy problems developed within the context of the most serious economic recession in the United States of the postwar period. Economic worries were added to those of fear and moral depression in the aftermath of Sputnik that the quality of American life was diminishing and that the American people lacked the pluck and genius to meet these varied challenges.

Dispute centered on the Eisenhower administration's stewardship of American foreign policy. Critics rejected the limits that it placed on the American role in global affairs and on the means and strategies that should be employed in conducting a globalized cold war. The debate that raged from 1958 through the election campaign of 1960 set the stage for the most extensive expansion of American power. It also fully absorbed the cold war into the domestic politics of the nation. Hard-line critics of the Eisenhower administration advised a wider spectrum of national military capabilities, tighter security alliance coordination with allies and clients, and military assistance, including arms and advisors, to establish a single, interwoven global security network resistant to external Communist aggression and internal subversion. Soft-line critics emphasized economic and technical support for political elements

within countries seeking to encourage modernization and democratic institutions. Both hard and soft-liners were convinced that foreign policy success hinged on the stimulation of the lagging American economy and on addressing social ills in American society, such as jobs, civil rights, urban blight, voting inequities, medical insurance, and income redistribution.

Domestic reform was called into the service of foreign policy. Through circular logic, economic growth and social change were promoted to assure international conditions whose preservation and extension were considered prerequisites of progressive movement at home. Foreign and domestic problems had to be attacked as a whole since they were seen to be inseparably linked. The United States was said to have the means for achieving these ambitious goals if it drew on the human and material resources at the disposal of the American people. The Eisenhower administration's shortcomings in foreign policy were measured by its failure to pursue domestic social and economic policies to exploit these resources.

A strong Presidency was also advanced as the institutional means to mobilize the American people whose skill and resources were enlisted in the world struggle. An ascendant Presidency, resting on a strengthened plebiscitary principle, was conceived as more suited to the needs of American society than one constrained by Congress under the separation of powers. The President's constituency extended beyond the geographic limits of the United States and included all those peoples and interests over which American power had influence and obligations. The President was agent of the American people whose society and government were at the hub of an emerging world order of their own creation.

The Kennedy administration fused hard and soft-line critics into an uneasy coalition, which carried him to a slim electoral victory in 1960. Kennedy proposed to respond to the domestic needs of the American people and simultaneously resolve the principal structural problems of international politics that posed a challenge to continued American leadership in the world. Kennedy's campaign speeches are instructive. They marked a complete break with the divisibility thesis:

> We will no longer be secure unless we have confidence that we represent the way of the future, that we are constructing here in the United States the kind of society which gives [people abroad] hope that they can follow our example. When we drift, when we lie at anchor, when we are uncertain, when we have long debates about what our national purpose is, then we give an image of uncertainty . . . . We have to demonstrate our conviction that not only will our children be free, but so will the children of men around the world.[6]

The array of foreign and military strategic initiatives taken by the Kennedy administration, heralded as a Grand Design, spoke to each level of international challenge facing the United States. At a security level, Washington embraced a flexible response strategy built on the development of strategic, conventional, and antiguerrilla forces capable of resisting overt or covert aggression around the globe. To meet what was perceived as a growing Soviet military threat, the Kennedy leadership announced its intention to seek a position of overwhelming strategic superiority. The European states were assigned the job of building up their conventional forces. European concern about American nuclear protection, on the one hand, and the possibilities of entanglement in the U.S. conflicts in the Third World, on the other, were muted in the call for an Atlantic Community in which the United States and a united

Europe were to be equal partners. The issues of European control over American nuclear weapons or over Washington's Third World adventures would be moot since European-American political perspectives and interests would presumably converge. The Bahamas accord between the United States and Britain in 1962 placed the British nuclear deterrent under closer American supervision. The offer to France to join the arrangement, which opened the divisive campaign to create an Atlantic multilateral force, foresaw the extension of American technology to France (and Western Europe) in exchange for greater coordination and control of European nuclear weapons and their development within an Atlantic framework under American direction.

The two industrialized blocs of Europe and the United States, linked by common security, institutional, and economic ties, were expected to be a powerful magnet for the East European peoples and to be a liberalizing pressure upon the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Community, resting on the two pillars of the United States and Europe, would also provide the political, economic, and strategic bases for a North-South relation favorable to the West. It would serve as an added buttress for anticipated Western domination in the East-West struggle. The Third World would be called into play to address the balance of the old world in favor of a brave new world under American leadership.

The Third World was not neglected. The Alliance of Progress, designed initially for Latin America, was modeled for world export. Like West Europe, the emerging states were expected to pattern their economic development on the American example. The soft-line elements of the Kennedy coalition argued for larger American economic and political intervention into the Third World to align the United States with nationalist and socially progressive elements around the world. Economic development, social and political equality, and democratic institutions were viewed as indispensable instruments for the integration of the underdeveloped states within a free and liberal Western community under American aegis. In the absence of American stimulated reform, Communist forces would have, as General George Marshall had intimated over a decade earlier, a favorable terrain on which to increase their power. Features of domestic political life that had hitherto escaped cold war attention—the tax structure of a country, its economic planning, voting procedures—came within the American purview. Where economic assistance and moral exhortation for reform proved unavailing, American arms would be available to protect and to establish democratic regimes, like the Congo, which were being besieged by the right or the left, preferably but not exclusively under collective security auspices. The armed services were advised to give more attention to fighting guerrilla wars, to increase airlift capacity as a means of streamlining and improving the U.S. ability to intervene militarily abroad, and to encourage a greater civic role for American and allied troops.

The Kennedy Grand Design and the policies which it initiated marked the zenith of the indivisibility doctrine in operation. American moral worth was to be validated on a world stage. American national action had merit only if it were universal. It was not entirely coincidental that Kennedy repeatedly invoked Thomas Paine's injunction that America acted on behalf of mankind: "The cause of America is the cause of mankind." The American role in world politics was total. It envisioned the eventual domestication of international politics and the internationalization of domestic politics. Security, democracy, and socioeconomic welfare were to be achieved everywhere or they could exist

nowhere. America would assume the challenge of its revolutionary past and project it forward in a revolutionary transformation of the international order cast in its own image.

Conclusions. The demise of the indivisibility doctrine was simultaneous with its fullest rhetorical statement under the Kennedy administration. Increasing American offensive nuclear arms failed to tip the balance of terror in America's favor. These efforts were perceived as destabilizing and mutually disadvantageous to both superpowers unless placed under agreed controls. Shortly after the announcement of a nuclear counterforce strategy, it was abandoned as unfeasible. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara conceded before Congress that a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in over 100 million American deaths. There was no alternative to arms control understandings with the Soviet Union since American security was not solely within the capacity of the United States to determine or control. It was a function of Soviet capabilities, intentions, and behavior over which the United States had some, but hardly a controlling, influence.

For their part, America's allies, especially the European states and Japan, resisted the roles assigned to them and the military-political-economic guidelines they were supposed to follow. Flexible response was judged too costly and politically unpalatable. Despite continued European misgivings about the U.S. nuclear deterrent, there appeared no workable alternative to dependency on the American guarantee. The multilateral nuclear force was viewed after 3 years of intense American diplomacy, much of it aimed at isolating Gaullist France within Europe, more as an obstacle than as a vehicle of U.S.-European cooperation. De Gaulle's veto of Britain's request for membership in the EEC, his rebuff of the MLF, his decision to withdraw France from NATO, and his sustained criticism of American imperial drives in Europe and the Third World diminished the attractiveness of European unity in American policy circles and, by that token, its prospects. A Europe of Gaullist-minded states was neither a pliable instrument in the service of American global designs nor necessarily compatible with narrower American self-interests. The French nuclear program deepened the problem of proliferation. Its charges of American economic dominance centered its attack on the dollar standard, its protectionist orientation within the EEC, and its insistence on a common agricultural policy, which restricted access of American farm products to European markets, suggested that European unity under such terms was potentially a competitor, not a partner, for markets and political influence around the world.

American setbacks in the Third World were no less pronounced. The Congo episode coincided with a trend in Third World sentiment adverse to the United States. The United Nations was increasingly less susceptible to American bidding. The Cuban revolution under Fidel Castro survived American efforts to destroy it despite the aborted invasion of 1961 and the missile crisis of 1962. The Alliance for Progress raised Latin American suspicions about its disruptive effects, and foundered for lack of congressional support. Except for heavily assisted client states in Asia and Africa, and even among them, the United States found few friends or ready invitations of the American example.

Vietnam drew the sharpest and most painful limits for the applicability of the indivisibility thesis. A military solution proved elusive in a war of national liberation; Communist forces proved more disciplined and devoted to their cause than the troops of America's

client regime in Saigon; democratic institutions and socioeconomic reforms that were promised never materialized. The cost was enormous—$25.5 billion economic and military aid to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam—and over 50,000 American lives lost in a doubtful struggle. Having tied itself to corrupt and authoritarian regimes, the entire rationale for American intervention appeared undermined.

The gravest blow to the indivisibility doctrine, however, was at home. Kennedy-Johnson efforts *To Move a Nation*, as one official of the Kennedy administration wrote, backfired.[7] Their efforts to increase American power, commitments, and responsibilities abroad and to reform American life met with increasing opposition as the costs in blood and treasure of these efforts became clearer. Domestic division, exemplified in clashes between the races, between generations, and between social and economic groups, was one of the fruits of expansion. Governmental authority, based on such dubious results, was inevitably challenged. Set in motion was a new crisis, as much domestic as foreign, that questioned the viability of American institutions, the success of its socioeconomic achievements, and the basis of its security arrangements resting alternately on nuclear holocaust or unlimited intervention in civil strifes and wars of national liberation around the world.

Thus, what one might call the Second American Revolution is over. The need for a new rationale to direct American power abroad and to relate it to American values and institutions at home is evident. But necessity is not necessarily the mother of invention. The Nixon administration promised to develop such an innovative conceptual and institutional framework to fit the times. Whatever its partial successes—Communist China's reintroduction into the international community and the SALT accords come quickly to mind—its violation of domestic political norms and its dissemblings over Vietnam deepened the crisis facing the American nation and its people. The job of defining a new conceptual and normative base for American foreign policy, one workable abroad and acceptable at home, remains.

President Kennedy, quoting Edmund Burke, was right when he said, "We sit on a conspicuous [stage], what we do here, what we fail to do, affects the course of freedom around the world."[8] The United States may, indeed, sit upon a global stage, but there is neither a completed script at hand, nor a role assigned nor ascribed. If the Presidential election of 1976 offers any indication, Americans also appear unsure, as never before, about who should be the director of the stage production. It may be unsettling but no less true to conclude that, for the while, the United States, buffeted at home and abroad, is like an actor in search of a play.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



A graduate of Loyola University, Chicago, Edward A. Kolodziej is Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. before serving with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress and later as a member of the faculty of the University of Virginia. He assumed his present position in 1973. He is author of *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou* and *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963.*

NOTES

1. Quoted in Norman A. Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 310.
2. *Messages and Papers of the President*, ed., Richard D. Richardson, I, p. 217.
3. Quoted in Graebner, p. 731.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 733.
5. Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 125.
6. U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, *The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), p. 777.
7. Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Douhleday, 1967).
8. *Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy*, p. 339.

The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is, in the words of former Speaker of the House Carl Albert, the most significant congressional initiative in the last 75 years. Under it the Congress is now required by law to consider the Federal budget as a whole and to act upon it before the commencement of the fiscal year. Professor Korb describes the background which gave rise to this Act and he explains how it is intended to work.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT OF 1974

by

Lawrence J. Korb

The Constitution of the United States gives the Congress the "power of the purse." When the Federal budget was small and simple, it was comparatively easy for Congress to exercise this power. However, with the tremendous growth in the magnitude and complexity of the Federal budget in the post-World War II period, congressional power in monetary matters became more and more illusory. Since in the American political system, "dollars are policy," the legislative branch found itself increasingly divorced from any real impact in the policy process.

In 1974, Congress enacted what former House Speaker Carl Albert called the most significant congressional initiative in the past 75 years, when it passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.[1] This Act, which completely reforms the executive and legislative phases of the Federal budgetary cycle, took effect in fiscal year 1977. This paper will discuss the background, the key elements, and the impact on DOD of this landmark legislation.

Why Reform Was Needed.[2] There were several reasons why Congress felt that it was necessary to change its procedures for considering the budget. These reasons may be grouped into four categories.

First, neither the House nor the Senate had any legislative committees charged with considering the President's budget as a whole. Consequently, Congress voted only on individual pieces of the budget, e.g., defense, agriculture, etc. There was no process within the legislative arena for considering what the sum of these individual actions would do to the economy: provide a stimulus or retard growth. Moreover, no systematic procedure existed for resolving conflicts among the different

authorizing, appropriations, and tax committees on the basis of conscious congressional decisions related to national goals and priorities. Any rational relationship between the actions of these committees was usually the result of happenstance. As a result, the gap between authorization and appropriations widened into a huge cavern and limitations on spending suggested by the President were exceeded annually.

Second, there was no timetable or deadline for enacting individual authorization and appropriations bills. Congress passed these money bills willy-nilly throughout the year and often enacted the larger appropriations bills only after much of the fiscal year to which they applied had already transpired. On occasion Congress would even adjourn for the year while individual appropriation bills were still pending. Congressional tardiness was especially flagrant with respect to the Department of Defense. As indicated in Table I, in the fiscal years 1970-76, Congress never completed action on the defense budget before at least 138 days or 38 percent of the fiscal year had elapsed. Moreover, in 3 of those 7 years, Congress actually waited until more than half of the fiscal year had gone by before it enacted the defense budget. On the average, in the fiscal years 1970-76, the Legislature delayed action on the defense budget until the fiscal year was just about half over. This tardiness left agencies like DOD in the difficult position of operating on the basis of continuing resolutions and made it almost impossible for state and local governments to fit Federal grants into their plans in a timely fashion.

Third, the scope for effective use of the budget to influence either the level of economic activity or the allocation of fiscal resources was limited by the inability of the Congress to keep Federal spending under reasonable control. Congressional budget decisions were generally made within the inefficient framework of a narrow, 1-year time horizon. These decisions often laid the groundwork for programs whose "out-year" costs far exceeded the expectations of their original supporters.[3] The food stamp and medicaid programs were examples of such decisions. In addition, over the years there developed numerous forms of "back door" spending, outlays which were not subject to the regular appropriations process: for example, legislation permitting agencies to enter into contracts or to borrow money not yet appropriated.

In order to counter these congressional weaknesses, the President often impounded funds already appropriated

TABLE I—DATES ON WHICH DOD BUDGET WAS PASSED BY CONGRESS

Fiscal Years	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Average
Date of Basic Appropriation	29 Dec	11 Jan	18 Dec	26 Oct	20 Dec	8 Oct	6 Feb	1970-76
Days of Fiscal Year Elapsed	183	194	172	157	174	138	220	177
Percentage of Fiscal Year Elapsed	50	53	47	43	48	38	60	49

by Congress on the basis of his priorities. Although this Presidential practice was of "dubious constitutionality," congressional irresponsibility often left the Chief Executive no other realistic alternative. Moreover, Presidential impoundment was often done with *sub rosa* congressional support. In this way, Congressmen could vote for spending and let the President take the blame for cutting. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy frequently impounded congressionally appropriated funds for bombers and missiles, while President Nixon often refused to spend funds on certain social and environmental programs approved by the Congress.[4]

Fourth, Congress had neither the staff nor the analytic capabilities to perform a proper analysis of the President's budget requests or to make a really careful examination of any meaningful alternatives. Most of its changes to the President's budget were dictated by the line item imperative, i.e., the legislative made "meat axe" or across-the-board cuts which saved money in a particular line item but often unbalanced a carefully constructed program. When the Chief Executive objected to the congressional changes, he had the resources to make a case that he was acting in the long-term interest of the country. The legislative branch did not have the wherewithal to demonstrate that it was doing the same thing.

Key Elements of the New Budget Process. In order to bring about a coordinated and effective approach to congressional budget actions, the Budget Control and Impoundment Act calls for wide ranging reforms of the previous system. The key elements of the new process may be grouped into four categories which correspond roughly to the four areas of weakness discussed above.

(1) New Institutional Structures. The act provides for the establishment of a new Budget Committee in each House of Congress. These committees are charged with developing annual targets for fiscal policy as well as priorities among major budget programs. They are also responsible for ensuring that actual congressional actions on authorizations, appropriations, and revenues conform to the agreed upon targets.

The new legislation also creates the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a nonpartisan group of about 200 analysts, to provide the Congress with information, analysis and alternatives on budgetary matters. The CBO is expected to perform roughly the same function for the Congress that the Office of Management and Budget performs for the President. Table II contains an example of this type of analysis performed for the Congress by CBO. This particular analysis deals with the long-term impact of an expansionary as opposed to a contractive policy on the dual problems of unemployment and inflation. It is important to note that CBO does not advocate either alternative. The office confines itself to advising Congress of the impact and tradeoffs of each one.

(2) Coordinated Decisionmaking. To assure a coordinated approach to budget making, the Act requires that, on or before two prescribed dates each year (15 May and 15 September), Congress must vote explicitly on the budget as a whole and on budget priorities. All other facets of the budget process are governed by these votes on what is referred to as the first and second "Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget." To allow adequate time for this process and to prevent tardy appropriations, the Act has shifted the start of the fiscal year by 3 months. Starting with fiscal year 1977, the fiscal year now begins on 1 October rather than 1 July.

The first resolution, which must be enacted by 15 May, sets tentative targets for annual budget authority and

TABLE II—POLICY ALTERNATIVES: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES

	Spending Component	Tax Component	Monetary Component	Three Components
Expansionary Strategy				
Effect of Policy On:				
Unemployment Rate (percentage points):				
1976: 4th Qtr.	−.4	−.3	−.1	−.7
1977: 4th Qtr.	−.4	−.4	−.3	−1.1
Annual Rate of Inflation (percent change, General Price Index):				
1976	0	−.1	0	0
1977	.2	.1	.1	.4
1980	.2	.2	.2	.5 to .7
Contractionary Strategy				
	Spending Component	**Tax Component**	**Monetary Component**	**Three Components**
Effect of Policy On:				
Unemployment Rate (percentage points):				
1976: 4th Qtr.	+.3	+.2	+.1	+.6
1977: 4th Qtr.	+.4	+.3	+.2	+.9
Annual Rate of Inflation (percent change, General Price Index):				
1976	0	0	0	0
1977	−.1	−.1	0	−.2
1980	−.2	−.1	−.1	−.3 to −.4

outlays, revenues, and the resulting deficit or surplus for the upcoming fiscal year. In addition, the resolution must also specify targets for each of the 16 functional categories within the Federal budget. Passage of the first resolution is based on joint recommendations of the House and Senate Budget Committees and takes place at the end of an intensive deliberative and bargaining process that involves consideration of the current services budget[5] (submitted by 10 November of the previous year); the President's annual budget proposals (submitted within 15 days after the Congress meets); the recommendations made by the various legislative committees (i.e., Armed Services) and by the Joint Economic Committee; and continuing and special analyses performed by the CBO.

The first resolution serves as a guide or target to the various congressional committees taking subsequent actions on specific authorization, appropriations and tax measures. If these actions add up to larger totals than the resolution provides for, the Budget Committees and the Congress must make conscious decisions on how the discrepancies are to be resolved. The Congress must either cut back the proposed outlays, increase taxes, or make changes in the initial targets. This reconciliation is done in connection with the adoption of a second concurrent resolution in late September, setting final, binding ceilings for annual spending and a floor on revenues.[6]

Once Congress has completed action on the second resolution and has passed whatever additional legislation may be needed to reconcile already enacted appropriations and revenue measures with that resolution, neither House is permitted to enact any legislative program that could change the final spending or receipt totals.[7] In order to make any changes in these totals, another concurrent budget resolution must be adopted by the entire Congress.

Although the new procedures did not become effective until fiscal year 1977, Congress conducted a dry run during consideration of the fiscal year 1976 budget. Table III contains a comparison between the original requests of the President for authority and outlays and the first and second concurrent budget resolutions of the Congress. Overall, the Congress raised the level of authority by $13 billion or 3.4 percent in its first resolution and by $22.2 billion or 5.8 percent in its second resolution. In the outlay area, the first concurrent resolution provided for a $17.6 billion or 5 percent increase while the second resolution effected a $25.5 billion or 7.3 percent increase over the President's original budget request. Congressional actions in the outlay area increased the Federal deficit by 34.4 percent. In arriving at its totals, Congress increased seven of the functional areas, left four unchanged, and reduced three.[8] The three areas cut by the Congress were defense, international affairs, and agriculture.

In its two resolutions on the fiscal year 1977 budget, Congress acted in much the same fashion. As indicated in Table IV, the first resolution raised the budget authority target by $20.8 billion or 4.8 percent and the outlay target by $19.5 billion or 4.8 percent. The targets adopted by the second resolution were almost identical to the first. The Budget Committees achieved their totals by cutting defense slightly in both authority and outlays and by increasing social expenditures. In the outlay area defense was the only major function reduced.

(3) Timetable. The new act presents a detailed and fixed timetable for the different phases of the congressional budget cycle. In accordance with this timetable, many parts of the budget process cannot move ahead unless other actions are completed. For example, appropriations bills cannot be con-

TABLE III—1976 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET

[In billions]

Function	1st concurrent budget resolution	President's original budget request February 1975	2nd concurrent budget resolution	difference columns 2–3 N	%
BUDGET AUTHORITY					
National Defense	$100.7	$107.7	$101.0	−6.7	−6.2
International Affairs	4.9	12.6	6.0	−6.6	−52.3
General Science, Space, and Technology	4.7	4.7	4.7	—	—
Natural Resources, Environment, and Energy	13.8	12.2	18.7	6.5	53.3
Agriculture	4.3	4.3	4.1	−0.2	−4.7
Commerce and Transportation	11.3	6.6	19.0	12.4	187.8
Community and Regional Development	11.0	5.2	9.5	4.3	82.7
Education, Manpower, and Social Services	19.0	13.7	21.3	6.7	49.4
Health	33.1	31.0	33.6	2.6	8.4
Income Security	140.9	135.3	137.5	2.2	1.6
Veterans Benefits and Services	18.0	16.2	19.9	3.7	22.8
Law Enforcement and Justice	3.3	3.2	3.3	0.1	3.1
General Government	3.3	3.3	3.3	—	—
Revenue Sharing and General Purpose Fiscal Assistance	7.3	7.3	7.3	—	—
Interest	35.0	34.4	35.4	1.0	2.9
Allowances	1.4	8.3	0.5	−7.8	94.0
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	−16.2	−20.2	−17.1	3.1	15.3
Total, Budget Authority	395.8	385.8	408.0	22.2	5.8
OUTLAYS					
National Defense	90.7	94.0	91.9	−2.1	−2.2
International Affairs	4.9	6.3	4.9	−1.4	−22.2
General Science, Space, and Technology	4.6	4.6	4.6	—	—
Natural Resources, Environment, and Energy	11.6	10.0	11.4	1.4	14.0
Agriculture	1.8	1.8	2.6	0.8	44.0
Commerce and Transportation	17.5	13.7	18.3	4.6	33.5
Community and Regional Development	8.65	5.9	7.0	1.1	18.6
Education, Manpower, and Social Services	19.85	14.6	20.9	6.3	
Health	30.7	28.1	32.9	4.8	43.2
Income Security	125.3	118.7	128.2	9.5	8.0
Veterans Benefits and Services	17.5	15.6	19.1	3.5	22.4
Law Enforcement and Justice	3.4	3.3	3.4	0.1	3.0
General Government	3.3	3.2	3.3	0.1	3.0
Revenue Sharing and General Purpose Fiscal Assistance	7.2	7.2	7.3	0.1	1.3
Interest	35.0	34.4	35.4	1.0	2.9
Allowances	1.2	8.1	0.8	−7.3	−90.1
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	−16.2	−20.2	−17.1	3.1	15.3
Total Outlays	367.0	349.4	374.9	25.5	7.2
Total Deficit	66.2	48.6	74.1	25.5	34.4

TABLE IV—1977 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET

[In billions]

Function	1st concurrent resolution	2nd concurrent resolution	President's budget	difference columns 3–2 N	%
BUDGET AUTHORITY					
National Defense	112.5	112.1	114.9	−2.8	−2.4
International Affairs	9.1	8.9	9.7	−0.8	−8.2
General Science, Space, and Technology	4.6	4.6	4.6	-	—
Natural Resources, Environment, and Energy	17.0	18.2	9.7	8.5	87.6
Agriculture	2.3	2.1	2.3	-0.2	8.6
Commerce and Transportation	18.2	17.2	17.9	−0.7	−3.9
Community and Regional Development	7.4	9.6	5.8	3.8	65.5
Education, Training, Employment and Social Services	24.6	24.0	15.9	8.1	50.9
Health	39.3	40.5	38.0	2.5	6.6
Income Security	158.9	155.9	157.7	−1.8	1.1
Veterans Benefits and Services	20.1	20.3	17.7	2.6	14.7
Law Enforcement and Justice	3.4	3.5	3.3	0.2	4.5
General Government	3.6	3.6	3.5	0.1	2.9
Revenue Sharing and General Purpose Fiscal Assistance	7.4	7.6	7.3	0.3	4.1
Interest	40.4	39.6	41.3	NA	NA
Allowances	2.9	.7	2.6	NA	NA
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	−17.4	−16.8	−18.7	2.1	11.1
Total	454.3	451.6	433.4	18.2	4.2
OUTLAYS					
National Defense	100.8	100.7	101.1	−0.5	−1.0
International Affairs	6.6	6.9	6.8	0.1	1.5
General Science, Space, and Technology	4.5	4.5	4.5	—	—
Natural Resources, Environment, and Energy	15.7	16.2	13.8	2.4	17.4
Agriculture	2.0	2.2	1.7	0.5	29.4
Commerce and Transportation	17.7	17.4	16.5	0.9	5.5
Community and Regional Development	7.8	9.0	5.5	3.6	65.5
Education, Training, Employment and Social Services	23.0	22.2	16.6	5.6	33.7
Health	37.9	38.9	34.4	4.5	13.1
Income Security	139.3	137.2	137.1	0.1	—
Veterans Benefits and Services	19.5	19.5	17.2	1.3	7.6
Law Enforcement and Justice	3.5	3.6	3.4	0.2	5.9
General Government	3.5	3.5	3.4	0.1	2.9
Revenue Sharing and General Purpose Fiscal Assistance	7.4	7.7	7.4	0.3	4.1
Interest	40.4	39.6	41.3	NA	NA
Allowances	1.2	.8	2.3	−1.5	65.2
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	−17.4	−16.8	−18.8	2.0	10.6
Total	413.4	413.1	394.2	18.9	4.8

sidered on the floor of either House until the necessary authorizations have been enacted and the first concurrent resolution adopted. Moreover, Congress must complete action on all spending bills within 1 week after Labor Day and may not adjourn until final passage of the second resolution, i.e., until it has fully reconciled all of the differences and budgetary matters. Imposition of such discipline on the legislative branch is a major innovation in the American political system, and could go a long way to restoring Congress to its constitutional role as a coequal branch of Government.

(4) Improving Budgetary Control. The Budget Control and Improvement Act contains three provisions designed to produce more complete congressional control over Federal spending. First, to help contain back door spending, the act requires annual appropriation of funds for all loan authority and entitlement programs, as well as explicit consideration of tax expenditures (tax exemptions and deductions).[9] Second, it severely limits the President's ability to impound funds appropriated by Congress. If the Chief Executive wishes to impound appropriated funds, he must ask the Congress for approval. Only if the Congress passes a recession bill within 45 days of the request may the President impound. If the President wishes to defer spending for a period not to extend beyond the end of the current fiscal year, he must announce his intention to the Congress. Even then, either chamber may force the Chief Executive to use his spending authority immediately by adopting a resolution to that effect within 45 days of the President's announcement. Third, to permit improved forward budget planning, CBO is specifically required to make 5-year projections of the budget. For example, the CBO projection of the fiscal year 1977 budget stated that if President Ford's budget were accepted, outlays would rise to between $560 and $563 billion by fiscal year 1981.[10] And to enable the Congress to keep track of how it stands in relation to its targets, CBO provides "scorekeeping tables" during the fiscal year. An example of this is provided in Table V.

Impact on DOD. From the perspective of the Pentagon, the Congressional Budget Control and Improvement Act of 1974 will probably prove to be a mixed blessing in that it should have both positive and negative impacts on defense appropriations. The potentially beneficial aspects may be placed into three categories.

First, by delaying the start of the fiscal year for 3 months and providing that the Congress cannot adjourn until it completes action on budgetary matters, the new act has improved the prospects of DOD receiving its appropriations on time. Since fiscal year 1970, the failure of Congress to enact the defense budget until midway through the fiscal year to which it is applicable has forced DOD to operate under a continuing resolution, i.e., spend at the same rate as the previous year. In the past this had led to a great many inefficiencies in the management of DOD. In those areas where the final budget differed from the previous year, the Pentagon had only one half of the year to adjust spending levels. Moreover, since the defense hierarchy must complete action on the upcoming budget during the fall, the Pentagon leadership was generally placed in the awkward position of having to make decisions on next year's budget without knowing what last year's budget would be. It is all but impossible to put an exact dollar figure on the inefficiencies caused by these late appropriations. But, most analysts feel that these inefficiencies added at least 5 percent to the annual operating costs of DOD.[11]

Second, analyses performed by the nonpartisan CBO should enable the

TABLE V—SUMMARY BY FUNCTION OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE 1977 BUDGET, AS OF JANUARY 10, 1977

[In millions of dollars]

Function	2nd concurrent resolution	Current status, through enacted House	Senate
BUDGET AUTHORITY			
National Defense	112,100	111,873	111,873
International Affairs	8,900	7,854	7,854
General Science, Space, and Technology	4,600	4,595	4,595
Natural Resources, Environment, and Energy	18,200	12,118	12,118
Agriculture	2,100	1,612	1,612
Commerce and Transportation	17,200	14,331	14,331
Community and Regional Development	9,550	9,560	9,560
Education, Training, Employment and Social Services	24,000	16,207	16,207
Health	40,500	38,983	38,983
Income Security	155,900	152,169	152,169
Veterans Benefits and Services	20,300	18,876	18,876
Law Enforcement and Justice	3,500	3,440	3,440
General Government	3,600	3,234	3,234
Revenue Sharing and General Purpose Fiscal Assistance	7,600	7,476	7,476
Interest	39,600	37,572	37,572
Allowances	700		
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	−16,800	−15,850	−15,850
Total	451,550	424,049	424,049
OUTLAYS			
National Defense	100,650	99,191	99,191
International Affairs	6,900	6,903	6,903
General Science, Space, and Technology	4,500	4,505	4,505
Natural Resources, Environment, and Energy	16,200	15,834	15,834
Agriculture	2,200	2,667	2,667
Commerce and Transportation	17,400	15,992	15,992
Community and Regional Development	9,050	9,084	9,084
Education, Training, Employment and Social Services	22,200	18,316	18,316
Health	38,900	37,958	37,958
Income Security	137,200	136,650	136,650
Veterans Benefits and Services	19,500	17,851	17,851
Law Enforcement and Justice	3,600	3,521	3,521
General Government	3,500	3,219	3,219
Revenue Sharing and General Purpose Fiscal Assistance	7,700	7,516	7,516
Interest	39,600	37,572	37,572
Allowances	800		
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	−16,800	−15,850	−15,850
Total	413,100	400,931	400,931

Congress to make more intelligent changes in the defense budget. In recent years, the Congress has made many changes in the Pentagon's budget which have paid short-run fiscal dividends but proved to be long-run fiscal disasters. For example, congressional restrictions on travel by DOD personnel saved funds in that account, but led to inefficiencies in the training area because many available school quotas could not be filled. Likewise, the congressionally imposed ceilings on civilian workers in naval shipyards limited the number of civilians employed by the Department of the Navy, but increased the accident rate and decreased the quality of the output because the fixed number of employees was required to work overtime to meet the authorized workload.

During consideration of the fiscal year 1977 defense budget, CBO produced four such analyses. These studies laid out alternatives for the Congress on such vital issues in the area of national security as naval forces and strategic force developments.[12] The naval force study presented in a clear and concise form the shipbuilding requirements, the budgetary implications, and the strategic assumptions underlying the creation of a 400, 500, and 600-ship fleet by 1985. This study also addressed the financial and strategic implications of fully implementing Title VIII of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1975, which requires that all future major surface combatants be nuclear powered. The study on strategic forces began by analyzing the developments of the U.S. and Soviet forces since the signing of SALT I in 1972. It then assessed the budgetary impact of the SALT and Vladivostok agreements and concluded by evaluating the potential fiscal effects of either a new SALT agreement or a breakdown of the negotiations on strategic arms.

During consideration of the fiscal year 1978 budget, the CBO issued a series of six budget issue papers on general purpose forces. These papers presented the assumptions underlying current planning of the general purpose forces, discussed the relationship between those assumptions and the current or projected forces, and analyzed the potential changes in programs for general purpose forces if different planning assumptions were adopted. Issues addressed included naval forces, Army procurement, tactical air forces, theater nuclear forces, and forces related to Asia. The force alternative analyses and issue paper studies will make it possible for Congress not only to realize the complete effects of their actions but can also direct congressional attention away from a fixation on line items and focus it on the critical issues of national security.[13]

Third, the new procedures should hold down the growth in the cost of many social programs, thus leaving more funds potentially available for defense. Congressmen now have the capability to assess the out-year costs of new social programs. Moreover, they now review annually all of the back door spending in the budget. Senator Muskie (D-Maine), the chairman of the new Senate Budget Committee, estimated that the new procedures resulted in a savings of $10-$15 billion in social programs in the fiscal year 1976 budget.[14] During fiscal year 1977 the various legislative committees submitted spending proposals that added up to $442 billion. As noted above, the Budget Committees pared these to $413 billion, primarily by cutting back social programs.[15]

However, the new budgetary procedures will not be without their adverse impacts on DOD. The new Budget Committees in each House now set a ceiling on defense expenditures *before* the Armed Services and Defense Appropriations Committees take up the DOD budget. Since a clear majority of the present members of these congressional budget committees have historically voted more favorably for social

than military programs, they are likely to treat the defense budget more harshly than the defense partisans on the Armed Services Committees. This new fact of life was vividly demonstrated during consideration of the fiscal year 1976 and fiscal year 1977 defense budget. The Budget Committees set a target that reduced defense spending by $7 billion or 6.5 percent while raising the nondefense portion of the budget 21.1 percent above the level of the administration's initial request. Moreover, when the Senate and House Armed Services Committees reported out a defense authorization bill some $1 billion above the target figure, members of the Budget Committees led a successful fight to defeat the bill on the floor of Congress. The 6.5 percent cut, which was eventually enacted, is the largest percentage reduction of the defense budget in history!

The Budget Committees were not particularly hard on defense during fiscal year 1977. The target for defense authority was approximately $3 billion below President Ford's request of $113 billion. However, before reaching any conclusion, three considerations must be kept in mind. First, in an attempt to keep his own Federal budget under $400 billion, President Ford had already reduced the defense budget $4 billion below Secretary Schlesinger's bottom line figure and $10 billion below the requests of the armed services. Second, defense still received the largest absolute and percentage reduction of any of the functional areas of the budget. Third, 1976 was an election year and the Democratic majority was unwilling to give the Republican administration a campaign issue by making a large reduction in defense spending.

Similarly, the creation of two new committees and the Congressional Budget Office will increase the information demands upon the Pentagon. The Senate and House Budget Committees have demanded that top-level defense officials appear before them. The 130 staff members on these two committees, as well as the 200 members of the CBO, have and will continue to request information and studies on which to base their analyses. For an organization whose members already spend over 1500 hours before 75 congressional committees and whose employees already answer nearly one million congressional inquiries annually, this additional information burden will not be easy to bear.[16]

Conclusion. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established the mechanism for improving the rationality of the decision process within the legislative branch of government. It also provides an opportunity for the Congress to strengthen its power over the purse and thereby reacquire its status as a coequal branch of government. Whether it, in fact, can accomplish these ends will depend upon the members of Congress.

The Budget Act will not take the politics out of the budgetary process. Nothing can do that. The legislative committees will still be concerned about their clients. The Appropriations and Budget Committees are likely to clash over such matters as the size of the deficit, inflation, and unemployment. Many legislators will attempt to co-opt

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Following graduation from The Athenaeum of Ohio, Professor Korb served for four years as a Naval Flight Officer before earning his Ph.D. from the State University of New York. He has served on the faculties of the University of Dayton and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. He is now Professor of Management at the Naval War College. He has published widely and his most recent publication is *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years.*

the nonpartisan CBO to support their partisan positions under the threat of reducing the CBO's own budget.[17] However, if these actions are kept within bounds, an extinct species may be preserved: an independent and intelligent Legislature capable of contributing to representative government through sound budgetary choices.

Thus far, the Congress is off to a good start. During the legislative phase of the fiscal year 1976 and fiscal year 1977 budgetary process, the new procedures of the Congressional Budget Act worked quite well. Priorities were established, targets met and the budgets enacted on time. However, the new act is likely to meet its most severe test during the next few years. During the first 2 years in which the act was in force, the executive and legislative leaders were controlled by different political parties. It was comparatively easy for a Democratically controlled Congress to reorder the priorities and present alternatives to the budget of a Republican administration. But, will the Congress maintain such independence with a Democratic President in the White House? Will President Carter allow the Congressional Budget Office and Congressional Budget Committees to offer alternatives to *his* budget? It is upon the answers to questions such as this that the success of a noble experiment will depend.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Nancy Ross, "Budget Adding Jobs Asked by Top House Democrats," *Washington Post*, 9 September 1976, p. B1:1. For a similar view see Walter Mondale, *The Accountability of Power* (New York: David McKay, 1975).

2. There are several excellent summaries on this subject. See for example, Committee for Economic Development, *The New Congressional Budget Process and the Economy*, December 1975; and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Federal Budget: Reform's First Round, an Introduction," *National Journal Reprints*, 1975, pp. 1-2.

3. Defense expenditures rarely fall into this category. The Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP), which is the foundation of PPBS in DOD, projects the costs of all current programs through the next 5 years.

4. The Congress took Nixon to court to force him to spend the appropriated funds. The court was not asked to intervene under Nixon's predecessors. Their impoundments were permitted to stand.

5. The current services budget is a document that shows Congress what would happen to the Federal budget if all the spending and revenue programs were carried forward for another year without policy changes. The fiscal year 1977 version estimated that, if all fiscal year 1976 programs were carried forward, fiscal year 1977 outlays would be $423 billion. This became the base against which the actual fiscal year 1977 budget was measured.

6. Neither of these resolutions is subject to a Presidential veto.

7. This provision of the new Budget Act was apparently forgotten by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in October 1976 when he asked the Congress to appropriate additional funds for shipbuilding. Since the second concurrent resolution had already been enacted, the Congress refused even to consider Secretary Rumsfeld's proposal.

8. The functions of income security, interest and allowances, and offsetting receipts are not counted. Expenditures in these areas vary with inflation and cannot be affected either by legislative or executive decisions.

9. These items are not insignificant. In fiscal year 1977, tax expenditures will exceed outlays for defense.

10. Congressional Budget Office, *Five Year Budget Projections Fiscal Years 1977-81*, 26 January 1976, p. 9. Significantly, the President's budget projected that outlays would rise to only $509.9 billion by fiscal year 1981.

11. This figure was based upon data collected by the author from the subunits of DOD in preparation for a report to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on "Congressional-DOD Interface," 20 May 1975.

12. Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Naval Force Alternatives*, 26 March 1976 and *SALT and the U.S. Strategic Forces Budget*, 23 June 1976. The other two analyses focused on tactical air wings and Army ground forces.

13. Although the CBO defense studies are well done, there is considerable doubt about their real impact. Interviews with staff members of the Armed Services Committees indicate that during the legislative phase of the fiscal year 1977 budget cycle, the CBO analyses were almost completely ignored by Congress.

14. Muskie's statement was made on the floor of the Senate and was reported in the *Washington Post*, 22 December 1975, p. A19:3.

15. Citibank, *Monthly Economic Letter*, May 1976, p. 5.

16. This data comes from the author's report to Secretary Schlesinger.

17. One such instance has already occurred. In October 1975, Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), put out a press release that made it appear CBO was recommending a cut in the fiscal year 1976 Defense Appropriations Bill. Actually the CBO did a study for Cranston based on his assumptions.

International law does not exist in a vacuum; its development is closely connected with contemporary conditions. The most complex and difficult political-legal problem today is the drafting of a generally agreed-upon law of the sea convention. The sophistication and Western orientation of the Saudi position on the law of the sea, as well as Saudi Arabia's oil reserves and the wealth and power they confer, make it a worthy subject for examination.

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

by

James P. Piscatori*

The Middle East, broadly defined, is penetrated by five bodies of water, the five "fingers" of the Mediterranean, Black, Caspian, and Red Seas, and the Persian Gulf. The Red Sea and Gulf have received particular attention in recent history. The significance of the Red Sea stems, first of all, from its connection to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel has one non-Mediterranean port, Eilat, which can only be reached through the Red Sea and then through the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Denial of entry to Israel through closure of the Straits of Tirān was considered a *casus belli* in 1967, and in 1973 a blockade of the entire sea was carried out at the Bāb al-Mandab Strait to support the war aims of the Arab front. Some strategists believe that in a long war similar action could offset the Israeli advantage in holding Sharm al-Shaykh.[1] Second, the Red Sea is important as the gateway to the Suez Canal, which itself was economically and strategically significant prior to 1967, because it reduces by one-half the Gulf to London journey. The recently reopened canal probably will be highly significant again as it is widened and deepened to accommodate ships of the 150,000-ton range and eventually of the 270,000-ton range.[2] Finally, the Soviet base at Berbera in Somalia highlights the vulnerability of access to the sea itself.

Of far greater importance is the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the growing industrial dependence on oil, even more than the discovery and exploitation of the

*I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Professors K. Booth of the University College of Wales and R.K. Ramazani of the University of Virginia.

resource itself, has helped to move the Gulf to the economic, strategic, and political forefront of world politics. The oil imported by the United States from the Middle East as a whole, for example, constituted 15-17 percent of total American oil imports during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. American imports from the region then were 877,000 barrels per day and during the first 6 months of 1976 the figures rose to 2,124,000 barrels per day.[3] Though the increase is substantial, American oil imports from the Middle East do not yet rival the present 80 percent level of oil imports for Western Europe. This Middle Eastern connection is not surprising since the area as a whole contributes about half the total oil production in the world, with Persian Gulf countries in particular producing one-third of the total.[4]

Given the sudden changes in the price of oil fixed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the revenues that are accruing to these states have no less suddenly increased. Iran is spending about $69 billion and Saudi Arabia approximately $140 billion in their current Five Year Plans to develop infrastructures and to provide new social services. Iraq is budgeting over $3 billion per year for investment and development purposes. These ambitious plans have stimulated a flurry of activity by European and American businesses competing to provide the technical services and sophisticated equipment required. The wealth in the Gulf is also being used to build up national armories. In 1974 alone, Persian Gulf countries purchased over $4 billion worth of arms from the United States, $1 billion from France, $500 million from Great Britain, and $340 million from the Soviet Union.[5] The trend is accelerating,[6] and it is already clear that military sales in the Gulf, like commercial sales and services there, constitute big business. Gulf countries, in short, are amassing great fortunes which also are converted into profits for the oil-consuming *and* technologically advanced countries.

This economic interdependence has added to the strategic importance attached to the Persian Gulf area since the British withdrew in 1971. The Soviet presence in the upper Gulf, symbolized by the 1972 Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with Iraq,[7] has been of concern to Western strategists. There is some evidence that Soviet influence was waning in Iraq,[8] but recently there has been a strengthening of ties.[9] In light of the lingering Soviet presence, regional cooperation to exclude all external powers is the American goal in the Gulf. Several factors overlap to account for the position of the United States: fear not only of a forcible interruption of the oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz but also of Soviet-inspired revolution against the traditional, pro-Western, regimes; knowledge that the American presence itself is limited to one command ship and two surface combatants, forming the Middle East Force at Bahrain;[10] and sensitivity to the potential spillover effect naval competition in the Indian Ocean could have because of its geographical proximity. In light of this reliance on friendly, regional policemen—mainly Iran[11] but also Saudi Arabia to a lesser extent, American arms sales to the Gulf are seen as valuable in more than the economic sense.

It is against this background of intersecting interests—economic, political, and strategic—that law of the sea issues in the Persian Gulf and the positions of Gulf States on those issues assume importance. Maritime disputes affect regional stability, and, moreover, several of the littoral states wield such economic and potential military might that their views may influence the direction of the developing law. Saudi Arabia, at first glance, would seem unlikely to have any impact on the law of the sea. The predominantly desert character of

its landmass, the world's 13th largest, has given greater historical significance to the nomadic Bādū than to dhow-equipped sailors. And the Saudi Navy is small, though growing: 1,500 personnel, about 2,000 officers and men in training at the San Diego Naval Training Center, two naval bases, three fast patrol boats (FPB), one patrol boat, and several landing craft and mine counter measures (MCM) on order.[12]

There are, however, three reasons why the Saudi position deserves attention. First, Saudi Arabia's stature in world politics has dramatically increased. With one-quarter of the world's producible oil reserves, the Kingdom possesses twice the reserves of the Western Hemisphere and twice those of the Soviet Union.[13] In addition, Saudi Arabia, providing 25 percent of American oil imports today as compared to 10 percent before the 1973 war, represents the principal Middle Eastern supplier of oil to the United States. The wealth of natural resources has been translated into political influence as the West generally and the United States particularly have realized that their economic well-being is in large measure due to the goodwill of the Saudis. This wealth has also allowed Saudi Arabia to exert considerable impact on Arab states, especially on Egypt which seems incessantly in search of a financial backer. That the Saudis themselves are aware that their political role has expanded is seen by the recent rapprochement with Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, both of which have long been hostile to the "conservative" Saudi monarchy. International law and politics are intertwined, and for no other reason, Saudi Arabia's position on the law of the sea should be examined because the Kingdom itself is potentially on the level of world politics a major power, and actually within the Middle Eastern subsystem, a great power.

Secondly, the Persian Gulf has been the scene of disputes over the delimitation of offshore boundaries, several of which have involved Saudi Arabia. Disagreements persist between Iran and Iraq, and Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, there are boundary and territorial differences between Iraq and Kuwait, over Būbiyān and al-Warba islands, and between Qatar and Bahrain, particularly over the status of the Howār Islands.[14] Saudi Arabia represents a Gulf state that has directly negotiated agreements with its neighbors, Bahrain and Iran, and that is presently dealing with Qatar and Kuwait in regard to outstanding problems.

Finally, Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its location, is able to exert some control over another important maritime area—the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Although Saudi Arabia is not a "confrontation" state in the Arab-Israeli conflict, its legal stance on this question of passage through straits has contributed to the general hostility and complicated the search for a *modus vivendi*.

Law of the Sea Positions. Saudi Arabia prides itself on its Islamic heritage and its policy is often shaped around principles of the faith. While the daring exploits of Arabic sailors are historically well-known, the sea, however, has been a comparatively less important consideration to the largely land-based Arab Muslims. The Qur'an itself displays an ambivalence on the subject with one passage indicating that men should be thankful for the livelihood, food, and riches the waters yield (XVI:14) and another suggesting that the devil inhabits the sea (XVIII:62). The Prophet Muhammad had little to add save perhaps that Muslims who die in a seaborne *jihād* will be doubly rewarded in the afterlife. The rules of naval warfare were developed through *givās* or analogy and hardly differ from those of land conflict. They incorporate certain moderate principles: an enemy ship in distress is to be issued an *amān*

or safe passage into coastal waters, and in keeping with general practice, vessels bearing diplomatic envoys are thought to possess a special status.[15] It is clear that the Sharī 'a or basic law does not address itself to the controversial law of the sea issues of the 20th century. Lacking traditional guidance, therefore, Saudi Arabia has *generally* adopted a course not far different from that which is outlined in the international conventions.

Breadth of Territorial Sea. From the earliest days of the country, concern with the waters closest to the coast has been pragmatic in nature as evidenced by the fact that the first references are found in the fishing and Coast Guard regulations. The fishing rules defined the "coastal waters" of the then Kingdom of the Hijāz, Najd, and Dependencies as the area within 4 miles of the coasts not including gulfs and inlets.[16] The *Regulations for the Coast Guard Directorate and its Divisions* were primarily concerned with the "customs line" that was identical with the outer limit of Coast Guard control and that extended to 4 miles off the shore and 10 miles within. This limit was not equivalent to the breadth of the territorial sea because of Article 49 (b) which allowed the sea patrol in the performance of its duties to "go beyond the customs line within the boundaries of the Saudi Arab Kingdom when pursuing boats and smugglers."[17] The outer boundaries were unspecified, but the assumption can be made, on the basis of the permission to go beyond the customs line, that territorial jurisdiction was seen as extending beyond the 4-mile zone mentioned in both the fishing and Coast Guard regulations.

The Saudi government reminded its neighbors in 1933 that no precise sea boundaries had been agreed upon and that no rule of international law existed to facilitate the delimitation of territorial waters.[18] It was not until Royal Decree 6/4/5/3711 of 2 Sha'bān 1368 (28 May 1949) that the term "territorial waters" was employed and precisely defined. These waters encompassed the inland waters of bays, shoals, and those between island and the mainland and between islands themselves, in addition to the "coastal sea" which extended outside the inland waters to a distance of 6 miles. This definition departed from the text of the original fishing rules in that it applied to all coasts of the Kingdom unified under the Saudi title in 1932—the Red Sea, Gulf of 'Aqaba, and Persian Gulf.[19] In relying on a 6-mile limit, Saudi Arabia chose to follow the earlier examples of the Ottoman Empire, Syria, and Iran.[20] Saudi Arabia however, led the way when it changed the relevant terminology to "territorial sea" and extended its boundaries to 12 nautical miles in a 1958 royal decree.[21] The effect was immediate as the two other major powers in the Gulf, Iraq and Iran, soon thereafter extended their limits to 12 miles.

In the explicit designation of territorial waters and seas, the two decrees, particularly the second, went far toward bringing Saudi Arabia into the mainstream of the international law of the sea. In contrast to early regulations, the 1949 proclamation of King 'Abd al-'Azīz expressly declared that Saudi sovereignty extends to the territorial waters, the air above, and the soil and subsoil below. Another and significant indicator of Saudi Arabia's growing sophistication was the general invocation of international law and the specific reference to the principle of innocent passage as the sole limitation on its sovereignty in the 1949 decree. The 1958 decree was more general in its provision that Saudi sovereignty is limited by existing rules of international law (Article 2). Herbert Liebesny's conclusion, though specifically directed to the 1949 decree, is also relevant to the later proclamation: "The Saudi decree

on territorial waters is a very carefully drawn document which is more detailed than many similar decrees and embodies modern theories of international law on the subject."[22] The comment would be of no interest were it not for the fact that Saudi Arabia often is accused of a medieval mentality.

The 1958 decree in particular was designed to put Saudi Arabia on an equal footing with other states at the first Law of the Sea Conference. The Saudi delegation chairman, Ahmad al-Shuqayrī, Minister of State for United Nations Affairs, specifically pointed out that Saudi Arabia's change of words to "territorial sea" put it in line with the draft convention and was made to avoid the misleading impression that territorial waters are limited only to inland waters. The delegate also took an uncompromising stand on what has become the standard Saudi commitment to a 12-mile territorial sea. Al-Shuqayri, particularly critical of the United Kingdom's defense of the 3-mile limit, argued that the political and economic demands of the present age require a wider belt. He denied, moreover, that the 3-mile limit was never uniformly accepted and pointed to a number of Western scholars in support of his position that states have determined their boundaries for a variety of reasons apart from the 3-mile example.

Saudi Arabia thus suggested that states be allowed to set their own limits within a 12-mile maximum in order to provide some flexibility in the parameters sanctioned by (1) security needs, (2) new economic and technical developments, (3) state practice, and (4) a new legal consensus. In this sense, al-Shuqayrī made the point that the debate is political and economic as well as juridical, yet he was not so attuned to the politicization of the debate that he could accept U.S. Representative Dean's speculation that the price of transporting Saudi oil would increase as the territorial sea widens.[23]

There was strong Saudi opposition to the American proposal for a 6-mile breadth. Al-Shuqayrī, invoking the International Law Commission's opinion that the territorial sea may be legitimately extended to 12 miles, pledged that his country would not become a party to a convention that adopted the American draft. Ironically for so anti-Communist a state as Saudi Arabia, its position echoed that of the Soviet bloc. Saudi Arabia specifically joined forces with Burma, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Venezuela in sponsoring a draft calling for a territorial sea of 12 miles with a contiguous fishing zone of an extra 12 miles. None of the proposals gained the necessary two-thirds majority,[24] and Saudi Arabia did not become a party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, nor to any of the other conventions for that matter.

By the 1960 conference, the Saudi position seems to have hardened on the importance of the territorial sea question. The success of the regime of the sea by then was predicated on the resolution of this one issue. As a result, al-Shuqayrī advanced the central thesis that the law of the sea is indivisible—either there is a complete law with the territorial sea settled or there is no law at all. In almost sacrilegious rhetoric for a Saudi, he intoned this warning: "Without an acceptable formula for the determination of the territorial sea, these conventions of ours will remain outside the sacred temple of international law."[25]

The Kingdom was persistent in advocating the 12-mile rule, and it is interesting to note that the manner of argument was entirely a-Islamic. Al-Shuqayrī based his presentation on an appeal, *inter alia*, to state interests, the position of the polyculturally legitimate International Law Commission, Moore's *Digest of International Law*, the British High Court of Justice, and nowhere was Islam

invoked. Despite the Western-based rationale, Saudi Arabia clearly felt, at that time, that its identity should be tied to the Third World, which was believed to be rising up to reject the colonial legacy and to assert the equality and sovereignty of every state. The anti-imperialist sentiment is somewhat surprising for a state that escaped colonial masters: "We have emancipated our land, and the time has come to emancipate our sea."[26]

If Saudi Arabia was then aligned against the major Western states and with the developing ones, by the Third Law of the Sea Conference it has found that it is aligned with the vast majority of states. The change, however, is not due to a position shift by the Saudis; to the contrary, they have remained consistent in advocating a 12-mile territorial sea while an international consensus has solidified around the figure. Saudi Arabia, along with Arab League states, has not objected to the demands of the archipelagic states with regard to the territorial sea, provided that lanes of international navigation are kept open. Saudi Arabia has also joined the majority of states in the present negotiations in advocating a 200-mile economic zone beyond the territorial sea,[27] but its commitment must be viewed as more a matter of principle than active concern when it is realized that the Persian Gulf at a maximum is 160 miles in width and that the Red Sea has a maximum width of 190 miles. What is important for Saudi Arabia is the more limited area of the contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea, although, as will be mentioned later, the country has seemingly endorsed the merging of the contiguous and economic zone concepts. Currently, the Kingdom is the only state in the Persian Gulf that has explicitly claimed the right of surveillance over an adjacent 6-mile zone in order to protect laws concerned with navigation, security, finance, and sanitation.[28]

Saudi Arabia has been the leader in the Gulf in establishing the 12-mile rule, and it has also been one of the leaders in advocating the universal adoption of the rule. In the region, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Oman have followed the Saudi lead, but Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have yet to follow suit. It is not likely that there will be any regional disputes since, as Richard Young points out, the 12-mile approach seems destined to be the Persian Gulf norm.[29] It is possible that there will be some tension over the contiguous zone, but to date this matter has not emerged as a significant issue. What is significant is that Saudi Arabia's consistent position undoubtedly influenced the positions of other littoral states in the Gulf and contributed to the emergence of the general consensus.

Offshore Boundary Disputes. As early as 1949, the Saudis also showed that they were capable of keeping pace with new international law of the sea developments. The Truman Proclamation of 1945 on the continental shelf inspired the 1949 royal decree on the submarine areas contiguous to Saudi Arabia's Persian Gulf coasts. Despite the fact that a continental shelf does not exist in the geological sense in the Gulf, the Saudi government, mindful of the natural bounty below the waters off its shores, wished to control its conservation and development in line with the unilateral declarations of states that could precisely lay claim to a continental shelf. The Kingdom claims that it should exercise control over the submarine areas contiguous to its zone because (1) the natural resources, in the first place, are capable of being exploited by modern technology; (2) the state can act in the interests of proper usage and conservation of the resources; (3) the resources can only be effectively developed and conserved, at any rate, with state involvement and help; (4) activities off Saudi Arabia's coasts

naturally involve its security; and (5) "various other nations" have already done so.[30]

The Saudi decree echoes the Presidential proclamation, except in the important respect that jurisdiction and control are asserted over the subsoil and seabed itself, as Pakistan and Great Britain have also asserted, and not merely over the natural resources as in the American document. In contrast to the Kuwaiti constitutive reference to the region's "becoming" a part of the state, the Saudi wording like the American is declarative of an inherent right of jurisdiction.[31] In addition, the Saudi decree follows American and British practice, and rejects Latin American claims of extensive control, by asserting that the waters above the contiguous seabed and soil are not subject to national interference. It should be noted, parenthetically, that Saudi Arabia has relied, in the absence of a proper shelf, on the idea of contiguity. This concept, however, is equivalent to the idea of the submerged *mass* next to a state's shores, and it should not be confused with the contiguous zone itself over which *activities* are regulated. Although relying on contiguity, Saudi Arabia has not defined its extent. Rather, like the American proclamation on the continental shelf, the Saudi decree provides for negotiations with neighboring states in accordance with "equitable principles" in order to determine the precise boundaries of the contiguous "shelf."

The call to negotiation was taken up in 1958 when an agreement was reached between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia on the delimitation of the "underwater areas belonging to both countries." It might be noted that the actual delimitation between the two states is dependent not on "equitable principles" per se, but on principles agreed upon by the participant governments. Vice President Kuretsky of the International Court of Justice in the *North Sea Continental Shelf Case* pointed out that Saudi Arabia allowed for this qualification in the 1949 proclamation, yet there is resort to a standard concept in the Bahraini-Saudi case.[32] The first clause of the bilateral agreement indicates that the division is to be based on the median line, a principle of equidistance that at least one student of Islamic law, Muhammad Hamidullah, finds enshrined in the classical sources as a valid means of settling boundaries.[33] It is also a principle incorporated in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.

The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agreement deviates from strictly equal sharing in the second clause in which a special area is set aside for Saudi oil exploitation "in accordance with the wish of H.H. the Ruler of Bahrain." This grant may well reflect an appreciation by the Bahraini government of greater Saudi experience in the oilfield, since Bahrain is to receive half of the revenues from the area. Yet Saudi administrative control and sovereignty are specifically emphasized—an indicator, perhaps, that fraternal Islamic relations are not always stronger than national interests. The agreement is notable as the first Persian Gulf effort to settle conflicting claims over the subsurface of what is termed the "regional waters."

A second, more important effort to resolve Gulf differences is the Saudi-Iranian agreement of 1968 in which the disputed islands of al-'Arabiyya and Farsī were apportioned to Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively. Consistent with both states practice since 1958, each island is given a 12-mile territorial sea. The principle of equidistance was employed to demarcate the boundary between the overlapping territorial seas of the islands, and the agreement also delineated the boundaries of the submarine areas appertaining to both countries in which each has sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil.[34] Without going into great detail, we may say that the

agreement as a whole has gone far towards eliminating tension in the strategic waterway between its two most important littoral states.

Another Gulf dispute remains largely unresolved, though its conflict potential is slight. It involves the status of the Neutral Zone lying between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that was delimited in the Uqair Convention of 1922. Although the agreement is silent on the extent and position of maritime boundaries and though no bilateral arrangements existed until 1965, it is clear that Saudi Arabia has for all practical purposes held that at least a portion of the sea off the Neutral Zone belongs to it. However, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed, on 7 July 1965, to demarcate the overlapping jurisdictions off the Neutral Zone. The crucial Article VII, whose language itself is curious and reflective of the divergent regimes of the sea, provides that the two countries have the same rights over those portions of the territorial sea adjoining their sectors of the Neutral Zone and that a precise boundary is to be determined at a later time.[35] The major, still unresolved, obstacle to agreement is due to the fact that Saudi Arabia has decreed a 12-mile territorial sea whereas Kuwait has chosen to leave the breadth of its sea unspecified.

There is a compromise agreement in the second paragraph of Article VII which refers to a 6-mile zone for the purpose of natural resource exploitation. Its specific reference is to the seabed and subsoil next to the zone which is to be annexed to the land portion of the zone. Two points are notable: (1) The article makes a clear distinction between the waters and resources of the zone—the limits of the former are unspecified whereas those of the latter are indicated. This distinction is a clear deviation from the Saudi position in the 1949 and 1958 territorial waters decrees and is thus an indicator of both the special position of the zone and the differences outstanding with Kuwait. (2) The article makes a distinction between *territorial* waters over which each country can exercise rights consistent with its portion of the zone and an undivided natural resource area that is attached to the zone as a whole. Once again, the extraordinary status of the zone is seen with its ambiguous if not confused division of rights alternately on a national and joint basis.

The 1965 agreement, differing from the regular Saudi decrees which are declarative of existing rights, is clearly constitutive of a new maritime regime off the Neutral Zone. The difference is understandable given the unsettled character of this zone. Indeed, the case represents an extraordinary concession by Saudi Arabia that its sovereignty is limited; the bitter pill, however, is made sweeter by the fact that Kuwait's sovereignty is also restricted, despite the energetic denials of that country's legal adviser.[36] To date, the boundary between the territorial seas has not been settled nor has the ancillary dispute concerning sovereignty over Qarū and Umm al-Maradim Islands been resolved.

One somewhat related development should be noted. In a 1968 royal decree, the Saudi government asserted its claim to the hydrocarbon resources of the Red Sea. The pronouncement is odd in that it applies to a zone which lies *adjacent* to the continental shelf; it is not clear what the zone exactly entails.[37] There is no precedent in terms of a similar claim in the Persian Gulf, nor, it should be noted, can the proposed area in the Red Sea be clearly delimited until the continental shelf itself of that sea is delineated, or even claimed. Arguing negatively, we may conclude that the zone was not meant to be identified with the contiguous zone since the decree does not assert control over security, immigration, and sanitation matters there; furthermore, the idea of the proposed zone cannot be

equated with either the "hovering," customs zone or pollution control zone concepts since the decree does not mention the governable activities subsumed under those categories.[38] The primary Saudi concern in the 1968 decree is ownership and exclusive exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed, and in this regard, the new, evolving economic zone may be relevant.

This concept, it would be well to note, has been controversial even within the bloc of developing states, the Group of 77.[39] Disagreement has centered on the extent of the zone, but there has been broad agreement on the character of the zone. For example, two declarations of the Organization of African Unity and two endorsements by the League of Arab States, both in 1973 and 1974, assert that coastal states have sovereign rights over the mineral as well as biological resources of this zone. The Egyptian delegate to the Third Law of the Sea Conference concluded in 1974 from these declarations that the continental shelf is included in this new category,[40] and in this sense perhaps Saudi Arabia, by its 1968 decree, helped to advance the thought that it is permissible to claim resources in the continental shelf and the seabed beyond. The claim is still curious since the Saudi Kingdom has not clarified its understanding of the economic concept other than to join with other Arab states, Iran, Honduras, Mexico, India, and Liberia to suggest, in effect, that the contiguous and economic zones are largely synonymous.[41]

Until there is further clarification, the decree may be considered, in the manner of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law,[42] as dealing with continental shelf-type matters. While there is no clause allowing for negotiation on the basis of equitable principles in case of dispute with neighboring states, there is a suggestion that joint exploration and exploitation of the resources are possible in a "common zone" when recognized by the Saudi government. The assumption that common zones are determined by negotiation is reasonable. No disputes appear likely since no major exploitation of valuable resources is underway, but it is a measure of Saudi Arabia's interest in the potential oil, heavy metal, and gypsum resources of the sea that it has made its claim known in advance of possible trouble.

Passage Through Straits. Having tentatively recognized the right of innocent passage as early as the fishing regulations of 1932, Saudi Arabia strongly objected to the particular right of passage through straits as described in Article 16 (4) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. The article reads: "There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas of the territorial sea of a foreign State."[43] The basic Saudi position, as developed at the United Nations conferences on the law of the sea, is that innocent passage is a right of way that is fully subject to law. That is, the Kingdom argued that an aggressor has no right of way in law generally at the expense of his victims, and that those states deemed in violation of international law and the United Nations Charter have no right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of states they have injured. In short, aggression suspends the right of innocent passage.[44] It is clear that Israel is considered the case in point.

In the course of specific deliberations, Saudi Arabia wished to amend the American draft definition of innocent passage with the proviso that passage is not innocent when contrary "to the present rules or to other rules of international law." The Saudi delegate, al-Shuqayri, also wondered why another

proposal, which was eventually adopted by close vote, deleted the International Law Commission's condition that states are to respect the right of innocent passage through straits *normally* used for international traffic and why it extended the range to straits connecting the high seas to a territorial sea. When Article 16 as a whole was adopted by a wide margin in a 1958 plenary session, Saudi Arabia abstained because it believed that subparagraph 4 is designed to satisfy a unique case and is a "mutilation" of international law. Al-Shuqayrī ominously concluded: "Saudi Arabia would take the necessary steps to protect its national interests against the interpretation and application of paragraph 4."[45]

For the most part, Saudi Arabia relied on the philosophical position that the maritime laws of war are different, and it even went so far as to propose a subtitle indicating that the Convention on the Territorial Sea applies only in peacetime. Once again, its defense was based predominantly on western sources that have distinguished between the two states of war and peace: the Corfu Channel Case, the 1926 draft convention of the International Law Association, and the law of the sea draft treaty of the International Law Commission.[46] The Saudis, in effect, advanced the position of the realists in the study of international politics and law that, since the persistent reality of conflict is obvious, it would behoove the international community to develop specific regulations to handle and to limit violence rather than to try vainly to abolish it.

Despite the rationale, Saudi Arabia's opposition to innocent passage through straits is clearly designed to cover Israeli access to the strategic Straits of Tirān. This opposition, it should be noted, does not relate to the Strait of Hormuz, since the interconnected waters there are parts of the high seas through which unimpeded innocent passage is considered unquestionable. Al-Shuqayrī was explicit at least once in his reference to the Straits of Tirān, when he argued that under the Palestine Armistice Agreements, Israel was given no juridical standing in the Gulf of 'Aqaba which is under Saudi, Egyptian, and Jordanian sovereignty.[47] Saudi Arabia was united with all the Arab states, save one, in arguing the line and in accordingly refusing to sign the Convention on the Territorial Sea, and even with Tunisia that did sign but expressly declined to be bound by Article 16 (4).

In the Third Law of the Sea Conference, Saudi Arabia affirmed its position that there is a right of innocent passage through straits that connect parts of the high seas only. In espousing that end, it joined Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates in proposing a definition of "straits used for international navigation" whereby the high seas connection and *customary* usage of the straits for international navigation become central. In 1974, Kuwait, speaking on behalf of Saudi Arabia and others, complained that the Convention article on straits had been politically inspired.[48] It is in light of this complaint and in view of Saudi Arabia's strong antagonism towards the state of Israel that one should question the earlier assertion that the Kingdom was acting only on behalf of general principle and not "regional policies or transient situations"[49] when opposing Article 16 (4).

Closely connected to this position is the Saudi concern over automatic passage for warships through the world's straits. In the 1958 Conference, Saudi Arabia opposed the British proposal which would allow unhindered access for warships on the ground that there are different types of straits. The "territorial straits" are inseparable from territorial waters, the Kingdom's delegate argued, and consequently the coastal state possesses the authority to regulate passage of warships for its own security.

Al-Shuqayrī invoked such authorities as Oppenheim and Colombos to buttress the identification of straits and territorial waters, but Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice of the United Kingdom, himself a noted legal authority, found the references irrelevant since the question of territoriality is conceded by the very nature of innocent passage. Undaunted, al-Shuqayrī turned to another great legal authority and judge of the International Court of Justice, Philip Jessup, for support of the contention that warships can no more sail through a state's territorial waters without permission than can a foreign army march across its soil.[50]

When a draft provision requiring prior authorization for the passage of warships through the territorial sea as a whole was deleted, Saudi Arabia voted against the entire article along with 23 other states, thereby depriving the article of the needed two-thirds majority for adoption. Al-Shuqayrī said in explanation that responsible sovereignty demands prior authorization before a warship can pass through territorial waters, since warships may not be regarded as inherently peaceful; unauthorized passage, therefore, is a violation of sovereignty and equivalent to aggression.[51] This emphasis on sovereign control contrasts somewhat with that of the 1933 Coast Guard regulations which prohibit the levying of taxes and the boarding by marine patrols of foreign warships in its jurisdiction. The only specific article on warships adopted by the 1958 Geneva Conference, Article 23, is acceptable to Saudi Arabia since it emphasizes that they are subject to the coastal state's rules of passage through its waters. The Convention, nevertheless, is objectionable because the gist of draft Article 24 (1) allowing unauthorized warship passage through straits is embodied in Article 16 which applies to "all ships" and which absolutizes the right of unimpeded innocent passage through straits. As late as 1974, the Democratic Republic of Yemen voiced similar opposition to treating warships and merchant vessels in the same manner, especially when passage through straits is concerned.[52] This stance, it should be noted, is not limited to Arab states or to Middle Eastern straits; Canada recently has endorsed the principle of prior authorization, and Indonesia and Malaysia actually require such notification and authorization before transit is allowed through straits they control.[53] The United States, however, does not officially recognize the necessity of such notification.

Fishing. Saudi Arabia is less concerned with fishing than with other maritime issues, but it has objected to the Convention of the Living Resources of the High Seas which does not consider fishing rights in the territorial sea. The country strongly argued in the 1960 Geneva Conference that the coastal state possesses sovereignty over the fish in its waters and so must grant authorization before foreign fishermen can operate within its limits. The Saudi delegate criticized particulary the British and French for claiming that such a rule would create an economic hardship for the maritime states that depend on farflung fishing catches. His response was a general accusation of neo-imperialism, but it reflected Saudi sensitivity to fishing by outsiders in the abundant waters of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf: "You catch my fish from coasts, you transport it in your fleets, you can it in your factories, you carry it again in your fleets to be exported to my country, and the only thing I have to do is to pay the bill--and how heavy the bill is."[54]

The representative's solution, however, was conciliatory because he suggested a sharing within or outside the U.N. framework of the advanced technology of the great maritime states and the fishing catch of the coastal states.

Although Saudi Arabia has not asserted its right to control fishing in a wider area, it should be noted that when it claimed a contiguous zone in the Persian Gulf, it specifically stated that the existence of the zone is not to be construed as affecting Saudi fishing rights. The disclaimer, intended to avoid the conclusion that such rights are limited to the zone, is compatible in theory with one of the main components of the economic zone concept. Given the strident voices that are often heard in advancing the new economic zone, the Saudi offer of cooperation with regard to fishing exploitation is at least refreshing.

Conclusions. Although it is difficult to make concrete conclusions, some general points can be stressed.

(1) Saudi Arabia accepts several principles that are part of the developing regime of the sea, even though it has not become a party to any of the legal conventions. There are several reasons why it has not signed the Geneva conventions. First, Saudi Arabia holds that maritime law is not part of international law until it is whole. The law of the sea is not likely to be complete until it incorporates a definition of the breadth of the territorial sea, a division of rules on innocent passage according to states of war and peace, and a clear statement of control over the fish of the territorial sea. Secondly, the Convention on the Territorial Sea incorporates the objectionable rule that all straits are open without limit to the passage of all ships, thus precariously ignoring the specific character of the straits, the types of the ships involved, and the disposition and intent of the state whose vessel is transiting. Finally, as one Saudi lawyer pointed out, the reluctance to sign may be a function of the traditional Saudi caution induced by historical isolationism.[55]

Despite Saudi Arabia's nonadherence to the conventions it has accepted several principles that are part of the emerging international consensus: sovereignty over a 12-mile territorial sea, control of certain activities in the contiguous zone, sovereignty over the adjacent submarine area or continental shelf and its natural resources, reliance on the median line and equidistance to delineate offshore boundaries, the openness of the high seas beyond the territorial sea and continental shelf and the basic right of innocent passage. In the most recent negotiations in the Third Law of the Sea Conference, it has also indicated its support of the economic zone concept and of the idea that ocean bed resources are the "common heritage of mankind," both of which are now part of the new growing consensus. There has not yet been a clear Saudi position on the character of the proposed international seabed authority other than the bland statement that it should respect the rights of all states and be fair in distribution.[56] The general point is clear, however, that Saudi Arabia in practice accepts many of the maritime standards which are found in legal texts it chooses not to endorse.

(2) The Saudi position is not seriously at odds with the Western position generally and the American position particularly. Part of the reason for the coincidence of views is the fact that in the absence of Islamic guidance, Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on predominantly occidental treaties, diplomatic notes, court cases, and scholars to elucidate the legal norms. While it is true that the Saudis may have differed with the United States and Great Britain frequently in the past, it is also true that by the time of the present negotiations, they were largely in accord with those states and differing with many of the developing ones. It is interesting to note that in the one area, passage through straits, where Saudi Arabia and the West disagree strongly, the Kingdom's position may partly be influenced by its adamant belief that Israel's most

grievous sin has been to occupy the holy city of Jerusalem. In general, however, we may conclude that culture has not affected Saudi Arabia's maritime policy and that it has acted, like any modern state, to advance its national interests and to legitimize them by invocation of the standard sources of modern international law.

(3) Saudi Arabia's behavior is bifurcated. On its western shores, it has acted to support the claim that Israel has no legitimate right of transit to Eilat. This stance is mitigated by the fact that the navigable channel through the Straits of Tirān lies in Egyptian, not Saudi, waters, but Saudi Arabia's growing might, its clear antipathy for Israel, and its strong support of Egypt suggest that the legal position cannot be discounted as contributing to the general tension. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has indicated a willingness to cooperate and negotiate in matters concerning the Persian Gulf. Evidence can be found in the agreements with Bahrain, Iran, and Kuwait. The Kingdom, moreover, has committed itself in principle to the equitable distribution and exploitation of sea resources off both shores. The attitude of compromise at sea is heartening at a time when resources on land are being depleted rapidly.

Saudi Arabia may not be in the leadership of the developing states nor is it a substantial naval power, but it is a state with significant resources at its disposal. Its wealth is the main underpinning of its foreign policy which has generally sought to preserve the status quo rather than to foster systemic transformations.[57] Caution and pragmatism, indeed, mark the Saudi approach to international politics and international law. Political caution has recently been confirmed by its firm opposition to the Soviet naval base in Somalia[58] and pragmatism by its continuing efforts to avoid direct military struggle with Israel. Legal caution is evidenced by its hesitation in becoming a party to specific multilateral covenants and pragmatism by its factual compliance with the law nonetheless. Since the "wide common" of Mahan[59] is troubled in these days of exorbitant national claims and naval rivalries, it is important to note that neither Saudi Arabia's aloofness from the conventions nor its generally strong commitment to Islam has made it unsympathetic to the West. But Saudi Arabia's maritime policy is really two tales of the sea. In one case the antagonism towards Israel has determined the Saudi resolve to oppose part of the law, but in several other cases the perception of state interests has led both to the moderate assertion of control over nearby maritime zones and to the willingness to negotiate conflicting claims in accordance with the broad legal framework most states accept. The Saudi example in the Persian Gulf at least is reassuring, and it is hoped that *this* example will be influential.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

After he earned his Ph.D. at the University of Virginia, Professor Piscatori was an International Fellow to Saudi Arabia where he studied Saudi attitudes towards international law. Afterwards, he was a Leverhulme Visiting Fellow to the United Kingdom. He is now a member of the faculty in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, where he is also working on a book, *Culture and International Law.*

NOTES

1. See, for example, *Strategic Survey, 1973* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 25. I have tried to employ precise transliterations of Arabic names, except the names of states themselves.

2. "Egypt," *The Times* (London), 5 November 1975, special section, p. V.

3. R.K. Ramazani, "Reflections on American Policy in the Middle East," *Foreign Policy Papers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, forthcoming).

4. Emile A. Nakhleh, *Arab-American Relations in the Persian Gulf* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 60; D.L. Price, "Stability in the Gulf: The Oil Revolution," *Conflict Studies*, May 1976, p. 14.

5. Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975, pp. 14-15.

6. See *The Middle East Monitor*, 15 September 1976, p. 1.

7. For the treaty text in English, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 3 May 1972, p. 12.

8. After the Iraqi-Iranian settlement in March 1975 concerning aid to the Kurds, the Soviet Union halted arms shipments to Iraq. Also, economic deals have recently been concluded between Iraq on one hand and the United States, France, and Italy on the other. See *Strategic Survey, 1975* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 86-87.

9. There has been a report of a new secret agreement concluded between Iraq and the Soviet Union on 17 August 1976, whereby Iraq is to receive $3 billion worth of sophisticated military equipment over the next few years, the Soviets are to increase their presence in Iraq, and the two countries are to coordinate their policies towards the Persian Gulf. See *Kayhan* (Weekly International Edition), 23 October 1976, p. 3.

10. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1975-1976* (London: 1975), p. 7.

11. See generally, Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Search for Regional Cooperation," *The Middle East Journal*, Spring 1976, pp. 173-186.

12. *The Military Balance, 1975-1976*, p. 37, *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1976, p. A20.

13. *International Petroleum Encyclopedia* (Tulsa: Petroleum Publishing Co., 1975), p. 76.

14. See Richard Young, "The Persian Gulf," in Robin Churchill, K.R. Simmonds, and Jane Welch, *New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Collected Papers*, v. III (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1973), p. 233.

15. This discussion is derived from Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 109-116. For a general discussion of the ancient and modern Arab and Islamic views on maritime law, see Muhammad Sa'īd Muhammad al-Khatīb, *Al-wad' al-qānūnī lilbahr al-iqlīmī ma' darāsa lilbahār al-iqlīmiyya al-'arabiyya wa al-'ajnabiyya fi al-Qānūn al-dawulī* (al-qāhira [Cairo]: Dār al-nahda al-'arabiyya, 1395 [1975]).

16. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, *Fish and Shell Fishing Regulations Applicable to the Coasts of the Red Sea, Umm al-Qura*, No. 397, 18 Rabi' I 1351 (22 July 1932), translated by J.C. Stewart (Dhahran: Arabian-American Oil Company, 29 September 1948).

17. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, *Regulations for the Coast Guard Directorate and Its Divisions, In Sanction of These Regulations High Decree Has Been Issued on Muharran 29, 1353 or May 13, 1934 Under No. 218/318*, translated by Aramco (Dhahran: Arabian-American Oil Company, n.d.).

18. Mohammed Zayyan al-Jazairi, "Saudi Arabia: a Diplomatic History, 1924-1964." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Utah, Department of History, Salt Lake City, Utah: 1970, pp. 66-67.

19. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Decree No. 6/4/5/3711, *Umm al-Qura*, No. 1263, 2 Sha'ban 1368 (29 May 1949), translated in *The American Journal of International Law*, July 1949, *Official Documents*, Supplement 3, pp. 154-156. Another translation in *The Middle East Journal*, January 1950, pp. 96-98.

20. Richard Young, "Saudi Arabian Offshore Legislation," *The American Journal of International Law*, July 1949, p. 530.

21. Text of 1958 decree in al-Jazairi, pp. 274-278.

22. Herbert J. Liebesny, "Legislation on the Sea Bed and Territorial Waters of the Persian Gulf," *The Middle East Journal*, January 1950, p. 95.

23. United Nations, Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records*, v. III: First Committee on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Geneva: 24 February-27 April 1958), pp. 35-37, 134-136, 186. Note that in the exact title, "Conference" refers to the first conference; the numerical designation will be used in brief entries.

24. United Nations, Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records*, v. II: Plenary Meetings (Geneva: 1958), pp. 36, 39, 116, 134-136.

25. United Nations, Second Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records*, Committee of the Whole (Geneva: 17 March-26 April 1960), p. 3. The numerical designation here is part of the precise title.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-10, 12, 385-399, quote at p. 398.

27. United Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records*, v. I (New York: 1975), p. 144; v. II, p. 268.

28. See Article 9 of 1949 decree and Article 8 of 1958 decree. See notes 19 and 21 *supra*.

29. Young, "Persian Gulf," p. 232.

30. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, *Royal Pronouncement Concerning the Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia With Respect to the Subsoil and Sea Bed of Areas in the Persian Gulf Contiguous to the Coasts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Umm al-Qura*, 1263, 2 Sha'ban 1368 (29 May 1949), translated in *The American Journal of International Law*, July 1949, *Official Documents*, Supplement 3, pp. 156-157. Another translation in *Middle East Economic Survey*, 18 January 1963, pp. 9-10. In a separate opinion, Judge Ammoun briefly mentioned, on the basis of a *Le Monde* report of 30 October 1958, that Saudi Arabia would extend the continental shelf doctriue to the Red Sea. See *The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands)* in *International Law Reports*, 1970, p. 122.

31. See Liebesny for Kuwaiti declaration, p. 95. The Truman Declaration may he found in Wolfgang Friedmann, Oliver J. Lissitzyn, and Richard C. Pugh, *International Law: Cases and Materials* (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 557-558.

32. Text of agreement translated in *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, July 1958, pp. 519-521. Also see Separate Opinion of Vice President Koretsky in *The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, International Law Reports*, p. 164.

33. Muhammad Hamidullah, *Muslim Conduct of State*, 4th ed. rev. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1961), p. 90.

34. *Agreement concerning Sovereignty Over Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi Islands and Delimitation of Boundary Line Separating Submarine Areas between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran*, 24 October 1968, in *International Legal Materials, Current Documents*, May 1969, pp. 493-496.

35. *Agreement between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone*, 1 July 1965, unofficially translated in *The American Journal of International Law*, October 1966, pp. 744-749. It should be noted that the translation is not without controversy particularly since the commonly termed Neutral Zones is translated as the Partition Zone, a translation preferred by the Kuwaitis such as the translator himself.

36. Sayed M. Hosni, "The Partition of the Neutral Zone," *The American Journal of International Law*, October 1966, pp. 742-743. For the Saudi position, see Shaykh al-Yamani's comments in *The Middle East Economic Survey*, 13 March 1964, p. 1; Mohammad Talaat el-Ghoneimy, "The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, July 1966, pp. 698-700. Also see J.Y. Brinton, "The Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, July 1967, pp. 820-821, and el-Ghoneimy's rejoinder, pp. 821-823. And, finally, see Husain al-Baharna, "A Note on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone Agreement of July 7, 1965, Relating to the Partition of the Zone," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, July 1968, pp. 733-734.

37. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Decree No. M-27 dated 9/7/1388 Hegira, translated as *Saudi Arabian Decree Relating to Ownership of Red Sea Resources*, in S. Houston Lay, Robin Churchill, and Myron Nordquist, eds., *New Direction in the Law of the Sea*, v. I (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1973), p. 119.

38. For a discussion of "hovering laws," see William W. Bishop, Jr., *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 521-522. The Saudi concern with pollution has been expressed in the general statement at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records*, v. I, p. 144. Also note that Saudi Arabia has acceded to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, the text of which may be found in United Nations, *Treaty Series*, no. 4714 (1959), pp. 4-25.

39. See Evan Luard, "The Law of the Sea Conference," *International Affairs*, April 1974, p. 270; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 25 June 1976, p. 27798.

40. Third Conference of the Law of the Sea, *Official Records*, v. II, p. 154.

41. The proposed draft on the economic zone lists the same activities as in the contiguous zone over which control can be exercised. See Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records*, v. III, p. 239.

42. See listing in *New Directions in the Law of the Sea*.

43. The texts of the four Geneva conventions may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Four Conventions and an Optional Protocol Formulated at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,* 86th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1959).

44. First Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. III, pp. 35-37.

45. *Ibid.,* pp. 84-85, 93, 96, 100. First Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. II, p. 65.

46. First Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. III, pp. 2-3.

47. *Ibid.,* p. 37.

48. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. I, p. 144; v. II, p. 139; v. III, p. 221.

49. First Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. III, p. 156.

50. *Ibid.,* pp. 129-130.

51. First Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. II, pp. 67-68.

52. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. II, p. 142.

53. Luard, pp. 269-270.

54. Second Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* pp. 401-402.

55. Interview in Riyād, 6 July 1975.

56. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Official Records,* v. I, p. 144.

57. See Robert Sullivan, "Saudi Arabia in International Politics," *Review of Politics,* October 1970, pp. 436-460.

58. The Saudi English daily, *Arab News,* reported on 7 May 1975 that Saudi Arabia and Somalia, during a state visit by Somalia's president, agreed to exclude foreign powers from the Red Sea. The Saudi opposition to Soviet bases in the area is clear from the strong emphasis on Islam in the communique and in the daily editorial, pp. 4, 8.

59. See, generally, Chap. 9 of Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Crane Russak, 1977).

THE PCI, NATO, AND THE UNITED STATES[1]

The North Atlantic Alliance came into being in 1949 to protect its members from an external Communist threat. Italy has always had a large and active Communist Party. However, recent events have raised the real possibility of the Italian Communist being taken into the Government. Professor Thompson discusses the effects of such an eventuality and he suggests possible courses of action.

by

W. Scott Thompson

During the spring of 1976, prior to the parliamentary elections in Italy, considerable attention in government circles and in the press was focused on the question of what effect Italian Communist Party (PCI) participation in the Italian Government would have on NATO. Although in the ensuing election the PCI increased its percentage of the electorate's vote, it obtained neither a plurality nor a sufficiently decisive gain to force the question of its explicit participation now, thereby giving Western strategists a respite, however brief, and dampening Western interest generally.[2]

Yet the *compromesso storico* has *in effect* already occurred: For the functional lines between participation and nonparticipation, between support and acquiescence, are fine, more so than has heretofore been appreciated. PCI chairmanship of parliamentary committees, greatly increased *de facto* PCI involvement in government and abstention on the organization of the government are what make continued Christian Democratic (DC) governance possible. There are no signs readily visible that the DC is capable of the reform and rejuvenation necessary to reverse the seemingly inexorable electoral trend that has worked against it for nearly 30 years.

So it is appropriate to reconsider the question of the effect the PCI has, and will continue to have, on Italy's relationship to the alliance and to her American partner, either in a continuation of the present situation, or in a formal *compromesso storico*, or in a PCI-dominant coalition that might result from the next election, if the PCI further increased its electoral standing.

The PCI leadership's assurances of its desire to uphold Italy's NATO membership also are worth consideration. And finally, we will examine the manner in which the alliance—and the United States in particular—might take out insurance against the possibility either that the PCI turns out to be a Trojan horse (at one unlikely extreme) or, more likely, would be driven by events to take a position hostile to the alliance as presently constituted.

The Military Stakes. First, it is worth looking at what is at issue, for there can be no doubting Italy's importance to NATO. Italy has three NATO roles: as a manpower reserve for NATO as a whole, as a nuclear base and, most importantly, as the fundamental heartland of the Mediterranean for NATO. Italy's Mediterranean role, by much the most important, must be seen not only in terms of the specific bases and functions, but even more importantly in terms of the role geography gives Italy; that is, the implications of Italy's geographic relationship to other countries.

(1) **Manpower reserves.** A first Italian NATO role relates to the central front. Some American military experts have argued that, in the event of a Soviet attack on the central front, Italy, either as a front or as support, must be written off. Instead, all reinforcements and efforts should be concentrated on the North German plain to repel or at least delay the onslaught. But many European strategists have by and large ignored that particular recommendation generally considering Italy's main-front NATO role to be as important as that of any other European member, save of course the Federal Republic. For in support of a defense of Central Europe, air, ground and naval units, with both conventional and nuclear capabilities are stationed on Italian territory; logistics depots and reception facilities for external reinforcements are there as well. Most of Italy's more than 200,000-man Army is committed to NATO. Forces in northeastern Italy can help block a potential Soviet land invasion route to Southern Europe, particularly if the situation in Yugoslavia should alter.

Italy thus gives depth to the central front, and is one of the principal pipelines to, and logistic backups of, SACEUR. Italy and the United States are continually modernizing and extending contingency plans. At this time they are, for example, working out the details of plans for joint marine landing exercises.

It is also pertinent to put Italy's economic problems in perspective. Despite their enormity Italy remains the world's seventh largest industrial power, producing much of its own high-technology weaponry, and is one of the major arms exporters in the world. In defense spending, Italy ranks fourth among European NATO allies, behind the Federal Republic, France and the United Kingdom, and is committed to increasing its army size back to earlier levels. Unlike Britain, Italy has been moving forward with a 10-year equipment modernization program for each of its services (600 Leopard II tanks are to be bought this next year, for example).

(2) **Nuclear reserve.** Thirteen tactical nuclear bases are in northern industrial Italy—as at Livorno, Vicenza, and Aviano, the great majority of whose several hundred warheads are for support of Italian forces. But here again Italy has a role in relation to overall NATO strategy. To the north of Italy is a belt made up of the two neutral states, Austria and Switzerland; to the west is France, about whose actual engagement in a European war one cannot be wholly certain. Italy thus not only gives depth to the central front for tactical air. Its bases are a reserve for the tactical nuclear weapons that might become necessary in the event of a Soviet attack

on the central front. True, the Nike-Hercules sites might well be phased out given the lack of a threat of massed aircraft in this region. A program of modernization, increased security, and substantial consolidation of bases would give the appearance of "progress" by phasing out substantial numbers of outmoded weapons; but any cutback in operational capability would have large implications for general European security.

(3) The bases. The Naples-Gaeta complex is headquarters for the Allied Forces Southern Command, with over 3,000 American naval personnel and over 10,000 American civilians and dependents in the area. It is the home port of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. When asked where the Sixth Fleet would go if this base were to be closed, a senior American official responded that there would not be a Sixth Fleet. Aside from its primary geographic implication, the point is that this enormous complex could not be duplicated elsewhere. Neither Greece nor Turkey in the present circumstances can be seen as potential alternatives; nor can Spain, which is outside the alliance; nor France, outside the integrated alliance structure.

Sigonella, an Antisubmarine Warfare base in Sicily, makes coverage of the entire Mediterranean possible with maritime patrol aircraft. P-3 Orions fly out of Rota in Spain, too far west to cover the eastern third of the Mediterranean. After 1979, Spanish restrictions at Rota on the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable aircraft will take effect in any event. The only other existing base that conceivably could substitute for Sigonella is Souda Bay in Crete. But Greece has lessened its commitment to NATO and its present domestic difficulties, along with the bargaining tactics of the Greek Government with Washington in working out terms of a military assistance agreement, plainly put Souda Bay out of the running.

La Maddalena in Sardinia is an important anchorage, with a submarine tender. The tender now supports four to five attack submarines in the Mediterranean. Before 1971 three and a half submarines had been the rule, but Admiral Zumwalt sought to increase NATO effectiveness in the Mediterranean. La Maddalena is a popular target in Italy, thanks to the issue of nuclear waste. The U.S. Navy considers the accusation a canard, given the lack of any evidence of nuclear discharges since the beginning of its use. Still, La Maddalena is an easy scapegoat for PCI propagandists, though party spokesmen are quick to point out that other parties of the left join them in attacking it.

Italy's military infrastructure attendant to the bases and to NATO's role in the Mediterranean also is impressive. Communications, command and control throughout Italy are good and are constantly being improved. Elaborate Italian-American treaties, under NATO's article 3 (which provides for the bilateral agreements necessary to make the alliance effective) exist to support the lines of communication and logistics flow. The NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) depends on Italy for much of its coverage, and the Sixth Fleet has its communications center in the Naples-Gaeta complex. Although precise costs have apparently not been determined, or even rough ones estimated, plainly it would be prohibitively expensive either to duplicate or to replace any of these systems in Spain, France, or any other country in different political circumstances, given congressional sensitivity to costs alone.

(4) Geography. If all the Italian bases could be duplicated elsewhere—or at least their operational functions replicated (and it is not evident how this could be done even without reference to cost)—the most important function would not only *not* be fulfilled; its

absence would be underlined. The Italian peninsula nearly bisects the Mediterranean. The sea is less than 100 miles wide between Sicily and the Tunisian coast. NATO thus has an extremely important capability to monitor the flow of all traffic, surface and submarine, from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. This capability and the possibility for sea control that Italy's geography affords, bolsters the argument of American officials that NATO could not really have a Mediterranean role without Italy, or with reduced or compromised Italian participation.

Conditions in this part of the world can change swiftly. In 1975, prior to the June municipal Italian elections in which the PCI made such dramatic gains, it was common for NATO planners to pin all hopes on Italy for the survival of NATO's southern flank. In the Western Mediterranean, the Portuguese situation had deteriorated apace, with Spain providing a continuing question mark as Franco's health worsened. The situation for NATO and for the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean was no better. As a result of the 1974 Cyprus crisis both Greece and Turkey altered their relationship to the alliance quite basically. Greece withdrew from the military organization of the alliance, and though it subsequently has tried to minimize the effects of its precipitate action, it is still haggling with Washington over terms of a new military pact, and could easily lower the level of its NATO involvement.[3]

Turkey, even more damagingly, almost totally ended bilateral cooperation with the United States for a time. Because of peculiar geologic factors—the faults underlying both Turkey and the Soviet Union—the Turkish action had a literally devastating effect, which was largely unappreciated by the public and Congress in the United States, on the American ability to monitor sensitive developments within the Soviet Union. Ankara and Washington have ended the impasse by negotiating a new military pact, though it remains unratified, thus leaving open the possibility of more haggling if the Greek-American pact looks too generous from Ankara's point of view. In the meantime, Turkey in 1976 became the recipient of more Soviet aid than any other state. Ankara has, at least for now, accepted the Soviet characterization of its new *Kiev*-class carrier as a cruiser, thus permitting it to transit the Turkish straits, a substantial bending of the 1936 Montreux Convention.[4] Were the Italian role in NATO to come under a shadow, Turkish reactions might well be to shift the balance of its ties further away from the West, and to open more new lines to Moscow.

A final point about Italy's relation to NATO and the United States is that the Italian government and civil service since the end of World War II have been extremely adaptive in sorting out problems of allied relationships. During the Cyprus crisis, the question arose of what to do about nuclear stocks in Greece in the event of a worsening of the crisis. Italy was prepared to allow a transfer of them to its own bases, thus playing an important role as a strategic NATO backdrop (though in fact it proved unnecessary). When the American Congress placed an embargo on Turkey, Italy moved swiftly to help fill Turkey's military needs. A bond of shared aspirations between Italian and Western leaders has resulted in an unstated ability to work in the most sensitive areas when it counts. Intelligence ties are excellent, thanks to the similarity of outlook between the services. It is this sort of tie that American military leaders fear would be lost first with the PCI formally in the government. It is particularly worrisome, because there would be nothing that could be said publicly about such losses.

The Central Question. Many students of the Italian problem argue that the

case for the military importance of Italy to NATO begs the question. The PCI leadership, at least that part led by and responsive to Enrico Berlinguer, has repeatedly asserted in recent years its belief that NATO is necessary. While Henry Kissinger warned of the perils of PCI ascendance and issued dire admonitions to Italian voters prior to the election, American political scientists and many analysts in the U.S. Government and elsewhere questioned the appropriateness of the debate and disagreed most strenuously with Kissinger over the implications of a PCI government or of a *compromesso storico*.

The most superficial review of PCI history from Gramsci forward reveals why students of Italy are so often persuaded of the genuineness of PCI adherence to Western traditions of parliamentary democracy and, to a lesser extent, to continued Western European membership in NATO. Although the party still practices democratic centralism, it is of a more flexible sort than any ruling Communist Party, and its membership criteria are loose enough to irritate and even shock orthodox Communists from bloc countries. Recently reported conflicts in the Central Committee underline how different the PCI is from the CPSU. In practice, the PCI's ability to work with the other Socialists and Christian Democrats in recent years would tend to underline the contention that, in power, however much more radical its policies would be than those of the other Italian parties (save the more doctrinaire PSI), its practices and behavior would be parliamentary. Since 1969 the party leadership has come out with increasing openness to a position supportive of Italian membership of NATO. Proponents of this line of argument emphasize that the PCI position is not tactical in any important sense, but is a fundamental commitment derived from its own definition of self-interest, which requires above all that it maintain independence from Moscow.

On the other hand, even if we discard the hypothesis that the PCI is simply a Soviet Trojan horse, we must ask what would be the effect on NATO of a growing PCI role, given the party's recent assertion that it would be "unthinkable that Italian Communists . . . should accept the Atlantic Pact as it is . . . in particular as one of the basic instruments of American interference" in Italian life.[5] Surely then the possibly massive alteration of NATO that would be the price of adjusting the alliance to PCI demands bears examination.

There is the additional point that the PCI is, and has chosen to remain, throughout these years of disagreement with the Soviets, within the broad movement of Communist Parties that are led by Moscow. Unlike the ruling parties of China, Yugoslavia or Albania, or several small nonruling Communist Parties around the globe, the PCI has not opted to leave Moscow's gravitational field.

If the PCI has moved in its foreign policy principles to a slogan of "equidistance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.," that is a long way from the present situation of a governing Italian Party that identifies with and closely collaborates with the United States. How genuine can one in fact take the PCI's democratic protestations to be, even if one does not doubt the sincerity of PCI Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer? For by the most optimistic estimates (from a Western vantage point), perhaps a fourth of the PCI—mostly those of the older generation—are potential CPSU supporters of one sort or another. That means several hundred thousand cadre are at least residually loyal to Moscow. Who can guarantee that Armando Cossutta, the hard-line pro-Soviet leader, will not stage a comeback and reverse the gains made by moderate and centrist Communists in the last 2 years, particularly at and since

the 1974 PCI congress?[6] If the PCI claims to oppose Soviet attempts to develop a position of hegemony in Western Europe (and in Yugoslavia), it largely supports its initiatives elsewhere in the world. The PCI explicitly or implicitly opposes American policy nearly everywhere, particularly in third-world conflicts of recent years, Indochina, Angola, and the Middle East for example, and has fundamentally different conceptions of how the North-South dialogue should be carried on. Indeed, the PCI's opposition to America and American policy is insistent, often shrill, while no corresponding threat from the East is admitted, and Soviet policy and society often are praised. Thus dissidents in the Soviet Union always are referred to as 'Dissidents' in inverted commas. When President Sadat of Egypt visited Rome in the spring of 1976, the PCI press, for example, admonished Egypt against becoming entrapped by American imperialism, rather than congratulating him on freeing himself from Soviet clutches, for which, in fact, it criticized him.

It may be, however, that neither of these points of view is as pertinent as is the actual dynamics that will come into play if the PCI role in the Italian Government continues to increase. For assuming that PCI adherence to parliamentary democracy is genuine and that its commitment to NATO is honored, the very nature of the PCI world view will have a great effect on NATO. There will be at least a decade during which the PCI (on the optimistic assumption) completes its purported evolution to a position akin, say, to that of the German SPD—an evolution which it is argued is irreversible and already well along the way. And during this decade they would presumably have made a number of demands on NATO which might change its character basically. The first relates to their view of the United States, the second to their view of NATO strategy.

Note first how relatively important Italy's bilateral ties with the United States are, compared with other European bilateral ties with the United States. In Portugal, for example, American influence has always been marginal, and was especially so after the Armed Forces Movement came to power, particularly given the high-level American distrust even of such center-left leaders as Soares. It was thus largely up to other NATO Allies to help Portugal's democratic forces combat the radical dictatorship towards which Portugal was heading during 1974-75. But for Italy, the American presence looms much larger than NATO's, as such, and indeed it is that American presence, especially as in the multinational enterprises, which plays so large a part in PCI ideology and hagiography (if not in practice, as some would insist).

The real question is, given the centrality in PCI ideology of the notion of a Socialist Europe freed from the domination of *both* superpowers, how readily would the party be able to continue the cooperation that the Italian Government has had for so long with the United States, particularly in sensitive areas? Some American analysts believe that it could continue, that a piecemeal policy of testing the PCI, and building cooperation step-by-step could work; that a two-track policy of anti-Communist rhetoric on our side combined with practical cooperation *sotto voce* with the PCI (and the same *mutatis mutandis* obtaining for the PCI) would work.

But more importantly, of what would such a two-track policy be in support? The real question is whether Italy's NATO partners *should* appear to encourage the PCI with such a two-track policy. If PCI *ideology* seeks a Europe without America (despite whatever is said of a short-term and tactical nature), then one might expect that, in due course, the party's internal dynamics would drive it towards that position,

given the underlying, deep and frequently vented hostility to and suspicion of America and its military and economic European missions. What skeptics are asking is whether it is credible to suppose that a Marxist-Leninist Party, however devoted to Italian independence, would really want to sustain enough of the present military infrastructure to keep the Italian-NATO and Italian-American alliances strong. If Gaullists were willing to throw the American-dominated NATO infrastructure out, would the PCI find it all that difficult to do the same? The argument often used to counter this line of reasoning is that the PCI leaders have again and again told visiting Americans that such would not be so, that it is in their interest to keep NATO strong (without specifying who defines that), which they also state to an Italian electorate not wholly without fears of Communist governance. Even those most generous interpreters of PCI intent concede that La Maddalena could well be an early victim of an explicit PCI role in government policy formation, without however realizing the gravity of the military stakes involved with denying an anchorage so far forward (relative to the ultimate supply and support base in Norfolk).

The other point is doctrinal and theoretical. The PCI predictably calls for a refashioning of NATO doctrine, away from the progress that has proceeded in the past decade. "First use" of nuclear weaponry is condemned, nuclear-free zones are urged; foreign bases (that is, those of the United States abroad) are condemned. The logic of these positions, with the Soviet Union located where it is, is precisely to reinforce Soviet advantage and weaken NATO. Given Soviet preponderance on the continent, the problem could be great. These positions to be sure are positions of Communist Parties most everywhere, which only underlines the point of who benefits. In effect PCI ideology would have NATO become passive in strategy at a time when the Soviet Union continues a massive build-up on Western Europe's eastern border (the implications of which are flatly denied by the PCI).

The problem for NATO becomes apparent when one asks what would happen were the PCI to begin making demands of the alliance which proceeded either from naivete or disingenuousness, which would most certainly happen prior to the claimed total transformation of the party. For example, using individual precedents from other NATO countries, the PCI could demand that nuclear storage cease, that home porting end, that bilateral American rights be sharply curtailed. Would NATO's refusal to grant such concessions lead to an action-reaction syndrome of self-fulfilling prophecies, much as in the economic arena of other countries, where the refusal for loans after capital flights is often used as justification for radicalizing polities and economies? The burden of proof would appear to be on those arguing that, despite PCI ideology and practice, such a normally predictable pattern would not occur.

What is easiest to predict is that NATO would become a "tiered" affair, something long inimical to its spirit and ideals, if not to its practice. The theoretical equality of NATO members has been an important dimension of the alliance, making the argument for membership by the smaller power governments in their domestic arenas more compelling.

Other strong forces would also drive NATO practice: American defense planners, to whom the really important NATO (nuclear) secrets belong, are unlikely to be willing to allow sensitive data to wend their way into PCI hands, no matter how fervid are Communist assurances of good faith. So an executive committee of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) could be formed, an

executive secretariat for channeling sensitive material could be established in Rome; but there would no longer be the important pretense of equality, and this itself would irritate the PCI leadership. The important question of what would happen to NATO, therefore, has little relation to what the PCI says, genuinely or disingenuously, its intentions are toward NATO, but would have to do with what the fundamental forces driving NATO are, with the PCI formally in the Italian Government. The question is not whether NATO could survive PCI participation, but rather, how much of its essence it would have to concede in order to keep the alliance together.

A NATO Strategy. Can the United States and Italy's European NATO partners do anything to forestall further PCI gains? This question has two dimensions: First, whether the PCI can be prevented from making further direct electoral gains at future elections; and, second, whether Western policy can be so set as not to harden Italian lines against Western pressure, given the reality of expanded PCI power that already obtains in the government (and which would increase at the next election if the same trend continues).

Western leverage is usually considered to be economic, particularly if capital continues to flow out at the 1976 rate. But no Western government is willing to contemplate actual economic sanctions against Italy. Its economy is enmeshed in the European Common Market and it is difficult to envisage how such leverage could be applied *post facto* without hardening attitudes.

So the primary variable may be political, and here attitudes are sharply divided on what in 1976 was the "Kissinger line." Supporters of it argue that Christian Democratic emissaries urged the United States to continue the pressure and argue that it brought real results in the June election, thereby forestalling otherwise much greater PCI gains, and forced the PCI to come forward and declare itself on critical alliance issues. Opponents argue that Kissinger was everywhere criticized in Europe for his persistence and lack of delicacy, and see a nationalistic backlash as one result. They would also argue that it was *Moscow* that inadvertently drew the PCI out in its otherwise successful effort to organize a European Communist Party conference.

One thing that becomes evident from a tactical point of view is that it clearly will be more useful to *say* less about what the United States and NATO would do if the PCI formed a *compromesso storico* with the DC, since it is not altogether evident what in practice we would do in any event, and the dark hints of the variety Kissinger used might turn out to be a bluff. What NATO allies, presumably working through the SPD and other like-minded parties, can do is to ask the PCI to spell out very precisely what it would propose to do with the NATO military infrastructure; where it proposed to limit American involvement in Italian affairs, and so forth. One would then ask what equivalent limits the PCI would propose for the Soviet Union among her allies, and then proceed to draw the PCI out on many ancillary questions: what would it do to protest the persecution of Soviet Jewry; to follow up on Basket Three in the CPCE? in MBFR negotiations? would it press the Soviet Union in a meaningful way to loosen the strings on its colonial empire in the Baltic and in Central Asia? what are its thoughts on the relevance of parliamentary democracy in third-world countries? One would then watch carefully to see if the PCI press could come to be at least as friendly in its attitude toward its American "ally" as it is toward its alleged adversary in the Soviet Union, whose numerous virtues have been extolled to the Italian people in its press for a generation.

All this might make the PCI look like more and more of a bad thing to Moscow, in the manner of the Dubcek or the Yugoslav Government. It might even split the PCI into an SPD-like open party and a hard-line Marxist-Leninist Party, which would be the most desirable outcome of those which it is possible for Westerners to contemplate. As it is, the PCI is getting something of a free ride, by not having to govern at the national level, and by not having to declare itself publicly without hedging on the really important foreign policy issues. At present, the PCI is able to convince numerous Western observers of its sincerity in wanting a strong NATO (among other things), at the same time that, according to American officials of a different persuasion, PCI leaders are reported to have assured bloc leaders of their adherence to such fundamental Marxist-Leninist tenets as the "leading role" of the CPSU in Communist affairs. All this needs clarification. As it stands, if the PCI began to govern, the West would be in the invidious position of having to regard "good behavior" on the part of the PCI as the most difficult problem of all; and whether the party was stalling or not would not be evident for at least several years, when it might be too late to avert a dangerous outcome.

Meantime, with PCI strength increasing, it is a natural process for those who see PCI ascendance as inevitable to start trimming their sails to what they think Communist policy would be; some of which, reportedly, began happening even before the election.

Comfort has been taken in some circles from the case of Portugal in 1974-75, where the Communist Party was for a time the increasingly dominant, and certainly the most effective, party member of a coalition with the military. NATO had the agonizing problem of dealing with Portuguese delegates to the Brussels headquarters and to all regular meetings in such a fashion as neither to compromise sensitive material nor, by the manner of its action, to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The problem was largely solved for NATO on an *ad hoc* basis, because Portuguese NATO delegates tended to sympathize with—and wished to be responsive to—NATO's dilemma, which many did by not insisting on reading material that might well be compromised by their fellow nations. This situation would be unthinkable with the PCI, as they have made clear.

The American Embassy in Lisbon found that the problem of security was real enough. Communist bureaucrats used information as a lever to obtain further information and to put the Americans on the defensive and in as bad a light as possible. A respectable Italian Socialist in the Defense Ministry might find it impossible to resist pressure to share information with a "liberal" PCI member in the Ministry of Agriculture, who might find it moving into the hands of a follower of Cassutta. This sort of thing happened in Portugal, often with direct effect on American, if not NATO, interests.

True, there are considerable differences between the then-fluid Portuguese situation and the one emerging in Italy. In Portugal tactics were of the essence. In Italy the PCI has already adopted its strategy: It will not (it points out) come to power with a dog in the manger attitude nor will it be held down as an embarrassment by parliamentary partners. Since Italy is a founding member of the NPG, the sort of information to which it might have access in power, is cosmic in implication. It is doubtful that the kind of machinery set up in Iceland when Communists were in the coalition there (compartmentalizing sensitive information through special—and safe—hierarchies) would be possible in Italy. High-ranking American military sources have argued that it would be most difficult to keep classified material entirely out of PCI hands at NATO

bases in Italy with the party in power, even if the nuclear secrets could be kept.

The issues for Western security are very serious, even without thought to the "worst case" outcome. What is curious in so many reactions to the prospect of PCI participation in the Italian Government is the eagerness with which so many Westerners have sought to play down the relationship of *Soviet* gains to PCI gains. The issue is not whether the PCI would cast its lot in with Moscow; it would not. The question is at what rate PCI ascendance would *impede* the integration and further development of NATO (no one expects the PCI to further it). If Westerners cannot see this, Moscow presumably can, and thus one looks for some solid evidence of the purported disquiet in Moscow over the gains of the PCI about which one hears so much. The PCI, after all, has both an "objective" and a "subjective" role in relation to Soviet-led communism, which is increasingly plural politically but militarily as monolithic as ever.

Envisage a graph: On the vertical axis is utility to NATO/Moscow, on the horizontal axis, time. A red line represents objective utility to Moscow of a PCI-dominated Italian Government, a blue line represents the utility to NATO of such a government. Would a downward blue line intersect an upward red line around 1980? The red line might well be bell-shaped, but the question of where and when it intersects the blue one is important. Possibly by 1985 the PCI will have moved far enough away from Moscow to be a net liability to it: But *meantime* NATO might have been crippled by the concessions required to sustain continued Italian membership.

If the *compromesso* occurs, or if the PCI forms a government, then the line that President Carter espoused in his quest for the Democratic nomination would no doubt be the operational one: that Italy's NATO partners would continue to deal with it as best they could. What remained of the failed Kissinger line would be relegated to obscurity.

A final comment. The situation in Italy does not exist in a vacuum. Despite the fact that the PCI is the largest Communist Party in a NATO country, there are parallels and lessons elsewhere. PCI strength has risen at much the same time as the left has grown in power in France, and in the same period in which a Communist Party came close to seizing power in Portugal; given the intensity of links between European states, one must assume systemic sources. All this happened during a period of unprecedented failure of Western will; and during a period of unparalleled military buildup on the part of the Soviet Union: factors that always have an effect on voters even if they are not conscious of the specific influence. There is no particular reason why the PCI's strength would not be eroded in a new period of European coherence and economic progress, even if the more basic source of PCI strength has been in DC incompetence and failure.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Following his graduation from Stanford University, Professor Thompson earned his Ph.D. at Oxford University. He is presently a member of the faculty at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is a former White House Fellow, having served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His most recent book is *The Lessons of Vietnam*, coedited with Col. Donaldson D. Frizzell.

NOTES

1. The writer would like to thank the numerous individuals in the State Department, Defense Department, and in the scholarly community whom he interviewed in the preparation of this study, and who offered thoughtful comments on a draft of this article. The views expressed are of course his own.

2. For useful background to the PCI, see Donald L.M. Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968), and Donald L.M. Blacker, "Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism," in Donald L.M. Blacker and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *Communism in Italy and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); for general background to Italy's relation to NATO, see Primo Vannicelli, *Italy, NATO, and the European Community: The Interplay of Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics,* Harvard Stndies in International Affairs, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1974; and for a contemporary PCI view of its role, see Sergio Segre, "The 'Communist' Question in Italy," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1976; for a general view of Italy's position in the global setting, see Wynfred Joshua, "The Mediterranean and Italy: Global Context of a Local Problem," *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* Georgetown University, 1976.

3. For a pungent assessment of the effect of Greek wrangling on the status of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The Homeless Sixth Fleet," *Washington Post,* 30 June 1976, p. 19.

4. See Barry Buzan, "The Status and Future of the Montreux Convention," *Survival,* November-December 1976, pp. 242-247.

5. Alberto Jacoviello, 'Il "caso Italia" e la Nato', *l'Unita,* 1 March 1976, also cited in *Survival,* July-August 1976, p. 166.

6. Some observers have also argued that, however liberal is the leadership of the PCI, the middle echelon is much harder-lined, as is the rank and file (in considerable contrast to France, where the opposite relationship exists). This would be borne out by the near unanimity with which the Soviet Union was praised after the Czech invasion of 1968.

7. For an incisive examination of the PCI's world view see Giuseppe Are, "Italy's Communists: Foreign and Defense Policies," *Survival,* September-October 1976, pp. 210-216.



SET AND DRIFT

NATIONAL SECURITY MODELS AND VIETNAM

by

Colonel Huntly E. Shelton, Jr., U.S. Army

For nearly a decade the United States was actively involved in a war halfway around the world in South Vietnam which cost her approximately 56,000 lives and $150 billion. This effort, initially thought to be a means for assuring the long-term survival of a South Vietnamese government whose policies were favorable to the United States, served instead only to delay for slightly over 10 years its collapse and the subsequent Communist takeover.

Such a significant commitment of U.S. national power in the form of blood and treasure to an effort that ultimately failed is, to say the least, perplexing if not mind-boggling. It is certainly a cause for national concern and self-scrutiny of whether the U.S. involvement was justified and, if so, in what terms. Perhaps equally, if not more important to the analysis is the realization that, if we come to understand thoroughly the justification for involvement of the United States in such a tragic undertaking, we may gain a better insight of ourselves as a nation and as a society. Hopefully, such a study would result in a more cost-effective approach to foreign policy wherein national security is achieved by a minimum expenditure of national resources on a continuing basis.

As Professor Frederick H. Hartmann argues in his forthcoming book, *The Game of Strategy*, conceptual models are an excellent means of representing the cause and effect relationship of various factors which comprise a given system. Primarily, they permit evaluation of the consequences and utility of a variety of different policy decisions. Each model depicts a different view of reality, is based on different assumptions, and each foresees a different end result. This paper will explore justification, or lack thereof, for U.S. involvement in Vietnam, looking at that involvement through the lenses of three different conceptual models, each of which is characterized by its own set of unique assumptions.

Foreign policy may be thought of as having three phases—concept, content and implementation, with concept governing the choice of content to be implemented. In the conceptual phase, policy formulation questions concerning the objective, anticipated opposition or help and minimum cost approaches are addressed. The concept governs the choice of content to be implemented.

The concept out of which foreign policy originates is an idea, a point of view, a perspective of the relations of nations. Basic to, and an integral part of this notion of how nations interact, is a set of assumptions which ultimately govern the shape and content of a nation's foreign policy. These assumptions and how they affect analyses of responses to the policy formulation questions, provide a framework for selection or rejection, as the case may be, of interests which make up the total foreign policy concept. This analytical process can be thought of as a function of an intellectual model in our head. We should be most concerned with the conceptual phase because its output is policy content. Since the conceptual phase is governed largely by a perception of what the world is truly like, models describing the conceptual phase will vary in construction as a function of perspective.

Three national security conceptual models will be used in exploring the justification, or lack thereof, for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. They are: containment, collective security, and cardinal principles. The models will be separated into two categories, those which justify U.S. involvement and those which tend to show involvement as a poor cost-effective choice. The assumptions on which a particular model is based and its construction are the two predominant factors which will serve to differentiate between models leading to involvement and those which do not.

It is important to understand that models can justify involvement and yet not be cost-effective. Each model, by unique construction, will purport to show a singular way in which the reality of the relations of nations is perceived, resulting from its assumptions and perspective. Each model has a built-in way of approaching costs. As each model is examined in turn, its characteristics will first be reviewed and then its support or nonsupport of U.S. involvement will be analyzed.

Vietnam Involvement: Justified. Two national security models generally support U.S. involvement in Vietnam. These are containment and collective security. Perhaps the applicability of these models as a means of justifying the policies of the United States stems largely from the fact that they are a product of American thought which had overriding impact on formulation of foreign policy until very recently. Neither of the two models addresses alternative options or courses of action for the express purpose of selecting the most cost-effective means to an objective, nor do they purport to do so.

(1) **Containment.** The containment model stems from an idea, a perception, that communism is monolithic, aggressive and significantly dangerous to the national security of the United States. This being the case, the idea justifiably triggers an action policy to contain communism at every point around its periphery. Containment, thought of in the context of strategy, surrenders all options to the enemy. It dictates *who* the enemy is, *where* he must be fought and *when* he will be fought. It provides the policymaker with a minimum of options, and totally neglects consideration of costs and open-endedly accepts enemies on the basis of ideology.

Answers to the three policy formulation questions, important factors in the conceptual phase of policy, are foreordained in the containment model. The objective is to prevent the spread of communism. Who will help or hinder does not really matter, the United States will go it alone if necessary. Therefore, the question is of little use in the containment model. The amount paid will be whatever price the aggressive Communist nation chooses or causes to be attached to its effort.

The world as the United States

understood it in 1955, that is our perception of the relations of its nations, caused us to become involved in Vietnam. We saw a continuing aggressive effort on the part of communism, rooted in the Soviet Union, to dominate the world. As the most powerful post-World War II non-Communist nation, the United States saw it her mission to protect the will and rights of free people wherever they may become endangered.

The roots of the containment idea most probably began with the 1938 lesson of Munich (appeasement leads to further aggression), but they only really started to take form in the Truman Doctrine pronounced in 1947. The Truman Doctrine made an open-ended commitment on the part of the United States to free people everywhere to help maintain their freedom against aggressive powers seeking to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. In intent, however, it was directed towards a perceived aggressive and expansionist Soviet strategy in Europe. This perception, strongly enforced by Soviet actions in Central Europe, gave rise to a three-point policy—Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and North Atlantic Pact—directed toward containment of the Soviet Union. In reality, however, the policy was a balance of power strategy which was clothed in the apparel of the containment model, because of the unique way in which the United States perceived world politics.

Because no Communist expansion occurred in Europe after pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine, the United States credited containment strategy as the correct prescription for its objective, and when North Korea crossed the 38th parallel we chose to export European containment ideas to Korea. The United States, leading the free world in a fight against the spread of communism, believed its successful efforts in Korea resulted in plugging still another leak.

In the mid-1950's, Indochina appeared to be a weak spot on the periphery. The United States elected to take the torch from France after she lost her ability to influence events in Indochina and we implemented policies designed to aid in the protection of the will and rights of its free people. In so doing, the United States failed to realize the root forces at work in Indochina at that time were anticolonialism and nationalism, not a dominant communism. In effect, because of our ideology and the idea that communism was seeking world domination, we were ordained to fight it, alone if necessary, wherever it occurred and at whatever cost necessary. Our predilection resulted from a mind-set forged by national experience and ideology. In 1965, when it appeared that South Vietnam would collapse without the assistance of the U.S. armed forces, what would be more appropriate than for the United States to pay the price and stem the tide of communism? This we gallantly set out to do as plans were put into operation that eventually caused U.S. force levels in South Vietnam to go above a half million servicemen. We marched to the tune of a world as we saw it to exist.

(2) **Collective Security.** The collective security model stems from the belief that aggression, no matter where, is a threat to peace in the world and that peace-loving nations will rally and collectively thwart the desires of the aggressor. Like the containment model, it is an open-ended cost model, basically assuming that success will come if the rules of the strategy are followed. With the exception of the question concerning who will help or hinder, answers to the three policy formulation questions generally follow the same line of thought as in the containment model. The objective is to defend against aggression. All states pursuing the collective security model are expected to help. The cost to be paid is whatever is required.

It is important to note that, as in the containment model, the identity of the aggressor, who is attacked, and where the attack takes place are all of little consequence. A significant advantage accruing from the collective security model, however, is the built-in concept that the total costs to overcome the aggression will be borne by all members. Therefore, the cost to each individual member is small—a significant amount of protection for a small premium.

Theoretically, the collective security model has much to offer. In practice, however, it is difficult to implement and has not served its intended purpose for a number of reasons. Two recent efforts, mainly by the United States, to establish collective security for the nations of the world have enjoyed only partial success. The League of Nations, founded after World War I, and the United Nations, established after World War II, each had its own difficulties along with successes. In the Italo-Ethiopian case in 1936 the League experienced difficulty in imposing effective sanctions against Italy. The Korean War in 1950 serves as a success story for the United Nations (primarily because the absence of the Soviet representative prevented a veto of the key resolution in the Security Council). It would be incorrect to say the idea of collective security cannot be made to work, but it would be unwise, considering the realities of today's world, to have very much faith in it as a conceptual model governing policy content.

Nevertheless, in theory the model does exist and in theory, although somewhat speculative, it can be made to work. Under this premise, U.S. involvement in Vietnam could be justified. North Vietnamese forces were introduced into South Vietnam during the early part of 1965, an act constituting direct and overt aggression. The United Nations, a body of nations subscribing to collective security, would have been completely justified in forcing the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese troops, machinery permitting. U.S. involvement, as a member of the United Nations, would not only have been justified but would have been expected. The reasons for U.N. sanctions not being brought to bear in Vietnam arise largely from its organizational deficiencies, as well as the world political climate in the 1960's, with its manifold ramifications.

The point to remember clearly, however, is that the collective security model is valid and will cause commitment of resources to thwart aggression regardless of the who, when, where and cost factors. The collective security model has a built-in factor requiring involvement for those nations which faithfully observe its rules. Theoretically, then, it follows that U.S. involvement in Vietnam to preserve peace in the world would have been justified by the collective security model.

Vietnam Involvement: Poor Cost-Effective Decision. A model to be used for cost-effective analysis must be constructed to consider costs on a cause and effect basis, must be able to function with variable constraints and possess a capability for iterative processing to permit the most cost-effective option or set of options to be reached. The only model which seems to lend itself to these requirements is the cardinal principles model.

The balance of power model is the essence of the relations of nations, but it lacks rigor, discipline and preciseness. It needs to be coupled with the cardinal principles model to be useful to any particular nation. In this respect, one should view the balance of power more as a theory pertaining to the relations of states in a system and the cardinal principles model as an intellectual thought process employed by a nation in the system during the conceptual phase of its policy formulation. With this in mind, I find only the cardinal

principles model to be cost sensitive and, in particular, to show U.S. involvement in Vietnam was a poor cost-effective decision. Therefore, it will be the only one discussed for this purpose but with the understanding that it functions within the balance of power theory.

Cardinal Principles. The essence of the cardinal principles model is contained in four interrelated principles. These are past-future linkages, third-party influences, counterbalancing national interests and conservation of enemies. The first two principles operate to establish a perspective, and the second two function to provide momentum and direction to policy content.

The past-future linkage principle serves to bring the present into proper focus by linking it to what has been and what is to be. Third-party influences strive to take into account the interactive effects of a nation's policies linked to all policies influencing the action of a target nation. Counterbalancing national interests brings into play the selection between alternative interests to vary the content of policy as may be required by existing or predicted constraints. Conservation of enemies is most important for it dictates that a nation should not acquire more enemies at one time than it can handle.

The governing constraint in the model is the number of enemies one can entertain at a point in time. The number of enemies is a direct function of the interests that constitute the content of policy. Study and analysis of past-future linkages and third-party influences provides the foundation for intelligent selection of an interest or its alternative as necessary to conserve enemies. Thus it is seen that the model is an iterative process directed primarily toward maintaining a policy content that has a reasonable chance of being successful. The process takes place in a cost-effective framework that is not open-ended for any variable.

Had the cardinal principles model been used in the conceptual phase of policy formulation during the early 1960's, answers to the three policy formulation questions would have predicted U.S. involvement in Vietnam to be a costly venture. In particular, the addition of China to our list of perceived enemies would have been foreseen with greater clarity. The model would have shown that the Soviet Union could gain greater freedom of action as a result of China being taken off her back to become involved in the Vietnamese problem. If past-future linkages had been studied sufficiently, quite likely the true nature and cause of the violence in Indochina could have been correctly understood, thus making the advisability of our use of force questionable at best. The geographic location of Vietnam would have revealed that the country was truly of no strategic value since it was not bordered by two or more major powers.

For these reasons, Vietnam's political-military insignificance would have been vividly highlighted. The cardinal principles model would clearly have indicated that the direct and opportunity costs resulting from the involvement would be far greater than any gains hoped to be realized—our freedom of action restricted while that of our true enemy was enhanced, all due to commitment of significant resources to a country of little or no political-military importance.

Choice of a Correct Model. Models addressing the same problem can and do produce significantly different outcomes, primarily because each model operates on a different set of assumptions perceived to be reality. The dilemma of the policymaker, given the choice, is which of the available models is correct? A correct choice can assure the continued survival of a relatively

weak nation while an incorrect choice can result in a waste of national resources possibly leading to disaster and even the downfall of an exceptionally wealthy nation.

To make an intelligent decision as to which model is correct, four criteria must be satisfied. First, the model should require built-in rigor and discipline; second, production of output should be free of bias; third, a wide range of output must be possible as a function of the range of the variables; and, fourth, the model must be sensitive to costs. After applying these criteria in turn to the containment, collective security and cardinal principles models, the cardinal principles model clearly stands out as the most useful.

The process of choosing a correct model is of little use, however, unless the policymaker is capable of rising above the trees to view the forest from better advantage. Unfortunately, this attribute comes only with attainment of maturity in the field of international relations—a plateau which the United States may just be reaching.

Justification for U.S. involvement in Vietnam can be found in two national security models, containment and collective security. Both are insensitive to costs and are based on beliefs that severely restrict their respective ranges of output. They each require commitment of resources with little or no regard to answers to the questions of who was attacked, where, and by whom. These two models are a product of American thought and their fidelity rests in the fact that they truly represent the way American policymakers perceived reality at the time they came into being.

Cardinal principles, a model structured to force consideration of costs, shows U.S. involvement in Vietnam to be a poor venture from a cost-effective point of view. This particular model seeks to have content of foreign policy result from a systematic consideration of four interrelated cardinal principles—past-future linkages, third-party influences, counterbalancing national interests, and conservation of enemies. The model is so structured that it tends to eliminate bias, permits a wide range of output, requires iteration of the thought process to arrive at an acceptable output and forces a perspective that approaches reality.

The characteristics of the cardinal principles model support it as the most useful and correct of all three models discussed in the paper. Unfortunately, such an analysis is of little use, except in an academic sense, unless the policymaker is sufficiently mature in the field of foreign policy to recognize the merits of policy conceived on other than basic beliefs, ideas or ideology. The United States, a fledgling nation, seems to have accepted this notion as evidenced by its recent rapprochement with China. To do otherwise sets the stage for a repeat performance of Vietnam—an extremely costly and wasteful episode in our nation's history.

A CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL DILEMMA: THE IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY

by

Lieutenant Commander James T. Westwood, U.S. Navy

Intelligence operations fall into three broad categories: (1) those by which "raw" data are collected, processed into "finished" information, and disseminated; (2) those conducted to counter-intelligence operations, of whatever kind, of rivals; and (3) those intelligence operations undertaken to influence the course of events, sometimes called clandestine or covert operations. All three kinds of intelligence operations will have an impact on foreign policy. This impact will vary in both scope and degree, because it is policy which gives rise to intelligence operations.

In the affairs of politically organized mankind, there is a ladder of actions which commences with variegated, often amorphous qualities that have come to be called *national interests*. In turn, the element of *policy* gives a certain form and direction to national interests, and from policy comes a scheme or plan of action which is *strategy*. Strategy, in its turn, is implemented by one or more tactics. Thus, intelligence operations are really tactics. There is little or nothing in this view that is mysterious and even less, if anything, that is unreasonable. Where there is no policy, there hardly will be any strategy—or tactics. Where policy is large and encompassing, it must naturally be expected that intelligence operations will occur. That these operations exist and flourish will not be a secret. Indeed, it will be a matter of the widest public awareness. Only certain sources, certain detailed methods, and the degrees of relative success, it is to be hoped—and expected—will be secret.

William E. Colby, the former Director of Central Intelligence, has said that intelligence will not work if exposed. He is quite correct. Exposures and exposes which reveal sources, methods, and degrees of accomplishment are fundamentally damaging in the long term and are critically detrimental to states' interests and policies. That is why such acts are forbidden by and severely punishable under law. One marvels at any group or individual who seriously supposes that a state and its leadership will forego an opportunity to further what it regards to be its interests or, generally, hesitate to defend those interests and policies. After all, men organize collectively for protection against common enemies and for the promotion of a concept of their welfare, i.e., the furtherance of their interests. In so doing they elaborate policies to promote their interests. Intelligence operations of all types are essential and integral to this process, and it is nothing short of amazing that governments, their critics, and their populations at large regularly lose sight of these fundamental conditions and premises. To argue that intelligence operations can be abrogated or suspended is tantamount to expecting that men, organized for political and social purposes have no interests. Intelligence operations are as old as organized man and as new as the most current demands made on them. Though sometimes seemingly independent, they fall closely in line with the patterns of behavior and the values of peoples and their governments.

The contemporary confusion that

surrounds U.S. and other Western intelligence operations in the wake of the Indochina wars and the Watergate conspiracy has its origins in contrasting perceptions of what constitutes U.S. national interests and, accordingly, what the policies to further those interests should be, provided the underlying interests themselves are understood. This problem is not, at its heart, as much a difference over the nature of intelligence operations themselves, though that is what it is widely perceived to be, as it is a matter of difference over what are the U.S. national interests and who is empowered to define them. Democratic states encourage and promote expressed differences, although they generally subscribe to the premise that the majority's will and satisfaction of its wants shall predominate. Americans accept this as a fundamental premise and have institutionalized it. By nature, the governments of democracies are so constituted that more than one body or institution may define and implement national interests, i.e., shape policy. Complicating this situation is the fact that within those bodies, whether legislative, judicial, or executive, there exist varied foci of differing interpretations and emphases as to the expression and the formulation of national interests.

British historian A.J.P. Taylor has remarked that democracies make up their minds slowly, haltingly, and sometimes wrongly. There can be no doubt of this in a system of government in which no one authority defines national interests and sets national policies. One does not have to agree with Taylor to appreciate how both differing and changing perceptions and policies in the same state, and among allies, may work at cross-purposes and lead to distorted impressions of events and motives.[1] It is an understanding of potential pitfalls which leads to the so-called "art of compromise" in hope that a coherent policy will emerge. In any given period of U.S. history, or even in a single year, it is possible to collect a wide range of statements issued by a variety of public officials and private commentators on what is in the national interest. If such a collection is studied in the aggregate, only the most imaginative and perceptive observers can explicate an unbroken line of commonality in the statements and, to a large extent, that line merely will reflect the diverse nature of the democratic process of government and the heterogeneous nature of both the governors and the governed.

Accordingly, it may seem far-fetched to blame intelligence operations by themselves for producing a negative impact on policy. If every intelligence officer resigned over every issue of national interest, policy, and strategy to which the officer objected, there would be scarcely any continuity in a business which requires a high degree of clear-headedness and an unbroken evolution of decisive study and actions. This is not to say that intelligence personnel are blameless by virtue of merely carrying out orders. History is replete with examples of excesses brought about by intelligence officials believing that they can and must define national interests and formulate correct policies.

Among the most perfidious of such excesses is the involvement of the Chief of Royal Serbian Military Intelligence, Lt. Col. Dragutin Dimitrijevic, who plotted and brought about the assassination on 28 June 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne. This assassination was the direct result of extreme intelligence "operational" measures, and had it not occurred, it is entirely likely that some other event would have ignited World War I. Nevertheless, this act is one of the most compelling examples of what can happen from the unrestricted operations of intelligence officials who set about to make and effect their own national policies. The effects on broader policies can be disastrous, and these effects

result from confusing tactical actions with prior policy processes and from misunderstanding relative roles and priorities.

The story of Dimitrijevic, called Apis ("the Bee"), is a fascinating one. At age 37 in 1914, he had had a brilliant career, having been appointed to the post of G2 of the Serbian General Staff. He was a jingoist, an extreme nationalist, and was the prime mover of the notorious Black Hand elite terrorist group. It is of more than passing interest to note that Dimitrijevic enjoyed a close relationship with one Col. Victor Artamonov, then the Russian military attaché in Belgrade. Through Artamonov, the Russians had been financing Dimitrijevic's network inside Austria. In return, Dimitrijevic shared information with the Russians. Dimitrijevic appears not to have thought that the Austrians would declare war over the assassination, but, to be on the safe side, he was guaranteed by St. Petersburg, through Artamonov, that Russia would come to Serbia's defense should Austria-Hungary seek revenge through war. Dimitrijevic was best at intrigue, violence, sabotage, conspiracy, and revolution and that, while brilliant, he knew little about the world beyond Serbian borders and had little appreciation for political feasibilities.[2] The impact which Dimitrijevic's intelligence "operation" had on the foreign policy of Serbia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Europe, and the world is so manifest, and persistent, that to elaborate it here is unnecessary.

A perceptive observer, Sherman Kent, has carefully examined the relationship of intelligence of policy in *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, in which he discusses both the blurring between intelligence operations and policymaking and the need for clear distinctions between the two. He argues that intelligence must not formulate policy and that "it is not the carrier out of operations."[3] He states, "Intelligence's role is definite and simple. Its job might be described in two states: (1) the exhaustive examination of the situation for which policy is required, and (2) the objective and impartial exploration of all the alternative solutions which the policy problem offers."[4]

Kent argues against including in intelligence operations anything that would influence the course and outcome of events. He appears to be strictly opposed to intelligence operations in the sense in which they are widely understood. On closer examination, however, he does not rule them out as a tactic of statecraft. He merely does not want covert operations confused with intelligence.

Covert operations of one government which aim to influence events in other states are no less an historic part of international relations than are the more traditional and open aspects of intelligence. Both exist to support and serve policy. In the extreme they become dangerous and tend to subvert the policies which they were conceived to promote, but, if competently managed and soundly conceived, all intelligence operations serve the aims of policy.

Covert operations have the singularly distinct advantage of carrying out policy without placing national honor on the line. Regardless of their nature, if they fail, they do not leave the taste of defeat in war. For several centuries, Great Britain survived and flourished and a large part of this success was based on what Americans would regard as covert, if not also somewhat shadowy, intelligence operations. We often look to our British heritage with great pride, revering the British as masters of statecraft. The British controlled the Middle East for decades through the services of such now legendary figures as Thomas Edward Lawrence, a gifted Oxford student of modern history and archaeology and the famed Wingate Pasha of Egypt and Sudan, Gen. F. Reginald Wingate, whose eldest son, Lt. Col. Ronald E.L.

Wingate, figured prominently in covert operations during World War II.[5] A recent article in a U.S. military intelligence journal on Lawrence and the Arab Bureau, of which he was a member while serving throughout both peace and war as a commissioned officer in the Royal Army Intelligence, notes that "The Arab Bureau soon came to manage considerable influence over British policy in the Middle East."[6] The story of T.E. Lawrence and his colleagues, a rather well-known illustration of the impact of intelligence operations on policy, is merely one among a host of lesser known examples. They show that covert operations are very much part of the real world.

In his recent work, *KGB–The Secret Works of Secret Agents,* John Barron elucidates, at length, the extent and nature of Soviet covert intelligence operations which implement Soviet policies. It can be argued that Barron's examples are carefully selected to cast Soviet policies in the worst possible light, but it is difficult to deny that the Soviet Union maintains a huge apparatus for influencing events worldwide in opposition to Western governments, Western political values and Western national interests and policies. Western intelligence operations at their very worst have never shown anything like the destructive and demeaning propensities of the operations of the KGB and its predecessor organizations in subverting the many to the few.[7]

"The burgeoning of the national intelligence community, in size and importance of function, has left unresolved the question of who should oversee the intelligence community, particularly the far-flung operations of CIA." Although they sound like a recent comment, Harry Howe Ransom wrote them in 1958.[8] Two factors must be addressed in considering this question: (1) the particular political system which defines U.S. national interests and within which U.S. national policy is made; and (2) the blurring of the distinction between peace and war.

The second factor is founded on a Clausewitzian dictum to which both the democracies and the Soviet Union subscribe.[9] Clausewitz' theories underly the strategy of flexible response: that open warfare is not the only solution to international problems and that there are many gradients of action other than declared warfare. By claiming Clausewitz on both sides of the Iron Curtain, we can accept a common mentor. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, at the head of their respective alliances, pronounce the intransigence of the other in a state of cold but nevertheless real "war." Consequently, all is indeed fair in war, and the actions of one side necessitate counteraction by the other side. Conveniently, because a legal state of war has not been declared, diplomatic relations can be continued along with international trade. Such a relationship is neither evil nor unusual. It has existed in many forms throughout history. Nevertheless, it creates a massive problem for policy, and consequently for intelligence. The whole range of intelligence operations is placed in a difficult position that can easily lead to policy subverting intelligence by tending to suppress the truths that intelligence seeks in support of policy. In 1947, Allen Dulles wrote in a memorandum to the Congress that "intelligence work in time of peace differs fundamentally from that in times of war."[10]

At the risk of seeming to take issue with Clausewitz, it must be emphasized that 30 years ago, Dulles drew a demanding distinction–a distinction lost sight of in the interval between 1947 and 1977. In time of war the requirements of national survival, the most basic of all national interests, will demand intelligence operations which no condition of an uneasy peace can be found to justify. In asserting that a state of *undeclared war* exists between

communism and democracy, ideology is converted into a *raison d'être* which it is ill-prepared and poorly constituted to practice. To the extent that democracies practice the methods of totalitarianism, they damage their basic fabric and thereby ultimately make themselves more susceptible to totalitarian advances.

In the United States this problem for intelligence is rooted in method by which the American government makes policy. However, its current dimensions are of reasonably recent origin. Harry Rositzke, a senior retired CIA officer explains:

> When, in 1948, spurred by the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the Italian political crisis, the National Security Council gave the CIA the responsibility for "political, psychological, economic, and unconventional warfare operations," the straightforward espionage mission of the AIS [American Intelligence Service] was enormously broadened, if not distorted.[11]

The rationale for this broad charter was overpowering in its simplicity: retard the growth of Soviet and all other Communist influence. The cold war was accepted as a fact of international life. Russia was widely thought to be militarily and politically poised to overrun much of Europe, the Near East and Asia. Having fought two gigantic wars in less than a century, the government was extremely anxious for an inclusive, all-round settlement and the Executive Branch therefore was not reluctant to provide initiatives for its new secret intelligence arm. Two years later, the State and Defense Departments, under Presidential instruction, produced a landmark American policy and strategy statement in NSC-68, the text of which was published in the *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1975. Its prescription was to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving predominance by giving the United States superior military power aimed specifically at deterring rather than fighting war while still achieving the national policy objectives of the United States. It contained the outlines of a strategy which recognized the national interests and chief foreign policies at that time. Covert intelligence operations were clearly a preferred alternative to the employment of military forces with the concomitant danger of an atomic exchange.

As time wore on, however, successive Presidents found continuing use for the clandestine service, and the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice found several opportunities for getting certain of their policies implemented without the necessity of an all-or-nothing stand. The growing impact on policy of the lumping together of clandestine operations with the more obvious and military-like operations was ignored. Senior intelligence officers and their subordinates found it increasingly difficult to be all things to all people. National policies, never entirely coherent, became more widely disparate, which was the natural product of plural and sometime contradicting centers of their genesis, formulation, and expression. Intelligence agencies grew in number, complexity, and size in an effort to match growing policy, strategic, and tactical requirements.

The American intelligence community did not grow on its own in the period from 1950 to 1970. Under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson it did not run away with policy; policy ran ahead of it. It attempted a herculean undertaking which if the powers of democratic governments, the Catholic Church, and Islam, had they all acted in concert, could not have accomplished: stopping communism. It was all based on the greatest lesson of modern history—or so it was thought to be—the lesson of Munich: Totalitarianism cannot be appeased; it must be actively fought and stopped.

Thus far, this policy has known only limited success. Communism has been retarded but not stopped. Southeast Asia developed into the ultimate and bitter expression of this truth. It was the dominant focus of extensive policies which, from the earliest period, were increasingly diversified and uncoordinated.[12] Intelligence operations did not fail. Rather policy overreached itself. Short of unrestricted warfare, it is extremely doubtful that communism can be stopped. Even with the overt use of military power, stopping it, per se, is by no means certain. It is simply not a reasonably expressed policy, and never has been. To defeat communism and stop its spread, it has always been necessary to treat its causes: poverty, ignorance, colonialism, distrust, disease, extreme hunger, and the surge of revolution and nationalism. Until these causes are adequately addressed through and by coherent and consistent policy, no amount of clandestine, paramilitary, or military operations will stop communism, which began with violent revolution and continues in that vein.

Returning for a moment to Rositzke, what he in essence stresses is that in the U.S. system of government there is no separate, distinct, and tightly controlled intelligence organization with singular responsibility for political actions that are taken apart from the much greater portion of conventional intelligence—an organization somewhat in the tradition of what is loosely called, in reference to the British experience, the SIS, or the "Secret Intelligence Service." Rositzke argues that intelligence operations in the narrow sense ought to be limited, highly coordinated, tightly controlled and performed by a small, select service distinct from but supported by conventional intelligence. He understands the compelling truth that modern warfare is potentially disastrous to the whole of mankind and that political warfare, or by whatever name so-called, covert action proceeds, is clearly a more preferred alternative in a less than perfect world. Importantly Rositzke's thesis recognizes the required distinction between peace and war as well as recognizing the realities of international affairs. It further recognizes that in a realized system where espionage is kept separate from other intelligence, the possibility that intelligence will be subverted to policy is drastically reduced thereby allowing an intelligence community to concentrate on unbiased estimates and on the straightforward production of intelligence information in fuller support of policy at all levels.

The period 1947 to 1951 was an important one for American policy and strategy. During those years policies and strategies were devised and set in motion which persist to this day. The strategy of deterrence was born during this period. In June 1948 the State Department first proposed the policy that the main strategic purpose of U.S. Armed Forces was not one directly involving combat but was rather one of deterring combat. This policy effectively became the basis of U.S. foreign policy, however sincerely the Soviets may have feared and may continue to fear U.S. aggression. This was a turnabout in U.S. policy and something of a revolution in strategy necessitated in part by the stark menace of atomic warfare. It was a policy which argued that war is not necessarily and inevitably the continuation of politics by other means, that in the words of Rear Adm. J.C. Wylie, USN, "War for a nonaggressor nation is actually a nearly complete collapse of policy. . . . When war comes, we at once move into a radically different world."[13] He understands that the evidence of history at once both invalidates and supports the universality of war.

U.S. policy since Vietnam gives some reason to believe that democracies have options other than war, options which can at least deal practically and successfully with communism and Soviet totali-

tarianism. Events in the Near East, in Africa, and in the Indian Ocean during 1975 and 1976 show what can be done if the several foci of policy coordinate their actions and concentrate on central strategic issues. One of those options is clearly the use of secret, espionage-type intelligence operations in the furtherance of policy, but, however organized, such operations cannot succeed by themselves nor can they be effective if improperly or unwisely employed. If not closely coordinated, disciplined, and used only as required, intelligence operations will have a substantially deleterious effect on policy, and will chase their own tails prior to biting them off.

NOTES

1. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 2d ed., with a reply to critics (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, 1961), p. xi. In his "Preface for the American Reader," Taylor notes national policy confusion. What he actually says is: "It is very hard for a democracy to make up its mind; and when it does so, often makes it up wrong."

2. Joachim Remak, *The Origins of World War I 1871-1914* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967), pp. 97-111, and *Sarajevo* (New York: Criterion Books, 1959), pp. 43-57. Remak, of all historians of the period including Schmitt, has done perhaps the most detailed work on the assassination. The evidence is found largely in firsthand knowledge and in the record of the 1917 Salonica trial of the conspirators including Dimitrijevic. Remak says that Dimitrijevic "was quite possibly the foremost European expert in regicide of his time" (p. 50—*Sarajevo*). Remak is convinced that Dimitrijevic acted entirely on his own without the knowledge of the Serbian Prime Minister, Nicola Pasic.

3. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 182.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

5. Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), v. I, pp. 301-308.

6. Roy E. Smith, "Lawrence of Arabia," *MI Magazine*, Spring 1976, p. 37.

7. An excellent, detailed treatment of the history of Russian espionage organizations and their influence by and on policy may be found in Richard Deacon's *A History of the Russian Secret Service* (London: Frederick Muller, 1972).

8. Harry Howe Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 178.

9. Contemporary Soviet military writing refers frequently to Clausewitz. Chief among the works available in English is Marshal of the U.S.S.R. V.D. Sokolovsky, ed., *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

10. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. *National Defense Establishment Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Armed Services on S.758*, 80th Congress, 1st sess., 1947, pp. 525-528. (Reprinted as Appendix A in the Rausom book.)

11. Harry Rotsitzke, "America's Secret Operations: A Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 341-344.

12. Bernard B. Fall, "Reappraisal in Laos," *Current History* January 1962, p. 10. Were it not for the writings of Fall alone, we probably still would not understand what was really involved in Southeast Asia. In discussing the period from 1958 through 1961, Fall says of the Laotian condition: "It was during that crucial period that American policies clearly diverged according to the viewpoint of each agency involved. . . ."

13. J.C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* cited by Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 476.



THE BAROMETER

(CDR Patrick McLaren, Royal Navy, a student at the Naval War College, comments on the misuse of language.)

What is happening to the English language in America? I am becoming worried and depressed about the increasing misuse of this flexible, beautiful tool of communication. Who invents such words as internalizing, conceptualization, insightful, hospitalization and funeralize? Why are they used? There are better, simpler words or phrases for all these and other horrid concoctions.

It is not just the degradation of words to which I object. The degradation of their use also hurts. Consider, please, the following extract from Professor George Liska's book *Beyond Kissinger*:

> Ideological commitments would be simultaneously eroded by the mutually reinforcing effects of increased domestic affluence and legitimized international influences, the first aided by the diffusion of Western technological assets and the resulting economic interdependence while the second was both facilitated and controlled by a likewise gradual diffusion of status-related prestige assets.

What on earth does this mean? I think that the first part means "Western technology and trade increase domestic affluence which erodes ideological commitments." The second part defies translation because "a likewise gradual diffusion of status-related prestige assets" is, in my view, meaningless. Perhaps I am stupid, but I submit that an equally good case could be made that Professor Liska suffers from intellectual arrogance or verbal diarrhea.

You may say that Professor Liska is an extreme example of American intellectual expression, and I would agree. But he is not, unfortunately, a solitary example. In two consecutive convoluted sentences in a case study for students, a professor at the Naval War College used the following words: "qualitative," "probabilistic" and "visualize." He meant "quality," "probable" and "see" respectively. Regretably I could give further examples *ad infinitum et nauseam*.

The abuse of a language has potentially serious consequences. Writing is an instrument for conveying ideas from one mind to another. Lord Macauley said: "The first law of writing is this: that the words employed should be such as to convey to the reader the meaning of the writer." And Matthew Arnold had this to say on style: "Have something to say and say it as clearly as you can. That is the only secret of style." Both strike me as eminently sensible principles. But American writing abounds with artificial words and verbose, complicated sentences. At a time when nearly half the world uses English as a common working language, I suggest that by debasing that language the United States is in danger not only of fooling itself by an inability to express ideas clearly, but also of fooling her allies for the same reason. The implications are clear.

In short, why utilize utilize when you can use use?



PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

A Primer on S.G. Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State**

by

David Joseph Kenney

Few institutions and fewer men change their country's destiny single-handedly. By deploying a submarine fleet, first the Whiskey-class boat in the 1950's and later the SSBN, away from the Russian coast into the shipping lanes of the world, Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov has rushed his navy into history.

The admiral's disposition of this fleet transformed a country, whose history is a chronicle of struggle with ancient enemies on the Eurasian landmass, into the second maritime nation of the world. Russia was, after 1,000 years, finally free of its own soil.

This deployment was the seminal act of Russian naval history. Russia no longer depends solely on her armies or rocket forces to bring victory by tortuous campaigns so destructive to Russia and her enemies alike. As a consequence, other possibilities of defense and of expansion exist beyond those provided by the ground arms and the nuclear weapons of air and rocket forces.

These possibilities and their potential effect on us are the subject of Gorshkov's most recent and arguably most striking work, *Sea Power of the State*. The book is dense, rich, logical and almost overpowering in breadth. The admiral calls upon the wisdom and experience of a life, dramatically spent, to give us a summa of naval power. This Soviet officer earned his flag during the darkest days of September 1941 and has held it through wars, purges and bloody ideological strife. Whatever else happened to Russia, Gorshkov determined that he should survive as a principal naval leader and that his country should have a navy second to none. He has succeeded in the tasks of building and operating the Soviet Navy. The admiral is that *rara avis*, a maker of history who is kind enough to give us glimpses of the future.

It would be useful to describe what *Sea Power* is *not* about and why Gorshkov writes and builds his arguments the way he does:

(1) The admiral's purpose is not to recast history in a Soviet mold. In this book the revisionist asides are muted and of short duration. True, he must do the usual courtesy to official Soviet history. He even attempts to make Admiral Ushakov, the victor of an engagement with the Turks, into a Russian

*Washington, D.C.: Naval Intelligence Support Center Translation Division, 1976.

Mahan. This predictably comes off badly. To his credit, the admiral focuses principally upon the present and future rather than on descriptions and analyses of past events.

(2) Nor does the admiral propagandize in this work. He writes factually and, compared to the usual Soviet polemicist, dispassionately. From the summit of a brilliant career he can survey the world ocean as few men can. His ships steam everywhere. He no longer needs to be defensive or tentative.

(3) The admiral's hostility to the United States does not influence the book's form or content in a meaningful way- if in fact it ever existed beyond the pages of his earlier, less refined work.* What does show is his great sense of being a Russian. There can be no doubt that in his old age (he is approaching 70) sheer patriotism is one of his great motives.

(4) Gorshkov, finally, is not interested in ship types, missions and weapons systems per se. He is greatly concerned with historical forces and levels of technology, and only as a consequence of these, with the equipment a navy has and the use to which it is put.

Style and Method. Not many people will find Gorshkov's prose style as felicitous as his observations are stimulating. Though his writing in translation is cumbersome to us, his goals in this book are achieved by a subtly constructed and artfully executed stylistic method which cannot be separated from his intent. The admiral was born before the Revolution and heard his first words from a family whose members most remembered literary experience was the liturgy of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Despite governmental attempts to excise Tsarist remnants from life under Marxism, Soviet political literature still observes in its form prescribed usages of the ancient rite: repetition, deference to its own "Sacred Scripture" and a complex sentence structure designed for its poetic effect. Why? To clear the way for a total acceptance or explication of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The results are not always benign, for the admiral's prose, especially in translation, is often unavoidably wordy and awkward rather than solemn and beautiful. The admiral might be suspected, too, of knowing that the loftier the tone of his discourse, the purer his readers will consider his intent.

Gorshkov's practice of this near-liturgical form does not mask his intent to the Slavic reader but highlights it, because the admiral is concerned with final ends, with destiny. He speculates at a very high philosophical level on the final victory of Marxism according to the scientific laws of history and on the part the navy must play. He dwells on the earthly purpose of a man who is a Russian, a sailor, and a believer in the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic of history.

Purpose. The lines of argument and the weight of evidence show clearly Gorshkov's purpose in writing *Sea Power*. The admiral's overriding goal is none other than to show that a Marxist, dialectical interpretation of the scientific laws of history demands the existence of a strong Russian Navy. Gorshkov contends that because a new thesis, or set of historical circumstances, has arrived, in which a strong Soviet Navy is dialectically necessary for advancement into the next stage of history, the navy must be given a vote in the political-military decisionmaking process, a just allocation of military funds, and an enlarged strategic mission. His statements fly in the face of classic postwar Soviet strategy as espoused by such leaders as Marshall Sokolovsky, who relegated the navy to a role far beneath the army's, and who thought the high purpose of a contemporary battle

Red Star Rising at Sea (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1974).

fleet was engagement of surface ships.

Why should the most successful Russian Admiral ever, feel compelled to use the vehicle of a book to advance this proposition, a task at once philosophic and budgetary?

Russian methods of forming a consensus differ drastically from those of the West. We publicly debate strategic options and military policy in our journals and in other public media, whereas formulators of Soviet policy must first search Marxist-Leninist literature for doctrinal bases with which to support their definitions, their analyses and their solutions. It is highly unlikely, for example, that a Russian counterpart of "Mr. X" (later revealed to be George Kennan) could write a speculative and pseudoanonymous article in the Russian equivalent of *Foreign Affairs*, arguing a whole new policy toward the West on nonideological grounds.

On the contrary, any Soviet strategist who proposes novel solutions to difficult questions, must support his logic with a wealth of classic Marxist underpinnings. The more daring the argument, the surer the author's grasp of dialectical logic must be shown to be. In this last will and testament, Gorshkov could not risk an ideological mistake. He wants to leave with the decks clean.

The most important reason for Gorshkov's prolixity falls into the central purpose of *Sea Power*. The admiral's great theoretical contribution and the basis for all the purely naval discussion in the book stems from his description of the course on which history now leads us.

Gorshkov believes radical changes have occurred in world politics, in the wealth and power of leading countries, in the way countries use power, in the economic bases of a nation's strength and, most importantly, in the way navies interact with all the elements of state power. Seapower is not merely the capacity to destroy one's maritime enemy but it is also the ability of the state to use for national purposes any part of the maritime world, from its oil to its fish to its shipping lanes. Gorshkov concludes that a principal power's navy may soon be the glue which holds a state together.

The end of World War II, according to the admiral, signalled the close of an epoch and the arrival, in Marxist terms, of a new synthesis. At that time a new set of social, political, military and economic forces, a new set of historical circumstances arrived. This synthesis then became the new thesis. In practice, this meant that Russia was free to rival America's economic power and to advance international Marxism because Russian armies dominated the Eurasian landmass as never before. Although large standing armies are necessary to confirm the victory over fascism and to maintain status quo, the ethnic enemies that taunted Mother Russia for a millenium are firmly in hand. The Soviet Navy has secured the army's flank well into the Mediterranean basin and guards the commercial and fishing fleets on the seven seas.

What, then, does Russia have to fear in the face of security undreamt of 25 years earlier? Gorshkov's answer has two parts: First, the new thesis produced a high technology that permits, even encourages, the destruction of Moscow not by armies or by airplanes, but by ICBM's launched from beneath the sea's surface thousands of miles from target. Formerly, Russia's sheer size and poor weather allowed the worst generals and the most ill-prepared ground troops an opportunity for the mud of winter to repulse even a Napoleon. Now, sure defeat can occur 20 minutes after missile launch.

The second part of the reply is that Russia's traditional land enemies have been replaced by a coalition of imperialist maritime nations. Gone forever is the smug certainty that Russia had always and would always finally defeat the

Poles, Magyars, Teutons and Balts as well as enemies from the East. These new and unfamiliar enemies and their technology are not susceptible to attack, let alone defeat by the traditional arms of the U.S.S.R.

Gorshkov warns that warmaking potential of this new coalition must never become military reality on Russian soil. In case of war or threat of war, the imperialist enemies' military and industrial power must be destroyed quickly in their own countries. The overall mission of the Soviet Navy is still defense of the homeland, but henceforth by use of the fleet against its opponents' shore facilities. This is a forward defense carried to the ultimate by modern technology. Its aim is to achieve victory without a land war and if possible without damage to Russia herself. No one wants a replay of the murderous land battles fought in Russia during World War II.

This argument fulfills a trend begun most noticeably in Sokolovsky's *Military Strategy*, which had led Soviet military thinkers away from a preoccupation with theater warfare whose inherent parochialism makes it less cost-effective and bloodier than global war, which if waged by a Soviet Navy at sea is cheap and sterile. Gorshkov implies that favorable major changes in the world's balance of power can be obtained by loss of few ships and their crews.

Hence the ancient concept of a fleet's purpose, combat against another fleet, carries secondary importance. The Red Army, Gorshkov reiterates, may sit powerfully astride the Elbe; it is powerless against the Trident. The Soviet Navy is now the motherland's first line of defense.

Why does Gorshkov advance this argument? Accepted Soviet or Marxist revolutionary doctrine (by omission not by design) had never held a navy necessary for victory in the class struggle. Gorshkov had to breach this obstacle before the Soviet Navy could hold a valid position in the military pantheon and before the navy's institutional memory within the Soviet government could be secured. Furthermore, he had to fight history tooth and nail to show that the course of action he advocates has precedent in victories during the class struggle. He had to show philosophy in action.

He gets little help from the Red Navy's history, because by and large it is a minefield of disasters. Even the most patient researcher cannot find the Russian equivalents of Trafalgar and Coral Sea, of Nimitz and Jacky Fisher, or de Grasse and von Hipper. Ironically, only the modern Russian naval era begotten by Gorshkov would please the historian in Gorshkov.

On the other hand, Marx, Engels, and Lenin had uniquely acute insights into the role of a Red Army during the revolutionary struggle. They and their successors believe that the army is the conduit by which civil strife, economic complaint and political discord are brought to bear in the class struggle. Theory became blood through the Red Army around the Winter Palace, on the Long March and in the Sierra Maestre.

Not only were Marx and Engels elegant theorists but they were also practical managers of violence who knew that successful revolutions occupied buildings, road crossings and power stations by force. They knew that the best way to accomplish these necessarily dirty tasks was the conversion and use of peasants and workers who fire the rifles and drive the tanks. Ships cannot seize and hold ground, armies can. Marx, Engels and Lenin sided with the armies. Lenin could not afford to build ships; Stalin wanted a big-ship navy because the British had one; and Khruschev thought *Sverdlov* cruisers best suited for transporting senior Soviet statesmen abroad in high style. No theoretical role in the class struggle was ever assigned to the navy.

Gorsnkov has overcome this historical and theoretical burden by a simple but clear piece of Marxist logic. He proposes that since Russia and international Marxism find themselves at a new stage of history and contend against new opponents, the state must maintain a mix of armed forces quite different from that needed to assure past victories in order to triumph in the present phase of the class struggle. Moreover, because of the vastly increased importance of the sea, which yields wealth of its own as well as carries the riches of the land, no nation can remain a principal actor on the world stage without a strong navy.

It is as though Gorshkov turns to his army colleagues and says, "Comrades, your land armies were dialectically necessary in a former movement of history and are still needed to consolidate victory. Military roles have changed, however, according to the scientific laws of history. That history has removed the main class struggle from the Eurasian landmass to distant countries and has made the sea a hiding place for weapons that could do to Russia what Napoleon and Hitler could not. The navy has to become a paramount arm, because only naval force applies to these new circumstances."

Nothing Gorshkov has done in the way of ship construction, weapons systems, operations and tactics contradicts *Sea Power's* interpretation of classic Marxist-Leninist military doctrine. All his acts accord with it. In fact, so powerful is the logic and so acute the sense of history in *Sea Power* that Gorshkov's work is now part of the hierarchy of doctrine his book venerates.

While the Soviet Navy's goal, defense of the homeland, remains the same, the fleet's missions have changed drastically. Traditionally, naval defense began and ended with strategic protection of waters near the Russian shore. To assuage army fears, Gorshkov stresses the continuing need for a strong coastal defense of the Russian littoral, principally by small rocket-equipped ships and by airplanes.

During this phase of history, however, modern technology demands that the most significant defense of the homeland begins on the high seas where both the Soviet and the imperialist shore-destroying ballistic missiles are concealed and launched. Here, the mission bifurcates: to destroy from the ocean bed the enemy's land-based military and industrial strength, while at the same time to neutralize the enemy's SSBN's which presently constitute about 70 percent of the U.S. strategic missile force.

Gorshkov thus demonstrates that the army, air and rocket forces have no role in foiling the vast preponderance of U.S. ballistic missiles. His navy is the only weapon that has a chance under foreseeable technological circumstances of killing the SSBN. Again, Gorshkov devotes lengthy argumentation to anchor this major conclusion to a classically Marxist interpretation of history's dialectical movement.

Once the idea that the fleet should operate principally against the shore is comprehended, the logic of the Soviet Navy's ship construction program and its fleet operations becomes clear. The analyst must then concentrate on what Gorshkov considers the touchiest problem to solve before the missions of the fleet against shore can be successfully prosecuted.

The most important operational point in the book is Gorshkov's statement that since the SSN is the most lethal ASW weapon, it must be neutralized or destroyed along with air and surface ASW forces to protect Russian SSBN's targeted against the imperialist's military potential and to leave the hostile missile submarines open to successful attack.

Gorshkov draws on the lessons of World War II to show how the Soviet

Navy must operate its fleet successfully against its enemies' shores. By way of example, Gorshkov claims that 70 percent of all German U-boats sunk in World War II were destroyed in transit, not during prosecution of an attack. He heaps mortal blame on the German Naval High Command for not devoting sufficient resources to neutralize Allied ASW efforts. Surface ships, Gorshkov claims, should have protected and coordinated submarine transits to and from operating areas.

This statement has enormous evidential value. It confirms our speculative reasoning to account for the substantial force of large ASW ships built and building, e.g., the *Krestas* and *Krivaks*. It predicts the deployment of squadrons built around the *Kiev* ASW carrier to perform high seas ASW and to protect Soviet submarines en route to operational areas.

To sum up, Gorshkov's principal operational reason for writing this book lies in his need to demonstrate that the Soviet Navy must kill hostile ASW forces as well as destroy their enemies' shore-based warmaking potential by attack from SSBN's. The implications of this statement, which approach a dramatic or theatrical tone as nearly as is possible in Soviet political literature, are profound. NATO navies must consider anew the rationale for ship construction, weapons systems and tactics.

Sea Control. The need to neutralize hostile ASW forces absorbs the admiral's concept of sea control. Gorshkov's notion is not Mahan's. The Soviet admiral envisages sea control as the establishment of dominance in a maritime area, perhaps measured in minutes, perhaps in only one medium of a small sector of the world's ocean. He sees a Soviet Navy composed of forces which either by threat or by actual victory in combat can prevent any other navy from working its will against the Soviet naval effort during this transitory period of control. Safe passage to their operating areas of the Soviet SSBN is sea control's first purpose, and neutralization of the imperialists is its second. Clearly, *Kiev's* embarked VSTOL aircraft are directed to this task.

Other cases are made for sea control, such as blockades against critical marine traffic, and assistance to friendly forces in the Third World. Gorshkov offers one proviso, however, in his remarks on sea control. So lethal are modern weapons, he warns, and so fast in their injection into combat, that sustained dominance by any navy over any body of water or maritime airspace is problematic.

Gorshkov is confident, nevertheless, that his navy can now establish what he calls a "favorable operating regime" virtually anywhere in the world ocean over a period long enough for Marxist political, military and social elements to produce a victory in the class struggle under proper dialectical circumstances. Strategic mobility renders the Soviet Navy alone of all the U.S.S.R.'s armed forces capable of decisive intervention abroad.

To Gorshkov, this belief may well mean the superiority of a naval force designed by himself as the principal military agent of his country's political leadership. Modern technology, the admiral warns, will smile only on a swift attacker who fires overpowering first shots, destroys his adversary and flees back into concealment. Running through *Sea Power* is the notion, vigorously expressed, that modern combat no longer favors the standing army, the massed artillery barrages, the frontal attacks of thousands of soldiers, and the existence of a huge logistics enterprise.

Despite its mobility, Gorshkov considers the attack carrier, up to now the foremost 20th-century example of naval surface and airpower, a useless system when used against the Eurasian landmass. No surface force, he claims flatly, can withstand nuclear air-to-surface missiles fired from the planes of the

Soviet Naval Force. Despite this bold assertion, the admiral concedes that the carrier, somewhat modified for sea control missions, is useful for that role and for general use in the Third World. Doubtless, the operations of *Kiev* and her sisters will show which roles the Soviet Navy does envisage for its own large air-capable ships.

Gorshkov's theoretical base for that part of his navy not pertaining to the SSBN/SSN/ASW mission has to do with what Marxists call "contradictions in history." These events occur when the forces of working class or peasantry collide with those of the capitalist imperialists. No one can predict the time, place or characteristics of these struggles, but the scientific laws of history dictate that they will happen. Gorshkov claims that when navies have been involved in these episodes, the imperialists have nearly always won, e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and the conquest of the Philippines by the United States. He warns that since the Eurasian landmass is largely policed by the Red Army, contradictions will occur most frequently in other, distant areas where the only mode of military intervention to assure a victory will be the Soviet Navy.

Gorshkov's world, boisterous and dynamic, is subject always to violent upheavals and quick to cause and to accept death. To further the class struggle in the next movement of history, the admiral posits an increasing need for strategic and tactical mobility. This means amphibious forces, a chain of foreign bases and a fleet train. Not only ships, but navies and countries must move swiftly.

To meet the demands of mobility in a world where contradictions of history occur unpredictably, a fleet must be able to fight in three media. While the admiral reluctantly admits to his own inability to predict accurately the kinds of engagements his fleet will fight, he does assert that he will build variegated and mutually supportive units and systems to prepare for all kinds of combat. The Soviet Navy, he insists, will install a plenitude of the best weapons systems on the cheapest, most austere hulls available. At the expense of desirable characteristics such as larger crew accommodations and spare parts, the Soviet Navy will maximize the cost-effectiveness of its weapons suites.

Some Short Points. Scattered through *Sea Power* are tersely expressed insights which outline Gorshkov's views on many issues common to all navies. Offered by way of example, but not of limitation, are the following short expressions paraphrased from the book.

(1) Building Program.

- Each navy is a unique product of its own leaders and is set in a particular economic and technological milieu. Therefore, the Soviet Navy will never be a mirror image of any other navy.
- Weapons, not hulls, kill.
- The tendency of naval warfare is to produce more heterogeneous ships, weapons and tactics.
- Single-purpose hulls are too expensive. Henceforth, all combat ships should fight in the three media.
- Technology is so expensive no navy can have everything. Each navy must select its own range of military problems to solve.
- The era's technological base will determine the final form of victory.

Gorshkov boasts that his navy rides the crest of a technological wave which fortuitously satisfies its huge wants in an era of revolutionary transition. He is obviously quite happy with his ship designers and naval engineers. The admiral believes he has the key not only to the navy's strategic needs but also to the kinds of weapons necessitated by his strategy. Here, he breaks with European naval tradition which weighed the thickness of one's own armor against the penetrating power of a potential

enemy's projectile. A new technological and strategic day has arrived; so too has the need for innovative ships and weapons that bear little resemblance to their counterparts of the 1940's and 1950's.

(2) Operations.

- The next war will be fought with forces on hand and on station. No opportunity will exist to move, let alone to build ships.
- Contemporary weaponry is so lethal that he who fires first probably will win.
- The appointment of ship captains and of tactical commanders is all-important. They must be able to act independently and decisively, because communications will almost certainly fail during a nuclear engagement.
- General fleet engagements serve little purpose and are vestigial. Fleet versus shore is the principal strategic preoccupation.
- The strike by a competent, prepared unit is the greatest naval act.

Gorshkov predicts short, savage naval engagements fought by forces already on station or at least nearby a combat area. The tide of battle, he warns, will swing back and forth, as missiles fired from airplanes and submarines, as well as from ships, destroy an enemy with a single shot and leave a battle's outcome in doubt until its end. In the next war a defensive posture is sure to bring defeat; all forces must be strategically and tactically ready to attack. Consequently, captains must imbue their ships' companies with an offensive mentality.

(3) Strategy.

- A world navy must construct a favorable operating environment in areas critical to that navy's success. Sometimes the task demands years, but history rewards him who stays the course.
- To go from favorable operating conditions to tactical control to theatre superiority to strategic dominance and vice versa can take but a few hours. Speed in every act is essential.
- Each epoch has its own naval problem. To understand it one must study history and logic with its dialectics.

The present era demands that the Soviet Navy sail the world ocean not only for traditional naval purposes but to decide which maritime areas are critical to success and to learn how to operate there. Within those areas, the navy must build tactical ascendancy, so that when battle comes, knowledgeable captains can gain theatre control quickly. If done astutely in consonance with the actions of other armed forces, strategic dominance may also be obtained quickly.

(4) Missions.

- Future naval wars may be surrogates for land combat. Naval wars are clean and occur away from Russia. Land wars are dirty and have historically involved serious destruction of the Russian people and property.
- The navy is the Soviet Union's only medium of strategic intercontinental mobility. Without it the Soviet Union would act contrary to the dialectic and would have to fight costly, damaging land wars.
- The sea and all it yields up will grow in importance. A principal nation must use the sea to assure its living standard.
- The Soviet Navy is only the maritime tail of the foreign policy dog.
- Victory on the naval side of a political event, not defeat of the enemy at sea per se, is the navy's job.

It is well to remember when analyzing *Sea Power* and all its complexity that Gorshkov is not burdened by the baggage of victory. No cabal of victorious but retired admirals utter critical stage whispers to the civilian leadership about the "odd" tasks young Gorshkov assigns the Soviet Navy. The terror of

the 1930's and the disasters of the "Great Patriotic War" permitted the few survivors, of whom Gorshkov is the prime exemplar, virtually free rein to devise a whole new set of assignments for the navy. No hoary wardroom traditions frustrate the experimentation which new looks at a radically changing world must necessarily produce.

Some Things Left Unsaid. Although *Sea Power* has enormous scope, some lacunae remain in the admiral's discussion. For example, the surface ship is inherently vulnerable. It cannot unilaterally terminate an engagement (it cannot run fast enough nor hide to avoid its adversaries); it must either kill or be killed. Although the Soviet Navy continues to build very costly and large surface ships, Gorshkov has not constructed a new theoretical framework that assimilates and discusses this new calculus of lethality.

Further, all navies of more than 100' boat size either have or will shortly acquire surface-to-surface missiles capable of killing a 5,000-ton ship. Are Soviet ships, like ours, too expensive to risk against an obviously offensive Third World PGF? What are the risks attendant upon the dispatch of expensive ships to fight very minor engagements?

How will the Soviet Navy, traditionally a highly centralized organization, exercise command and control during a nuclear engagement when communications are broken? It is well but not satisfactory to say "Have good ship captains."

Is not a war of position self-producing in the sense that during the construction of favorable operating conditions, thought by Gorshkov to be a prelude necessary for victory, the presence of warships in a troubled area will destabilize the situation sufficiently to force or permit naval combat?

What will the admiral do to counteract the cheap precision guided missiles (PGM) that will appear by 1980 at the latest? These missiles will have a 500+ mile range, carry a ship-killing warhead and be operable by irregular troops from, say, the hills of Sicily. History shows us that owners of weapons tend to use them. The problem of operating surface ships close aboard a hostile shore or in an enclosed body of water such as the Mediterranean might become unmanageable.

Is the strategic mobility that Gorshkov claims for his navy a cover for a new wave of adventurism involving limited nonnuclear naval wars? Was the Soviet combat naval presence hull down off Angola a harbinger? Why does the admiral make so much of his gift to the Soviet leadership of strategic mobility?

While Gorshkov is careful not to offend the army, his whole argument cannot fail to produce a question about the structure and purpose of massive Soviet ground forces. Does Gorshkov represent or head a group of thinkers who wish to deemphasize the huge army establishment of the Warsaw Pact in order to free resources for other tasks such as increasing domestic living standards? If this proposition has even small validity, who are the admiral's colleagues and his opponents in this venture?

Gorshkov does not discuss these and other vexing questions. He must know of their existence. His innate brilliance and his knowledge of Thales, Heraclitus, Hegel, Lucretius and Jomini, all of whose influence is quite apparent in *Sea Power*, as well as that of the classic Marxist writers, put him in a position to handle these speculative topics as well as anyone. Has technology and the wild race of events about us, overpowered even Gorshkov's ability to synthesize all he perceives into one construct according to the scientific laws of history?

All Is Not Vodka and Caviar After All. Certainly, Gorshkov does express well-modulated trepidation about the future. The admiral realizes that the

importance of seapower and of a navy is not a constant either in Russian history or in the dialectical march of events. He fears that one day history may have no use for his splendid machine.

Oddly enough, in view of his present position, Gorshkov fears the ocean will become the main, perhaps the only, arena for the next war. He envisages savage naval engagements as surrogates for the blood-filled wars on Russian soil he wishes to avoid. Ruefully, he believes all countries will carry their wars to sea. He contemplates it as a vast launching pad for all nations' missiles, finally becoming a desolate no-man's land where victory, as heretofore understood, may have no significance.

Gorshkov worries about the methods and techniques of the battle itself. Do air-to-surface missiles fired undetectably hundreds of miles from target prevent the attainment of any kind of sea control? What is sea control? He wonders at the end of the book in the face of new technology, and how does one meld it to the proven ways of the sea?

The world, laments the admiral, is dotted by the imperialists' bases. How can the Soviet Navy achieve the superiority of position it needs to win a naval war? How will he get the money to build and maintain the fleets he believes necessary to defend fisheries, offshore oil and mineral deposits and the marine economic zones so necessary for a growth in Russian living standards?

Balefully, Gorshkov perceives a strategic shift of imperialist power from land to sea and wonders if the Soviet Navy can withstand new expansionist policies of the West. The admiral somewhat puzzlingly affirms the existence of a continuing power held and ready to be used by the West against the Soviet Union; a power not explicable by the scientific laws of history, a power he neither can fully perceive nor accurately describe.

Conclusion. Because Gorshkov's main points are chillingly important, we must understand why he writes as he does and what his primary concerns are. Even though Gorshkov's place in Russian military thought has not been argued through to its conclusion, *Sea Power* offers profound insights into naval problems America and her allies must solve for the sake of their countries' survival.

No Soviet newspaper publishes the hearings that must certainly be held in the Soviet Defense Ministry on strategic option-building programs and force levels. *Sea Power* is the closest firsthand look a lay reader will get inside the Soviet decisionmaking process. The distribution of 60,000 copies of this book inside the U.S.S.R., and the sale overseas of hundreds of bound editions at cheap prices indicate the Soviet Government wants the book read and understood.

Probably no author other than Gorshkov is better suited to outline the strategic, theoretical and operational framework of Soviet military policy for the balance of this century. Now a member of the Defense Ministry, Gorshkov has spent 20 years as CNO. This extraordinarily long tour has yielded the Soviet Navy unique stability in the design and operation of its ships, weapons and planes. Western admirals are fortunate if the ships designed on their watch are operational under their immediate successors. Some ships launched and operated by Gorshkov have, by contrast, served a full 20-year term and now move into obsolescence.

The admiral is a man of high pragmatic accomplishment. No modern naval leader but Gorshkov has survived Moscow's internecine warfare to bring his navy from the backwaters of Eastern and Central Europe to a periscope view of the Statue of Liberty.

Who among us could fuse a discredited Slavic navy to the bankrupt philosophy of Marxism and produce a weapon that can help destroy Western

civilization? Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and strategist, has written a book that will influence navies and governments for the rest of this century.

BOOK REVIEWS

Baynham, Henry. **Men from the Dreadnoughts.** London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1976. 265pp.

The first 15 years of the 20th century witnessed the transformation of the Royal Navy from an unchallenged imperial police into a force striving to maintain sea control in the face of German naval expansionism. The change in roles brought many changes in material; new types of ships and new equipment, all having a major impact on naval personnel. The problems of officer adjustment to change, of adjustment of old values to new requirements were not easily solved. Thus one saw the Scott-Beresford dispute regarding the importance of gunnery. One saw the continued building of warships ill-adapted to the new mission and even the hounding from office of a First Sea Lord because of his lack of sympathy with nostalgia. The need for a redeployment which does not accord with the self-image of the service has caused comparable problems for the U.S. Navy. After 25 years as a force for the imperial projection of seapower, the U.S. Navy is being forced to attack the problem of maintaining sea control, a problem brought into historical focus by the Strategy and Policy course of the Naval War College.

Strategy is not the only field in which one can learn from history. Bureaucratic organizations in general and armed services in particular are social systems, which are similar to some degree. Similar social systems exhibit similar behaviors in response to similar problems. It is the opportunity to examine the present through the perspective of history that makes the subject of Henry Baynham's *Men from the Dreadnoughts* of great professional interest to those concerned with the present and future of the U.S. Navy. Problems of strategy, problems of technology, problems of officer competence are only relevant if the enlisted men can and will perform. The third of Baynham's series dealing with the lower deck of the Royal Navy, *Men from the Dreadnoughts*, lacks the romance of the earlier volumes, of Trafalgar and of Bias Bay pirates. Instead of third-class cruisers on the China station, the typical R.N. environment was becoming Dreadnoughts exercising in home waters. The change in environment had a marked effect on the lower deck but this was overshadowed by requirements for new skills, which brought new types of men into the service with consequent need for change in training and discipline; a need for an entirely new lower deck social structure.

Baynham has intensively interviewed 50 survivors of the Edwardian Navy and his book is in the main an ordering of this oral history—an attempt to recreate "how it was" in the tradition begun by Studs Terkel. This is in itself doubtless a commendable goal (albeit of limited current applicability); nevertheless it is not completely met. We learn about the days of fame of the gunner but not about his life after his status decreased with the advent of centralized fire direction. We are told that much of traditional discipline and routine could not be applied in the early destroyers and submarines but no details emerge. Above all the book is silent regarding

the effect of, and adaptation to, social change in the case of senior petty officers, a problem and a group of major importance.

A simple count of Baynham's interviewees shows that the traditional (seaman, stoker, Royal marine) branches of the service produced few who rose above petty officer while the new specialist branches produced few who failed to reach above that rank. This apparent career disappointment accompanied by loss of status cannot but have had an effect on discipline, especially a discipline made less rigorous by the introduction of the new specialists. Baynham discusses the problems of discipline but does not look for general causation. We are told of the 1906 near mutiny of the stokers at Portsmouth but not whether it was unique, nor are we informed of nonproximate causes of the incident. Thus the student concerned with understanding recent problems such as those on *Constellation* is left curious but unsatisfied. Symptoms of stress in the social system of the Royal Navy are described to us, but with no attempt to link them into a coherent diagnosis. Although he points to increasing democratization of avenues of promotion, Baynham is satisfied with childhood socialization as an explanation for the differences in promotion between boy entrants who became a chief yeoman of signals and a leading stoker. The Royal Navy as a socializing agency and the effects of branch on career are both ignored.

The writing of history can never be absolute; it is colored by the perspective of subsequent events. Who, now, is concerned with Mussolini's achievement in draining the Pontine Marshes? Baynham attempts to avoid perspective and in doing so considerably decreases the value of his book. We have a collection of chapters rather than a development of a thesis. Nevertheless it is valuable as an introduction to a largely neglected area of study. Baynham's tapes are presumably available and, together with interviews with others who served in the same period (on actuarial grounds there should be more than 55) and searches of the relevant documents, the data for the execution of some well-planned research is available. The core of my problem with the book lies in the fact that research cannot succeed without a well-defined objective. Baynham has performed a service in opening up an important data source. However, in that his work lacks a clear focus (and indeed in a critical sense—he spends pages on stories I have heard on several continents with different protagonists), he does not significantly add to our knowledge, although expanding our store of information.

What then has Baynham accomplished? He has produced a readable view of naval life in the period. My first reading of the book was accomplished in a single sitting. While reading I was engrossed, but on closing the book my questions started and were not answered by detailed searches. So far Baynham has no competitors but the importance of his subject demands more heavyweight efforts. Until research (which depends on research funding) extends in this direction, *Men from the Dreadnoughts* cannot be overlooked.

MICHAEL F.H. DENNIS
St Cloud State University

Brown, Weldon A. **Prelude to Disaster: The American Role in Vietnam, 1940-1963.** Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975. 278pp.

The experience of reading this book parallels, in an odd way, some of the events it describes: One has the definite sensation, the further one progresses, of sinking slowly into a quagmire. Admittedly this imparts vividness to the account, but it is not, one suspects, the impression Professor Brown sought to produce in his history of the American role in Vietnam from 1940 to 1963.

(A sequel, *The Last Chopper*, covering 1963 to 1973, was published in 1976.)

Brown's theme is the "betrayal," by Ho Chi Minh, Ngo Dinh Diem, and their respective external patrons, of the Vietnamese people's burning desire for "freedom." But Brown offers no precise definition of this term: While he admits at one point that "freedom meant one thing to Europeans and Americans, something quite different to the majority of Asians," the general thrust of his argument is that the Vietnam conflict "was a war to contain communism, to establish freedom, as justified as had been the war in Europe and Asia from 1939 to 1945, and the Korean War from 1950 to 1953." This tendency to impose Western political concepts on Asian cultures prevails throughout the book to its considerable detriment.

Brown's account also suffers from his inability to disengage his passions from his subject, a step which would appear to be a necessary prerequisite to the kind of "objective evaluation" he promises us. To describe President Eisenhower as "one of the architects of the policy that enslaved millions" is not to enhance the dispassionate nature of the analysis, nor does it help for Brown to conclude his discussion of the 1954 Geneva Conference with the outburst: "Pontius Pilates—all of us!" Brown then compounds the confusion by endorsing, in his final chapter, all of the Johnson administration's arguments in defense of its Vietnam policy, down to the point of invoking Munich, SEATO, the pledges of three previous presidents, and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

The book contains one other distinction: Although published 4 years after their release, the book does not contain, in the course of some 248 pages of text, a single reference to *The Pentagon Papers*. Since Brown cites these documents in his bibliography one can only conclude that the omission was by design, as with other aspects of this puzzling book, though, one cannot help but wonder what the design was.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS
Naval War College

Fay, Peter Ward. **The Opium War, 1840-1842.** Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1975. 406pp.

This masterfully written book deals with a far broader area than its title might indicate. The author, Professor of History at the California Institute of Technology, discusses the entire range of contacts between China and the West in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. He also demonstrates a direct connection between these and current events: The attitudes and policies of the Chinese People's Republic's leaders in 1976 show a definite historical linkage to the events of 1840 to 1842.

The reader is struck not only with the prominence in this book of "Commissioner Lin"—the mandarin who seized and destroyed 170 tons of opium, and who still is a hero to the Chinese—but also by the similarity in the language of the Manchu court in the 1840's and that of the Maoist Communist Party of today. For instance, in acknowledging Britain's military superiority in 1842, the royal emissary cautioned that the emperor "would, if pushed too far, call upon his people to rise, men, women, and children—every bush will be a soldier."

Fay credits the British penetration of China to the twin influences of "Christ and opium." The former was proselytized by an interdenominational horde of missionaries from many countries. Represented, for example, was the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the English Church Missionary Society, Spanish Dominicans, Portuguese and French Lazarists (Vincentians), and Jesuits from many nations. The efforts that representatives of these organizations were willing to

engage in was demonstrated by Father Jean-Gabrielle Perboyre, a Vincentian who travelled for 16 months from Paris in order to reach his assigned post at Nanyang, in Honan Province.

Opium became important because of its immense profitability; a 300 percent turnover was not unusual. The opium trade also produced large tax revenues for the British colonial government in India. For it was in India that the vast majority of opium for the China trade was produced. One of the author's most interesting chapters is the one in which he describes the production of opium, from poppy flower to clay pipe.

Fay is both entertaining and illuminating when discussing such "sidelights" as opium or tea production, missionary efforts, and the practices of the mercantile houses, particularly the Scottish firm of Jardine Matheson and Russell and Company of the United States. The majority of the trade was conducted by the "early Victorian Vikings," as Fay terms the British merchants.

These firms headed up a trade effort which in 1839 dealt heavily in providing China with opium in exchange for tea and silver. It was the foreign desire to expand this trade, and the Chinese attempts to eliminate it, which precipitated the war of 1840-1842.

Early diplomatic attempts to settle the opium question failed, with Commissioner Lin dealing the Western merchants a heavy blow both in "face" and in the pocketbook. The British then sent a naval force to deal with the upstart Chinese.

Fay gives a detailed and authoritative account of the events and circumstances of the First Opium War. It was almost entirely a naval and amphibious war on Britain's part. A particularly interesting description is given of the *Nemesis*, the first iron steamer to navigate the Cape of Good Hope. This vessel—manned almost entirely by civilians, and not commissioned in the navy—was the Royal Navy's primary weapon for forcing the rivers and estuaries of China.

There were three main campaigns in the war. The first was a failure; the British attempted unsuccessfully to blockade the Chinese coast. The lack of the naval forces necessary to accomplish this task was due to the Foreign Office being far more concerned with the war in Afghanistan than with Chinese affairs.

The second campaign involved an amphibious operation up the Pearl River to Canton; the third was a similar expedition up the Yangtze River to Nanking. These efforts were successful, although the author emphasizes that the British forces were almost completely dependent on naval support. Away from their ships, the troops lacked adequate supply, transport, and supporting arms. What is more, although they never effectively opposed the Royal Navy, the Chinese on more than one occasion fought very well against British soldiers.

The Yangtze River campaign ended in August 1842 with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. Its provisions included the opening of five "treaty ports" and the cession of Hong Kong to the British. In Fay's view this treaty was most notable for what it did not mention:

> Christ and opium! The bearers of the first were more insistent than anyone else that China be opened. The traffic in the second was unquestionably the occasion . . . of the war that began the opening. The Treaty of Nanking dealt directly with neither.

This sums up the thrust of Fay's book. The Nanking pact marked the "beginning of the opening" of China, a beginning that was not well-established until the 1860's. Fay concludes that the process of opening China was not much of a success, if we bear in mind that China was "open" for little more than a century. In April 1949 the English cruiser *Amethyst* was blockaded on the

Yangtze River. Then, "one dark night [she] stealthily slipped her cables and got away down the river to the sea . . . China was closed again."

The Opium War is an excellent work. Fay provides an extensive index, a helpful "list of characters," and useful maps. This carefully documented work does not displace John King Fairbank's classic work on early Sino-Western relations but supplements it in an outstanding fashion.

BERNARD D. COLE
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Kelleher, Catherine McArdle. **Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons.** New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975. 372pp.

Professor Kelleher has set herself the task of examining nuclear weapons developments in relation to German politics during the years 1954 to 1966. Her volume, as Professor William T.R. Fox brings out in the Foreword, is one of three country studies on the same general topic, of which the French and British volumes are already in print. All three are part of a series sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University.

Professor Kelleher's book begins with a prologue for the years 1945-1954, and then in Chapters 2 through 10 proceeds essentially chronologically through the period 1954-1966. Chapter 11 is a "Commentary" on those 12 years, and Chapter 12 is "A Look Forward" at the present-day situation.

The book is based upon personal residence in Germany and a number of interviews, mostly with Germans, but also with American, British, and French subjects. (The number of interviews conducted in 1964 to 1966 exceeded 125.) Professor Kelleher notes that she did not aim at replicating "the usual American or German secondary analyses," that she wanted to focus on primary sources. As a result the notes make only very restricted reference to books in the category of "secondary analyses." One inescapable problem with this kind of approach is that it necessarily drives a book toward a focus on such primary material as does turn out to be available.

Professor Kelleher's book is a competent account which does justice to her chosen focus. As she herself realizes and stipulates, many of the issues of German control of and access to nuclear power appear today rather remote and secondary. It is for this reason that she added the chapter at the end to provide a contemporary focus.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Naval War College

Korb, Lawrence J., ed. **The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S.** Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, 1976. 172pp.

Before he left the Department of Defense in January, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., in a memorandum on senior service colleges, reaffirmed his commitment to improving officer education:

> These institutions represent the capstone of the DoD educational system. They must be centers of excellence—marked by scholarship, innovative thought, and research. They should attract the best students, teachers, researchers, and visiting faculty . . . .

For 3 years Mr. Clements had led the DoD Committee on Excellence in Education, made up of the Service Secretaries and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)—"a group that'll get your attention," one wag noted—in a searching review of officer education: the service academies, the senior service colleges, the intermediate-level (staff) colleges, and the graduate education system. And for 3 years Clements and the Committee ran into the kinds of strains and

paradoxes discussed by the authors in Professor Korb's compilation of essays.

There is, first, the classic question of whether courses in military schools are training or education. The simplistic and rather silly notion: "Training is for enlisted men—education is for officers" is heard only rarely now. In his chapter, Adam Yarmolinsky notes that " . . . innovation is the essential business of education, as replication is the essential business of training. . . . " Although neat, even that phrase begs many questions; for some portions of what the military calls "education" allow little room for innovation.

Second, there is the vexing question of curriculum focus in officer education: should it be concerned with general *broadening* or with the *employment of military force*. Donald F. Bletz, noting that the military needs few sociologists but many officers who understand society, argues for broader education. John E. Ralph, on the other hand, alone among the authors, makes a strong case that military education has yielded wrongly to such ideas and moved away from its primary purpose: training in the use of military force.

Third, there is the obvious strain faced by any military educational institution which, by definition, has two sets of loyalties. One to the established procedures and hierarchy of the military. The other to education's insistence on freedom in the pursuit of knowledge.

And finally, as General Ralph points out in his article, there is tension inherent in the very phrase "military education." Education is aimed at providing a means of human betterment, of societal improvement. The military, in its role as guardian of the society, frequently must destroy in order to protect. There are, in fact, some who feel "military education" is a two-word *non sequitur*.

Dr. Korb, a Professor of Management at the Naval War College (formerly on the faculty of the Coast Guard Academy), has pulled together 14 thoughtful but disjointed essays on officer education which, with the help of a skillful introduction and careful editing, add up to a useful and readable book. It is not a definitive study and does not purport to be one. This short volume is divided into an overview, a section on precommissioning education, one on professional education, and a final and more theoretical part which discusses issues (e.g., education vs. training) and unabashedly promotes a graduate education in civilian universities.

Officer education is on trial, Professor Korb notes in his introduction. One is tempted to respond: "It has ever been thus." For in times of budget crunch, travel and training are the first to go, the old canard alleges. Furthermore, issues involving military education and training, their form, content, and cost—are not new to the Congress, only cyclical. After each war there is a reevaluation of how money should be spent during periods of no military conflict, and for the last several years we have been in the midst of such an examination.

But this period does seem extraordinary—at least in terms of the scope and intensity of the investigations. In addition to congressional interest, exemplified by House Appropriations Committee studies of professional military education, graduate education, and the service academies, the General Accounting Office has, during the past several years, looked into ROTC, graduate education, language training, and dependents schools overseas, and has made a series of studies of the service academies alleged to be the largest single investigation ever conducted by that Office.

In the meantime, the formation of the DoD Committee on Excellence in Education, in late 1973, led to a sweeping review of the officer education system by top DoD policymakers themselves. The Committee was concerned

that officer education programs were not always administered effectively, with an efficient use of resources.

This state of affairs was not blamed entirely on the services or on individual educational institutions. Rather, it was felt the problem stemmed from the fact that lack of senior-level guidance and review had allowed the schools to pursue their respective programs without any rigorous attention to the specific needs of their services or of the Defense Establishment as a whole. This lack of attention had resulted in a variety of anomalies noted in this volume.

For example, the various senior service colleges in many respects duplicated each other's courses. Graduates of particular intermediate service schools were not assigned to positions for which their studies ostensibly had prepared them. And, both the senior and intermediate schools provided some courses within their curricula which had little, if any, relevance to the stated purpose of those schools.

Similar problems were found at the service academies and within the graduate education systems, and a series of corrective initiatives ordered by the Committee will continue to be reviewed by the new Administration.

In addition to all this outside interest in education, the services themselves have in recent years conducted intensive internal reviews of various sorts. Between 1972 and 1976, an officer in a position to know alleges there were no fewer than 42 studies of education and training affecting the Department of the Navy alone!

In short, it seems that officer education *is* on trial. One hopes it will continue to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. For despite obvious weaknesses, it is a highly respected system, and one that has served us well.

Perhaps one should be reassured that this book came to be written at all. It is comforting to note that gifted academicians, within and without the military, believe the officer education system is of sufficient importance to the health of the nation to deserve their serious attention. In a strange way it is even more comforting to note they almost never agree on what specific changes are needed to make the system most effective.

Former Deputy Secretary Clements highlighted the role of officer educaton when he said: "'Excellence in Education' is more than the name of our committee it is an essential element in improving the management of this Nation's national security affairs."

THOMAS W. CARR
[Mr. Carr is Director of Defense Education]

The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. **United States/Soviet Military Balance.** Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 86pp.

Of the myriad reports, studies, documents, and articles prepared under the cognizance of the U.S. Government, few could be recommended for general readership. Fewer still provide more than specific or isolated facts concerning the salient issues of the times: either they are too technical, too general, or they lack completeness and continuity. This limited study prepared as "A Frame of Reference for Congress" and published as a Committee Print is exceptional in its breadth, its detail, and its brevity. Prompted by a request from a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Congressional Research Service has authored a short, current, very readable unclassified study of the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The study gives a quick overview of the policies, programs, and problems of the armed forces of both countries and initially sets the purpose as twofold:

—First, to furnish the Congress with an objective analysis of U.S./Soviet military balance.

—Second, to provide a starting point for congressional debate on the subject.

While the stated objectives may appear applicable only to the statesman, they are significantly important to the apolitical majority. This is a study which should be read and used by officers in our armed forces, civilian decisionmakers, and any citizen who seeks a reconciliation of fact and fiction regarding "ours" and "theirs."

Part I provides a statistical base documenting the quantitative balance of forces which has noticeably shifted to the Soviet Union over the past decade. Additionally, a qualitative assessment is made and technological superiority lists offered to stimulate the reader.

Part II examines the statistical imbalances, traces their origins and analyzes the notions and ideas which have formulated our present defense policy in contrast with that of the U.S.S.R. Of significant interest is a tabular presentation of U.S. aims followed by the "key shortcomings" entailed by those aims. The disparity between "ends and means" is objectively assessed and the shortcomings factually supported. While comparisons continue throughout, the major focus is on the U.S. problems and U.S. solutions.

Part III suggests options and alternatives to match realistic ends with limited means and bring U.S. policy in consonance with our aims and means to achieve them. The primary strength of this appeal is that it is nonbudgetary; it is keyed to the essential issues, and suggests answers to the questions which face our Congress as defense decisionmakers. Prevailing U.S. policy creates asymmetries, makes the balance a more illusive goal, is inherently inefficient in matching ends with means, and its nature is often reactive, not active. The solution:

--Step One is to ascertain real requirements, predicated on imperative U.S. interests, objectives, and commitments.

--Step Two is to reshape U.S. force structure, defense policies, and fund allocations so they correspond.

Steps One and Two are premised on the fact that adjusting the budget is the last option, not the first.

This Committee Print serves as a singularly valuable reference tool for anyone confused, or frightened by, or ignorant of the current U.S./Soviet military balance. Bolstered by a thorough index, supporting appendices, and a complete glossary, it is an objective, well-organized, genuinely interesting work which is unquestionably helpful in understanding the often asked and usually unanswered U.S./Soviet military balance question, "Who's ahead?"

J.P. MORSE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

MacIsaac, David. **Strategic Bombing in World War II: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey**. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976. 231pp.

David MacIsaac prefaces this informative study of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey with a quotation from von Ranke: "Let no one pity a man who devotes himself to studies apparently so dry . . . . It is true that the companions of his solitary hours are but lifeless paper, but they are the remnants of the life of ages past." In this case Lieutenant Colonel MacIsaac need not have been so modest in his claims for the vitality of his subject matter. The issues of strategic bombing to which the Survey members addressed themselves over 30 years ago are very live ones indeed, as witness the controversy about the bombing of North Vietnam and, even more recently, the debate about flexible options. His book describing the first major attempt to get at the difficult questions of fact and logic involved in the use of strategic airpower, is not simply about the remnants of the life of ages past, but is part of the baby book of the U.S. Air Force.

Strategic Bombing in World War II is a welcome work on an important and

pertinent subject. The Strategic Bombing Survey compiled the standard reference work on the effects of bombing in World War II. Since it was a commentary on conventional weapons with only a brief report on the atomic attacks, the Survey seemed to become obsolete almost immediately with the advent of nuclear weapons. This impression has proved to be wrong. Scholars and policymakers still refer to the Survey for evidence to support their various and often conflicting views about conventional and nuclear weapons. Such use of the Survey raises the questions which are the focus of MacIsaac's book: What are the origins, nature, methods, and limits of the inquiry begun in the middle of the oil transportation debate in 1944 and completed amidst the "great Anderson-Navy war" in 1947? The book provides a wealth of information to answer these questions.

That the Survey began and ended in disputes about the decisiveness of airpower should not be surprising. It was intended to be a searching critique of "the whole bomber offensive, essentially on the basis of the postwar necessity for an authoritative and unbiased answer to the inevitable question, 'Who won the war?'" For the Army Air Forces to propose to answer a question phrased in such terms reflects the faith that an unbiased answer exists, accessible to men of goodwill, and favorable to the strategic bombing effort. This faith was present in large quantities in the AAF in the spring of 1944, when for a while, it seemed that strategic bombing might turn OVERLORD into a mopping up of German forces rather than a forced landing on a hostile shore. Significantly for the Survey, this faith both provided the impetus for an investigation of strategic bombing and accounted for much of the bitterness of the oil transportation debate that spring, in which the AAF's plans for use of the strategic air forces were overruled by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The question of decisiveness, phrased as "who won the war?" casts the attempt to answer it, no matter how unbiased, into the intellectual meat grinder of interservice rivalry. Even an effort by civilians is not exempt, because the question demands a partisan answer. Any criticism of the bomber offensive seems invidious, reflecting badly on the service whose mission it is, and implying that men have died in vain.

The chief members of the Survey saw this problem. They attempted to guard the integrity of the investigation against charges of partisanship and the dangers of bias, first, by exhortation. Director Franklin D'Olier, told the staff on 22 December 1944:

> We shall proceed in an *open-minded* manner, without prejudice, without *any* pre-conceived theories, to gather the facts. We are simply to seek the truth. And when *all* the facts are gathered, then the Directors will draw up the report as impartially as it is humanly possible for us to do. We have no intention . . . of commending or criticizing any individual, group, or organization in any way except as *final* facts and the real truth might so require.

Second, they focused the Survey firmly on the effects of bombing rather than on the policy of the conduct of operations. In MacIsaac's words,

> What would be served by producing a contentious or critical report, one that singled out errors and named names? Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, Doolittle, and all the others—men . . . to admire for their courage and their willingness to shoulder enormous responsibility—these men had led the way; thousands of others had given their lives . . . . it was . . . clear by April 1945 that fact-finding was the order of the day.

Despite these efforts, as the investigation revealed apparent shortcomings in the strategic bombing campaigns, the Directors tried to balance criticism with advocacy. The "idea of having on board a 'resident apologist' could only have appealed to their sense of fairness." They therefore took on as Director of the Military Analysis Division the former Deputy Commander for Operations, Eighth Air Force, Gen. Orvil A. Anderson. He was a man "justly proud of his persuasive skills" and subsequently the eponymous combatant of the "great Anderson-Navy war." This war and the reports associated with it were virtually inevitable consequences of asking the question, "who won the war?" MacIsaac does an admirable job in showing how, even with the best of intentions, the directors of the Military and Naval Analysis Division fell to fighting over the decisiveness of bombing in the Pacific. It is interesting to speculate on the probability of similar battles about the European experience, had the British not been successfully excluded from the inquiry.

The Survey's great achievement is that, given the political and intellectual problems attendant on the issue of decisiveness in war, to say nothing of those that accompany an attempt at substantive analysis by a committee, it did produce the "Domesday Book of the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II." MacIsaac's phrase is doubly apt, since the Survey is not only a standard reference for those interested in the history of airpower, but is also itself part of that history. His book properly presents the story of the Strategic Bombing Survey in that perspective by tracing the course of the bombing campaigns and of the interservice rivalry centering around them.

Inevitably, the book faces many of the same problems as the Survey. As MacIsaac notes, an account of the first major attempt to come to grips with the issues of strategic bombing must deal with those issues. And to the extent that they are live issues, MacIsaac then confronts the same problems as the Survey. Even as a simple account of what actually happened, the book's merit depends on his understanding of the issues and on his ability to deal with possible charges of bias. How does MacIsaac meet these tests? Because he is so careful to avoid criticizing the bomber offensive from the vantage of hindsight, his presentation of the issues themselves sometimes suffers. There is a minor misstatement of the issues in the oil transportation debate; more important are his apparent confusion about the Survey's intellectual task of evaluation and the disingenuousness with which he treats the link between the Strategic Bombing Survey and the AAF's campaign for postwar autonomy.

On the first point, the issues of the oil transportation debate, MacIsaac is correct when he states that the primary question was "how best to provide air support for OVERLORD," but wrong when he asserts that advocates of the rail plan insisted the best way to achieve "air supremacy over the beachhead on D-Day . . . would be for the air forces . . . progressively to destroy the railway network of Northern France and the Low Countries." Perhaps this is a case of poor editing, for he immediately goes on to state the real reason advocates of the rail plan favored it: it was to "prevent the enemy from moving his reserves into the assault area and generally from shifting troops and supplies behind his own lines." The effect of this mistake is to blur the issues of a complicated disagreement about strategic airpower.

On the second point, the intellectual problems of evaluating strategic bombing's effectiveness, MacIsaac's statements do not follow logically. His argument is that the Survey came to concentrate on effects, rather than effectiveness, not merely because of the difficulty of getting facts, but also

because of the intellectual impossibility of evaluation. That is "the measuring of effectiveness changes relative to the level at which it is applied in . . . decision making." Fair enough, but after a clear illustration of the different standards for evaluating the tactical and strategic success of attacks on ball bearing factories that rightly culminates in the question of alternative use of sorties to achieve strategic success, he concludes, " . . . to measure effectiveness, as opposed to effects, becomes a problem of such magnitude as to be impractical, requiring as it does the evaluation of an almost limitless number of decisions leading up to the attack order."

This does not follow. To assess effectiveness, one does not evaluate a series of decisions leading up to an attack order; one measures the effects of the attack or campaign against the criteria for tactical or strategic success, and then weighs that effectiveness against the effectiveness of possible alternatives. There are certainly intellectual problems with the criteria for strategic success, and the problems of alternatives are indeed thorny. They lead not only to questions of alternative targets for strategic bombers but to the ultimate questions of alternative use of those bombers' men and metal. The Survey considered questions of targeting, but begged off these other issues, as does MacIsaac, when it refused even to define what strategic bombing was. The problem is not an infinity of decisions along the chain of command, but the belief that airpower is the supreme weapon for strategic success.

The primary issue of strategic bombing, on which practically all others hinge, is its decisiveness, or *"effectiveness . . .* as an instrument of final victory" (emphasis in original). Champions of airpower have always claimed decisiveness for it, together with the military organization implied by decisiveness: an air force with recognized superiority over the other elements of force. The Survey's original task, which they declined in the event, thus had clear implications for the AAF's postwar goal of autonomy. This was not lost on officers in the AAF at the time. Whatever other purposes the Survey was to serve, it was also an attempt to discharge the burden of proof resting on these men as challengers of the status quo. They were not cynical men; on the contrary, as indicated above, they firmly believed an impartial investigation would prove their point that airpower was decisive. MacIsaac omits this intention from his list of the Survey's origins. It appears in his account of the Survey's history obliquely, as "the war of words over the inevitable question of who—which service or branch thereof -won the war." He notes General Anderson's "aggressive determination to squeeze out every possible advantage for the future Air Force" from the Survey as though it were Anderson's idiosyncrasy to do so, rather than his job.

Such restraint seems to be his method of ensuring the objectivity of the account. It is not entirely successful, and it means that he is not completely straight with his readers. He does not spell out, for example, the "politically explosive" questions members of the Survey might have asked but did not when investigating the bomber offensive in Europe. These questions seem to be about the change to area bombing, but the reader does not know precisely what questions MacIsaac or the Survey might have had in mind, or why they would have been political dynamite. Furthermore, autonomy is not the only issue dealt with elliptically. In correcting the bibliographical record on one of the products of the Anderson-Navy war, the notorious Pacific Report No. 71a, *Air Campaigns of the Pacific War,* MacIsaac concludes: "Presumably there's a moral in all this. If so, the reader is left to draw it on his own . . . . " And again,

after a discussion of the constraints on the committees' reports, he states that "the degree to which any such considerations apply to the Strategic Bombing Survey I leave to the reader to decide on the basis of the foregoing account . . . ." The refusal to draw conclusions is no guarantee of objectivity. That problem lies deeper, as a student of the Survey like MacIsaac knows.

At the beginning of Chapter Three, MacIsaac quotes Bliss Carman: "A fact merely marks the point where we have agreed to let the investigation cease." In studying the Survey MacIsaac has inherited some of its faults as well as some of its virtues. The marshalling of evidence is fair and balanced; MacIsaac has no axe to grind. On the other hand, there are questions he will not pursue and facts that he will not investigate further. The book is interesting and worthwhile. Lieutenant Colonel MacIsaac need not have been so careful to save appearances.

MARILYN Z. WELLONS

Marder, Arthur. **Operation Menace.** London: Oxford University Press, 1976. 289pp.

When France concluded an armistice with Germany in June 1940, Britain alone faced a hostile European continent which Hitler had occupied from the North Cape to the Spanish frontier. The French Navy was at best neutral and there was a real question as to whether the extensive French empire in northern and western Africa would remain neutral or would be open to German penetration.

If Dakar on the west coast of Africa were to come under German control, the vital sealanes around Africa would be threatened and the British strategic position, already desperate, would become even more perilous. While the French colonies in north and west Africa remained loyal to Vichy, some in equatorial Africa had already rallied to General de Gaulle who continued the battle against Hitler.

Churchill felt it necessary to proceed on short notice in August and September 1940 with the attempt to capture Dakar, because he assumed German attempts at infiltration. De Gaulle assumed that the civil and military population of Dakar would support a Gaullist attempt to wrest the city from Vichy control. Both assumptions were false.

Arthur Marder chronicles and then analyzes how this operation based on false assumptions was plagued from the start by imprudent haste, inadequate planning, poor coordination, false intelligence and just plain bad luck. He has examined the relevant documents and he has corresponded with surviving participants to present a classic case of military and naval failure, even though the men on the scene were by and large intelligent, competent and perceptive. Fortunately for the ultimate success of Allied arms in World War II, the mistakes made at Dakar were not repeated.

A contributing factor to the failure of the Dakar expedition was the unexpected movement of elements of the French fleet from Toulon to Dakar. Adm. Sir Dudley North, based on Gibraltar, did not prevent the passage of the French ships through the straits, partly because of his interpretation of ambiguous standing orders and partly because of confusion and lack of direction from London. North was relieved because the Admiralty had lost confidence in him, fair enough grounds under any circumstances. However, in relieving him the Admiralty implied in writing that he was derelict in the performance of his duty.

Marder examines in some detail North's attempt to remove what he considered to be a blemish on his honor either by retraction or by a formal inquiry. The matter simmered for nearly 17 years and was not resolved until after a formal debate in the House of Lords and a statement by Prime Minister

Macmillan in the House of Commons. The point of the affair is that any officer may be and should be removed from command when his superiors have lost confidence in him. But in relieving him care should be taken not to imply wrongdoing, unless, of course, formal proceedings are contemplated or can be supported.

The history of warfare is replete with examples of failure and the lessons that can be learned from them are legion. Arthur Marder has performed an admirable service for military professional officers and scholars alike by presenting concisely and completely the details and explanation of why Operation Menace failed. It could be profitably studied in war colleges as a classic case of how not to conduct a combined operation.

B.M. SIMPSON III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

May, Ernest R. **The Making of the Monroe Doctrine.** Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. 306pp.

Contrary to the conclusion of most historians, Ernest R. May argues that the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 can best be understood "in terms of domestic politics." Rejecting notions of national interest as well as the pressures of international politics, May offers the thesis that "The positions of the policymakers [in the United States] were determined less by conviction than by ambition." In short, competition for the Presidential nomination of 1824 produced the Monroe Doctrine as we know it. The author realizes that his is a provocative position and, from the outset, he admits that "the direct evidence of connections between foreign policy debates and the presidential contest is sparse and ambiguous."

Nevertheless, he urges his readers to follow him on this speculative journey for his goal goes beyond the understanding of the Monroe Doctrine to a more general call for American foreign policy analysts to reexamine their assumptions. The motivations of policymakers can be more clearly predicted "by an analysis of their domestic political interests than by analysis of their private beliefs or of the options defined for them by apparent actions or intentions of other nations." While May repeatedly asserts that he has no desire to reduce the decisions of policymakers solely to their political ambitions, the logic and force of his argument, especially in relation to the promulgation of Monroe's Doctrine, leave little room for a more eclectic conclusion.

And May is very persuasive in presenting his case. It is difficult to quibble with his assertion that too few historians have bothered to examine the relationship between domestic politics and the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, he is a little wide of the mark if he insists, as he seems to, that this has been a failing of much of the recent work on American foreign relations. Certainly the outpouring of monographs on the cold war has not been remiss in that regard. However, if Professor May is correct about the motives which led to Monroe's Message, the implications for U.S. Latin American policy are important.

Professor May's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is itself based on two underlying assumptions about the Doctrine's intent: First, that it would be aimed at restricting continental powers from recapturing for Spain or for themselves the newly independent, former Spanish colonies in Latin America, and second, that it would state the position of the United States vis-à-vis the Greek revolution. Tied to these two issues was the question whether or not the cabinet would accept the invitation of British Foreign Secretary George Canning to join in a declaration in opposition to the recolonization of Latin America. Unlike other scholars May assumes that the

Monroe administration was not seriously concerned about the possibility of Russian expansion in the Pacific Northwest.

May begins by examining the views, backgrounds, and political philosophies of the men he considers key to both the Presidential contest of 1824 and the preparation of the Monroe Doctrine: James Monroe, the President; John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State; William H. Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury; John C. Calhoun, the Secretary of War; Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House; and Andrew Jackson, the hero of the War of 1812. After this investigation the author admits that "Someone living in 1823, foreseeing the issues the American government would confront, and possessing some information about the values and beliefs of key American politicians, would have been able to make guesses about their positions, but he would have been hesitant to back his guesses with bets."

An examination of the policies of the other powers involved--Russia, England, and France--proves no more enlightening according to May. In a chapter entitled "Foreign Politics" the author offers a succinct and interesting picture of the ideologies and personalities which helped form the foreign policy decisions of these nations. No common policy could emerge among those nations, and, May suggests, none existed within the inner policymaking circles of each power: "In short, the prospective policies of Russia, France, and England set no clear boundaries for the choices to be made in Washington." Less convincing, however, is the author's assertion that "American decision-makers had adequate evidence for a just assessment of the situation abroad. If they chose to make unrealistic estimates of the possible consequences of the options before them, they were rationalizing arguments for courses of action which they preferred for other reasons."

Thus having rejected the notion that American policymakers were motivated by their particular views of national interest or by any other real perception of European dangers to the new world, May is left with the conclusion that the debates and decisions which led to the formulation of Monroe's Message were motivated by the contest for the Presidency.

"The men who constructed the Monroe Doctrine," according to Professor May, were "preoccupied" with the upcoming Presidential election. Among the leading candidates, John Quincy Adams had the most to lose from a "debate over some issue of foreign policy." On the other hand, Henry Clay had the most to gain by contrasting his position as champion of the "recognition of the new Latin American republics" with the more cautious policy of the Monroe administration, which included Clay's three main competitors--Adams, Crawford, and Calhoun--in its ranks. If the Administration chose to accept the British offer of joint opposition to the continental powers, Adams, as Secretary of State, would appear to have returned to supporting discredited Federalist policies, which certainly would not have enhanced his Presidential possibilities. Adams' survival as a viable candidate, according to May, rested upon his ability in "persuading the doubtful that he was patriotic and anti-British . . . and as much a nationalist and as much a partisan frontiersman as was Clay."

Thus in late November Adams convinced a reluctant President not to accept Canning's offer and instead simply to declare that the American continents should "henceforth not be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers." Secondly, while Monroe announced the hope of his government that Greece gain her independence, he pointedly did not extend recognition to that revolutionary government. This action, argues Professor May, avoided another worry for

the Secretary of State. For if the United States had recognized Greece as independent, Edward Everett, President of Harvard College and, worse, a Federalist, would most likely have been appointed Minister to Greece. If Everett were selected, Adams would be open to the charge of supporting the much maligned party, but if Greece were recognized and Everett not asked to be Minister, the Secretary stood to lose crucial support in New England.

May seems to present a credible case in support of his thesis that the Monroe Doctrine grew more from domestic political considerations than from issues of national interest or from foreign pressures. While I am impressed with the argument, it seems that two assumptions of the author are open to question.

First, May assumes that the Administration had no reason to take seriously Tsar Alexander's Ukase of 1821 which extended the boundary of Russian-America south to 51° latitude and claimed a 100-mile coastal limit for Russia's North American possessions. The Tsar quickly relented, May suggests, because "Alexander seemed to feel a genuine affection for the American republic." Whatever the Tsar's sentiments, he did not agree to suspend the enforcement of his Ukase until after the American Minister to St. Petersburg, Henry Middleton, at Adams' instruction, informed the Russian Foreign Ministry that if the orders were effected the U.S. Government would assume that "a state of war between the two powers exists."

The second assumption is related to the first. By underestimating American-Russian disagreement, especially concerning the Pacific Northwest, May seems to confuse the announcement of the Doctrine in December 1823 with the policy which Monroe and Adams had begun to implement earlier. For instance, on 17 July 1823, about 5 months before Monroe sent his message to the Congress and 1 month before Canning made his offer of a joint declaration, Adams informed Baron Hendrik de Tuyll, the Russian Minister, that the United States "would contest the right of Russia to *any* territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."

Apparently Alexander did not agree with the Secretary of State and on 15 November Tuyll delivered a note to Adams in which the Tsar, as spokesman for the continental powers, asserted that Russia and her allies would continue in their full support of legitimate regimes, and that they would not be deterred in their efforts to restore to Spain and Portugal their lost colonial holdings. Professor May, however, does not think the Tsar's note should be taken seriously for it was "merely an example of Russia's pious rhetoric." Apparently Secretary of State Adams was more concerned and at the cabinet meeting on 25 November, he and Secretary of War Calhoun argued at length over the proper manner to respond to the Russian message. In fact, no one at that session thought the Tsar's threats should go unanswered. Calhoun suggested that the best vehicle would be the President's annual message. Adams protested arguing that "the communication from the Russian Minister required a direct and explicit answer." For to do so in a message to Congress would be:

> . . . precisely as if a stranger should come to me with a formal and insulting display of his principles in the management of his own family and his conduct toward his neighbors, knowing them to be the opposite of mine, and as if I, instead of turning upon him and answering him face to face, should turn to my own family and discourse to them upon my principles and conduct, with sharp inuendoes upon those

> of the stranger, and then say to him, "There! take that for your answer. And yet you have no right to take notice of it: for it was only said to my family and behind your back."

And on 27 November Adams, having carried the day, informed the Russian Government that the United States would oppose any attempt by European powers to restore to Spain her late colonies. His government, the Secretary informed Alexander, "could not see with indifference the forcible interposition of any European Power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain over her emancipated colonies in America, or to establish Monarchical Government in those countries, or to transfer any of the possessions . . . to any other European power."

Clearly, the Secretary of State did not view a Presidential message to the Congress as an effective or as a proper response to a foreign power. Thus, Monroe's Message was an announcement to the American people that the Administration already had taken firm action against those European nations which threatened to restore colonial rule in Latin America and that it had dealt as strongly with Russian designs in the Pacific Northwest. While May is correct in pointing out that the Monroe Doctrine of December 1823 was motivated by domestic political considerations, all Presidential messages to Congress, according to Adams, were supposed to be for that purpose. To be sure, Monroe's announcement aided Adams' Presidential hopes in that it undercut Henry Clay's argument that Adams was weak in his support of Latin American independence and of American interests in the Pacific Northwest. The substance of the policy generally referrred to as the Monroe Doctrine, however, had been effected more quietly and had been begun much earlier through diplomatic, not public, channels.

HOWARD I. KUSHNER
Cornell University

Norman, Barbara. **Napoleon and Talleyrand: The Last Two Weeks.** New York: Stein and Day, 1976. 299pp.

When studying the death of empires, historians usually concentrate upon long-term trends and underlying causes leading to the regime's collapse. The collapse itself is usually treated as an inevitable consequence of larger historical forces or as an afterthought. The way in which a regime perishes, however, is often important in and of itself, for its manner of dying influences significantly the options and choices of its successors.

Barbara Norman has written an interesting study of the last days of the Napoleonic regime. She notes that in the spring of 1814, a Bourbon restoration was by no means the inevitable result of Napoleon's defeat. Allied statesmen and French leaders had numerous alternatives including a dictated peace to the Emperor, a regency for Napoleon's son, occupation and partition of France, or replacing Napoleon with Bernadotte, a former marshal and satellite of the Tsar. Thus restoring Bourbon rule was only one of several possible results of Napoleon's defeat.

At this juncture, Talleyrand, a former bishop, former revolutionary, former imperial official and perpetual schemer played a major role in helping the Bourbons to regain their throne. Talleyrand created a provisional government at Paris and convinced many in both the allied and imperial camps that a restoration was the only viable alternative.

Unfortunately, the author says little about Talleyrand's own motives. Did he act as he did because he believed

that a monarchy, having no stake in trying to regain Napoleon's conquests, was the only form of government capable of bringing stability to France and Europe? Or did he betray Napoleon because he had hopes of obtaining power and influence from the new regime? The author also fails to discuss the Tsar's scheme to place Bernadotte on the French throne and his reason for giving up his plan. Finally, the author says almost nothing about Austrian and English policies and their impact upon the fate of France.

What the author has done is to provide a well-written, well-researched narrative account of an important aspect of Napoleon's downfall. She has also described the important role that Talleyrand played in deciding the future of France.

STEVEN ROSS
Naval War College

O'Neill, James E. and Krauskopf, Robert W. eds. **World War II: An Account of its Documents.** Washington: Howard University Press, 1976. 269pp.

In June 1971, the National Archives and Records Service sponsored a well-received conference in Washington, which was designed to establish a dialogue between archivists and historians in the use and location of the primary historical sources of World War II. Topics discussed included wartime diplomacy, military biography, and access to archival sources. Virtually everyone who attended the meeting felt it was a success, but to transform a conference into a published volume is a difficult, if not overwhelming, task.

Everything said in such a gathering may not be worth publishing. Papers delivered by promising young scholars may not measure up to professional expectations and may lack publishable quality. The old sage may reproduce a paper delivered at an earlier military history symposium, or the last chapter of his latest book, or even a discarded lesson plan from last fall's graduate seminar. At the National Archives and Records Service conference such was not the case. The leading archivists and historians of World War II were invited to be the participants. Among the established scholars presenting papers were Louis Morton, Henri Michel, Barbara W. Tuchman, Selig Adler, Albert Blum, and Noble Franklin. Their papers are good—in fact very good. They provide an excellent dialogue between the archivists and historians of the Second World War. By themselves these papers are a valuable contribution to scholarship. But the editors of *World War II: An Account of its Documents* were not content with simply collecting 18 well-written essays into a book. In addition, they compiled biographies of the contributors, a bibliography of the finding aids to materials on the Second World War, a thorough and exhaustive index, and a brief yet complete summary of the discussion that accompanied the papers during the conference. The photographs, most of them from the National Archives files, are informative and seldom found in other books. The editors' efforts produced a solid piece of work designed to serve the needs of both the academician and savant of World War II.

Of the papers delivered, several are particularly noteworthy. The late Louis Morton's essay on the different historical interpretations of the events that led to Pearl Harbor is most perceptive and interesting. After reading his cogent article, one has a better understanding of why Japan attacked America's mighty fortress in the Pacific. Also fascinating and informative was the essay by Henri Michel, the secretary-general of the *Comité d' Histoire de la 2ème guerre,* entitled the "Archives of the French Resistance: Methods of Collection and Results." A clandestine organization by its very nature does not

keep records, documents, or even a list of members. How the French are recounting the lost facts of the Resistance and chronicling the past from records that at first seem not to exist is an excellent example of ingenuity in historical research. Finally, Pulitzer Prize winner Barbara W. Tuchman, while discussing the problems in writing her biography of General Stilwell, found that the need to gain access to the Pentagon's classified material was overrated. In all cases but one, documents were declassified for her; and quite often she was able to establish the facts by simply going to a private source.

The most pertinent feature of this book, however, is the assistance it offers researchers in mining the wealth of material pertaining to the Second World War. The U.S. military heritage of World War II is richly documented, and this overabundance can be a problem for the researcher. For example, the National Archives has 164,000 cubic feet of military records from the years 1940-1945, which translate into some 670 million pages. Then the depositories of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have their own holdings. Add the files found in the Presidential libraries and all the microfilms on the subject of World War II and we have about 14,000 tons of military records. Needless to say the scholar can be overwhelmed; research on even a narrow topic is often mind-boggling. The archivists attempt to establish some semblance of order out of this chaos by describing where the records can be found, how to gain access to them, and how to use them. With this book at hand the researcher need no longer be intimidated by this vast supply of information.

Anyone who is entertaining thoughts of studying the primary sources of World War II should read this book. No doubt the war colleges and professional service schools will have a copy for their libraries. It is an indispensable source for the academician and the primary researcher of World War II.

DAVID MILES
Captain, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Academy

Palmer, Alan. Bismarck. New York: Scribner, 1976. 271pp.

Few individuals have been so extensively examined by biographers as Bismarck. Vilified by some, almost deified by others, Bismarck has been exhaustively and brilliantly portrayed by the likes of Eyck, Ludwig, and Pflanze. That after all this, a prominent author should still choose this subject for his latest study at first appears to be an exercise in superfluous repetition. And yet, Alan Palmer has produced a generally interesting and thoroughly solid biography. As the publisher's fly-cover proclaims with only slight exaggeration, this is genuinely a comprehensive biography of a formidably complex personality. In a remarkably compact account, Palmer has presented a factual synopsis, clear and accurate, of Bismarck's political and diplomatic career. Cleverly interwoven into this matrix is an attempt to give an account of Bismarck the man: "to dissect the myth and find the man behind the mask." Although new and dramatic revelations are not forthcoming, the combination spun by Palmer has resulted in a lucid and stimulating biography.

The book, however, is not without shortcomings. Because of the brevity of this account, it is impossible to get a good, appreciative feel for the guile and shrewdness with which Bismarck handled foreign policy. A sense of the finesse and precision in day-to-day maneuvers, dispatches and negotiations is missing, as is manifestation of the remarkable flexibility (often called opportunism) which characterized Bismarckian diplomacy in the face of each new development in a crisis. Obviously

this can only be fully achieved in a book of much greater length and detail, but even with restricted space, Palmer does not offer the reader much of a sample from which to appreciate Bismarck's skills.

In fact, rather than glorify his subject's talent, Palmer at times appears to go out of his way to minimize Bismarck's artistry and success. The account of the prelude to the Franco-Prussian War offers a vivid example. In July 1870, Bismarck intended to provoke France into an aggressive act against "the German people and so draw northern and southern Germany together in a national crusade . . . against the traditional enemy beyond the Rhine." The initial plan went awry and Palmer quickly proclaims: "Once again his [Bismarck's] calculations worked out badly." Yet the author is almost blase about the fact that 1 week after this "failure," France had in fact declared war on the Germans; that the resilience of the Iron Chancellor and his ability to adjust tactics to suit circumstances had garnered success from the impending setback. In short, the author can hardly be found guilty of hero-worship.

However, the most unfortunate aspect of the book is the undercurrent of personal censure one senses Palmer has toward his subject. It is not that he vilified Bismarck—evil can still hold fascination—but rather that he exhibits cold, unsympathetic disapproval of this subject. There is no hostility toward Bismarck, but neither is there enthusiasm. The effect is that sometimes Bismarck is flattened into a plastic character which dampens the readers' ardor for the book. Genuinely entertaining biographies are written by those who are fascinated by their subject.

STEVEN A. ESZENYI
Major, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Academy

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and Davis, Jacquelyn K. **The Cruise Missile: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain?** Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1976. 53pp.

Many naval officers may view the development of cruise missiles by the U.S. Navy simply as a matter of catching up with the Soviets who have deployed such weapons for years—an opportunity to overcome longstanding disadvantages in standoff range. Aviators could well view these weapons as the lifesaving system which will permit target neutralization outside the range of an ever-worsening SAM defense. Submariners want cruise missiles to retain the utility of Polaris-firing SSBNs after Trident. Strategic planners see the SLCM as providing a survivable, precise second-strike capability. SALT negotiators would employ them (at worst) as a tradeoff against the Soviet Backfire medium bomber. Like the blind men touching the elephant, each has a different perspective of cruise missiles' form and mission.

In this concise, lucid and thorough miniature treatise, the authors examine today's U.S. cruise missile programs from each community's perspective, and objectively as a generic technology. They logically expand their writing to include reconnaissance, decoy, jamming and other nonwarhead missions. They also provide an excellent unclassified primer which is unique in the field including exposure to the new acronym vocabulary: ALCM, LLCM, SLCM, TALCM, TERCOM, SRAM, SCAD, CADM, RPV, etc.

Davis and Pfaltzgraff conclude that the cruise missile is far too capable a weapon to be merely a bargaining chip for SALT. The number of mobile platforms from which cruise missiles can be launched provides survivability; the missiles' low cost (quoted as one twentieth or less than that of a ballistic missile) encourages quantity buying; their low flight profile provides invul-

nerability to air defenses; and, lastly, their terrain following guidance gives a small CEP- the authors contend that all these factors combine to make the cruise missile a most desirable system for all services, a true "Defense Bargain."

While the study is both remarkable in its thoroughness and commendable for its brevity, there are three areas of constructive criticism I would offer. First (and possibly a problem only in semantics), the authors have relegated the U.S. Navy to a role of "sea denial" rather than the more assertive missions usually stated. This implies a relegation to lower quality vis-à-vis the Soviet Navy than most of us are ready to accept.

Second, I found the book dangerously optimistic in its statements of capabilities for the cruise missile. No single design or variants on a single design can be fired from sea, air, land, and submerged launchers; *and* proceed at any range out to 2,000 miles; *and* remain invulnerable during this flight *then* deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead or even a device the size of a CAPTOR mine at a land or sea target within a 30-foot circular area. SLCMs may or *may not* be the decisive factor to reverse the NATO/Pact balance in Europe and provide defense/deterrence in that theater as claimed. Cruise missile technology must be developed, and tested in a family of missiles each with realistic operational requirements. They should not be oversold while in advanced development until proven, lest an enemy believe we truly will have a capability for remote warfare by some specific date and overreact, or lest some economizing zealot in Washington begins trading off procurement of cruise missiles against proven systems.

Last, a reader could conclude from this study that the era which started in the late 1940's when strategic weapons necessarily meant nuclear warheads may now be drawing to a close. The time is at hand for a redefinition of strategic vs. tactical missions and a dialogue concerning the place of conventional and nuclear warheads in each role. Perhaps we can now achieve counterforce strategic capabilities with conventional weapons.

These criticisms aside, cruise missiles provide the greatest potential of any weapons system to come on the scene in years. Pfaltzgraff and Davis have provided a text that should be required reading at all levels.

DAVID G. CLARK
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Pipes, Richard, ed. **Soviet Strategy in Europe**. New York: Crane Russak, 1976. 316pp.

Particularly at a time in U.S. history when major reassessments of its chosen foreign policies have been receiving increasing polemical and, perhaps even substantial, attention, a work meant to be examining "the persistent elements in Soviet Russia's European policy and to assess that policy's successes and failures," should be most welcome, especially if contributors include such first-class analysts as John Erickson, Michel Tatu and Thomas Wolfe. However, despite their noteworthy attempts and other sound articles by Christopher Civic, Lothar Ruehl, Philip Hanson, Michael Kaser and John and Pauline Pinder, the value of *Soviet Strategy in Europe* rests on the individual contributions of its authors rather than as a meaningful, thorough and cogent interpretation of Soviet "policy."

Perhaps a more extensive commentary by the editor, Richard Pipes of Harvard, which sets out a rigorous and objective analytic framework underscoring the issues and interpretations surrounding Soviet policy would have been an effective way of tying together a series of papers written under the sponsorship of the Stanford Research Institute. By identifying the constraints as well as the successes of, Soviet

policy, one establishes a reference against which that policy can be measured.

Professor Pipes argues that "there exist in the world the most fundamental differences in the psychology and aspirations of its diverse inhabitants." The various elements of Russian historical experience in conjunction with Russia's peculiar governmental tradition (namely, that comforts or privileges come only from the state), persistent Russian expansion, the background and conditioning of the present elite under conditions of the "most ruthless political infighting known in modern history" and the peasant origins of that leadership have combined to create "a very special kind of mentality, which stresses slyness, self-interest, reliance on force, skill in exploiting others, and, by inference, contempt for those unable to fend for themselves." Since, in Professor Pipes' view, "political thinking and behavior are shaped largely by the experience gained in the arena of domestic politics, . . . [and] [F]oreign policy is . . . an extension of domestic politics," the West is at a particular disadvantage and, worse, may not realize its jeopardy.

While the foregoing may be correct both in truth and in logic, what Professor Pipes fails to incorporate as part of the Soviet domestic and foreign policy process, is the pragmatism and caution which have been fundamental characteristics of the Soviet leadership at least since the early 1920's. Without this ingredient, it is easy to make an excellent case for unlimited suspicion of virtually unlimited ends to Soviet objectives. All of which is not to diminish the critical fact that an adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has existed, exists today, and will continue in the future. But, what is needed is better analysis of that relationship including examination of the very real constraints to "unlimited" Soviet ambitions.

It is too bad because there are some excellent analyses in the book. Michel Tatu updates his earlier powerful study of Soviet decisionmaking (*Power in the Kremlin* [1968]). Lothar Ruehl and Christopher Civic write sensibly on Soviet relations with West and East Europe. Thomas Wolfe and John Erickson produce their usual excellent standard of analysis of Soviet military capabilities and intentions in Europe and divide somewhat in their conclusions over the "conventionalization" of Soviet military power. Both suggest that the meaning of recent increases in Soviet conventional military capabilities in the Central Front over the past 6 or 7 years is partially uncertain. However, Professor Erickson, with specific and necessary caveats, concludes the evidence may be more than just pointing in that direction and that a "conventional" as opposed to a "strategic nuclear" option exists. Hanson, Kaser and both Pinders write incisively about the economic dimension with the first pair advancing a well-measured analysis of COMECON import-export requirements and a penetrating examination of "technology transfers," reviewing Soviet constraints as well as benefits and objectives.

In summary, *Soviet Strategy in Europe* is helpful as a vehicle for publishing some very good individual papers about our primary adversary. But, in analyzing the broader view of Soviet policy, of U.S.-Soviet relations during a period of so-called "detente" it could profit from the eminently sound interpretation of "Detente Under Soviet Eyes" made by Adam Ulam:

> Detente in the Soviet view has meant a new type of *relationship* with the United States, but this relationship does not *automatically* put the Soviet Union under an obligation to pursue policies Americans would approve. Detente was never assumed by Moscow to mean a specific series of agreements, not to

mention an alliance. It was meant to provide a framework within which the two powers could seek agreement; an atmosphere conducive to political bargaining free from threats of war, enabling both sides (the Russians obviously hoped primarily themselves) to gauge more accurately each other's interests and intentions. But the mere existence of detente does not, the Russians feel, put any restraints on their policies, even though they are pleased when the State Department feels it does put restraints on America.

That type of introduction blended in the European context would have been far more desirable and useful in reinforcing the high standard and quality of the contributing writers.

HARLAN K. ULLMAN
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
National War College

Potter, Edward B. Nimitz. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 507pp.

This thorough and workmanlike life of Adm. Chester W. Nimitz is also somewhat frustrating, owing to circumstances largely beyond the author's control. For his subject, however eminent as a naval officer, was singularly unhelpful as the subject of a biography. Although he himself apparently enjoyed writing, Nimitz adamantly refused to write his own story, nor would he permit others to attempt the task during his lifetime. Not until 4 years after the Admiral's death and 25 years after V-J Day did Professor Potter start work on the volume. Not only were most of Nimitz' contemporaries dead by this time, but the single most valuable collection of source material had been lost, for Mrs. Nimitz had burned almost all the daily letters her husband wrote her during the war.

The outline of the career is clear enough, and shows a highly competent officer rising steadily through the various grades, with a single mishap in 1908 when he put a destroyer up on a mudbank in the Philippines. Nimitz' early concern with submarines and diesel engineering led him by way of the diesel-powered tanker *Maumee* to involvement in the first operational effort in underway replenishment, the refueling of Commander Taussig's destroyers on their way to Europe in 1917. Transferred to the staff of Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet, he acquired an influential patron in its commander, Capt. Samuel S. Robison. A year at the Naval War College in 1922-23 involved, along with the obligatory study of Jutland, exposure to the novel possibilities of the circular cruising disposition, with which Nimitz subsequently experimented while Assistant Chief of Staff to Robison during the latter's tours as Commander Battle Fleet and Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet. From 1926 to 1929 he was the first commander of the naval ROTC at the University of California; in the middle 1930's he served as flag captain of the Asiatic Fleet and Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; promoted to rear admiral, he had a tour in command of Battleship Division 1 before reporting as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, in which post Pearl Harbor found him.

Inevitably, the period of the Pacific War forms the bulk of the book. Here Professor Potter gives us an interesting description of the campaign as seen from headquarters at Pearl Harbor and Guam. The importance of communications intelligence comes through clearly. Suitable emphasis is given the various problems of personality, strategy, and organization which developed with the great augmentation of strength of 1943-44, with the upward mobility of naval and Army aviators, with Marine command of Army troops, and in the relations with Commander Southwest Pacific Area. Perhaps the most surprising revelation here is that in late

January 1944, less than a month after a conference with Admiral King in which the latter had emphasized the Marianas as the key to Pacific strategy, Nimitz and all his staff joined in support of the MacArthur plan for a single-line advance by way of New Guinea and Mindanao. But this decision was shortly sunk without trace by an angry broadside from that fierce Mahanian who ruled the Navy from Washington.

Of the unofficial Nimitz, we learn that he had simple tastes, a due respect for the proprieties combined with total lack of arrogance, great devotion to his family, and a service loyalty that ran both up and down (the latter sufficiently demonstrated when he went over the side into the winter Atlantic to rescue a drowning sailor). He loved music, disliked women in the armed services, and felt uncomfortable with the expanded postwar bureaucratic Navy. In retirement his generosity showed in the care and support he provided to four refugee Hungarian children whose parents had been unable to get out, and his catholicity in acquaintances in an enduring friendship with a Chinese-American banker. But the inner man remains concealed: The single most revealing insight in the book is provided by a discouraged letter of March 1942, one of the very few that Mrs. Nimitz did not destroy. Nor do we see the individual through the eyes of others: His postwar relationship with Eisenhower is not touched on, and it remains unclear why Secretary Forrestal so strongly opposed his appointment as Chief of Naval Operations.

One may regret the inability of author and reader to penetrate the screen that Admiral Nimitz so successfully erected in defense of his privacy. Yet it may be that in seeing only the naval officer we see the essential truth. Throughout his active career and on through his retirement this very balanced steady man seems to have found all the satisfaction he needed in the service of his country. One of his daughters once contemplated joining the Communist Party and another in due course became a nun. But the Admiral's tombstone, by his own specific choice, carries as its only symbol a circlet of five stars.

JAMES A. FIELD, JR.
Swarthmore College

Reber, Ian and Shaw, Paul. **Executive Protection Manual.** Schuller Park, Ill.: Motorola Teleprograms, 1976. 285pp.

In an age where warfare is often terror and terror becomes a form of warfare it was inevitable that worried but practical men would begin to grope with the problem. And so the management of terror has been reduced to a technical training manual. It is a fascinating exercise, recommended for anyone who wonders professionally what the hell he would do if attacked, ambushed or kidnapped on the way to work. The work is professional, concise, and like the terror area it describes (a growth industry), it comes in flexible, expandable looseleaf format. I doubt if a prudent senior government officer or corporate official will want to pass up this easily read and intriguing "how to avoid . . . ." textbook.

Principally, the book is a primer on terrorism and terrorists. Who, how, when and why! But much more importantly the book describes in considerable detail the problems of how to avoid acts of terror, principally the ambush, the kidnap and the hostage situation.

The text is divided into 15 chapters detailing the techniques, psychology and case histories of recent acts of terror, including the kidnapping of the British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson in Uruguay. Survival techniques, hostage psychology, negotiating concepts are all explored in-depth and fascinating detail.

An entire section of the text is spent

on crisis management as applied to terror, blackmail and kidnapping. The role of the family, the role of the agency or corporation, the need for contingency planning and for training are laid out thoroughly and in detail.

This is one manual which deserves to be read for its own sake.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Stevenson, William. **A Man Called Intrepid**. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. 486pp.

This is an important book for a wide range of readers: World War II scholars and buffs, those interested in espionage and clandestine operations, constitutional lawyers, revisionist historians, moralists, and proponents and opponents of unconventional warfare, to name a few.

A Man Called Intrepid provides an enticing glimpse into the inner sancta of high-level policy formulation, international and domestic intrigue and gut-wrenching decisionmaking. The author has presented a collection of case studies in espionage and counter-espionage which defy the imagination. More accurately, they might be called short stories. Each of the six parts contains extremely interesting and thought-provoking accounts of clandestine operations during World War II which had some impact on the conduct or outcome of the war.

There is an interesting and important account of relations between Churchill and Roosevelt prior to our entry into the war. It raises serious questions about the role of a neutral nation, what the President can or should do to enhance national security while supporting one belligerent against another. Bureaucratic problems are also discussed including disputes between agencies of the United States and Great Britain, as well as those within the U.S. Government.

Stevenson notes that on several occasions the necessity to preserve the secrecy of allied intelligence sources (human and technical) resulted in foreseen and unfortunate friendly casualties: devastation of Coventry, death of the actor Leslie Howard, German rockets missing London but landing in other inhabited areas.

There are instances of extraordinary bravery such as the efforts to destroy the "heavy water" plant in Norway to prevent the Nazis from harnessing atomic energy. This example also brings into view some of the conflicts between those who favor unconventional operations and those who prefer "conventional" military methods. New light is shed on the disastrous raid on Dieppe and, perhaps, justifies the losses suffered there.

Intrepid is much more than a sequel to *Ultra Secret* and the exploitation of the Enigma code machine. It is an exciting, well-written, inside look at many facets of worldwide intelligence and counterintelligence operations prior to and during a great war and, as such, deserves our attention.

W.P.C. MORGENTHALER
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Taylor, Maxwell D. **Precarious Security**. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. 143pp.

In his three earlier books Maxwell Taylor has consistently sounded one alarm or another, but in this new work, recently identified in the press as influencing President Carter, Taylor's bugle rings out in somewhat muted and subtly ominous—and yet ultimately optimistic—tones. In the period of 1976 and beyond, the author methodically catalogs the major international problems he perceives as critical to the security of the United States, including the relative decline in military strength of the United States and our allies versus the growing militarism of the Soviet Union, economic problems of the Western

world related to energy shortages, disruption of the status quo power relationships in the Mideast, and growing discontent in the world's have-not nations. He adds to these woes with his impressions of domestic problems of disunity at home, decreasing national confidence in political leaders, and loss of the national will as evidenced by the "self-destructive and decadent traits." Taylor assumes his "self-appointed task . . . to outline a national security policy that will identify the sources of power available to provide such security, and propose ways for maximizing the effectiveness of this power and for minimizing the waste inherent in present procedures."

Taylor then proceeds through nine substantive but easily read chapters to outline his conceptions of the future, which, coming from a former Army Chief of Staff, an ex-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a past and possibly future Presidential advisor, should be considered seriously by any alert and astute student of international affairs. Taylor sees the Soviets losing little in various politically required international concessions and simply waiting instead for the "Marxist day of judgement when the walls of capitalism will come tumbling down." Instead of the inevitable nuclear conflict or stalemate of yesteryear, therefore, Taylor now foresees only limited conflicts involving proxies for the superpowers, but he theorizes that military intervention by both these powers might occur to prevent further nuclear proliferation of workable weapons, particularly in India, Iran, Libya, Brazil and Venezuela.

He calls for a total reexamination of all existing alliances which he perceives as outdated and partially indefensible in today's environment. Additional antithetical discussions involve Israel's chances of survival with and without U.S. support, using food production as a national weapon, the likelihood of the AVF working in wartime, Mexico and the Warsaw Pact nations pouncing on the prostrated superpowers following a nuclear exchange, and the unconstitutionality of the new War Powers Act, which Taylor thinks should be challenged immediately in the courts since it is far too constraining on future presidents.

A particularly interesting new concept for Taylor is his enlarged horizon of "total national security" and the "valuables" it must protect—including now the quality of life and the national economy, as well as the time-honored ideas of national essence and alliances. This approach allows the author to ask for financial sacrifices by the populace, and to state that the "test of a bona-fide national interest is the willingness of a country to expend resources for its attainment," a not-too-well veiled warning that we may have to pay for our future security in the coin of reduced excesses and fewer creature comforts.

Maxwell Taylor followers will be interested, too, in his postcript explanation and interpretation of the "debacle in Vietnam," especially his analysis of the four contributory U.S. mistakes. His projections for overall defense manning, conversely, will surprise no one given his own predilections and the aforementioned perceptions. Unpredictable, though, is Taylor's call for greatly increased economy in defense to reverse the DoD image as a wasteful spendthrift, by subsequent reductions in land-based missiles, large aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and foreign-based Army divisions—particularly in NATO.

On the civil, domestic scene, Taylor strongly advocates a total reexamination and reorganization of the Federal government machinery, and the creation of an all-encompassing new National Policy Council modeled on the NSC to absorb the NSC, but embracing the "total security" picture he portrays to establish clear and consistent policy and to avoid wasting resources. Harkening back to one of his Johnson-era recommen-

dations, he again suggests the President must increase his use of communications and the media to form favorable public opinion, and that the President is otherwise at a severe disadvantage in the opinion arena. Taylor suggests 1 to 2 hours of Presidential television press coverage weekly to allow "recurrent public questioning" of national policy, and implies that this step will improve the national consciousness.

In summary, Taylor predicts that the American people will pay the price necessary to achieve their "total security" once they are enlightened. His book could add to that enlightenment.

HERMAN J. LONG, JR.
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Vernon, Raymond, ed. **The Oil Crisis.** New York: Norton, 1976. 301 pp.

The events following the outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states in October 1973 had traumatic impacts on the world's economic and political systems that are still being felt. The "oil crisis" is the term commonly used to describe the embargoes and production cutbacks by the Arab oil producers and the fourfold increase in crude oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil crisis strained the NATO alliance and was a major factor in the double-digit inflations and severe recessions that wracked the industrial nations' economies in 1974 and 1975.

Raymond Vernon has edited and contributed to a collection of essays by a multidisciplined group of international scholars whose efforts were sponsored jointly by the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University and by *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This volume will aid readers to understand the nature of the oil crisis and help them to put it in perspective. Although most of the essays are related to others in the work, many of them could be read independently.

Raymond Vernon opens the book with an interpretative essay which focuses on what was learned about the oil crisis by the interaction of these scholars. Other essays provide analyses of the economic background and development of the crisis; of the actions of the oil-producing countries, the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union during the crisis; of the role of the multinational oil companies; of the functioning of OPEC, and of the efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for international energy cooperation. The book concludes with three essays in a section called "Synthesis," which Vernon, in the preface, says, "should be read in the same spirit as the Japanese novel *Roshomon--Three Versions of an Incident.*"

One conclusion the authors reach which is worth noting is that the multinational oil companies showed a greater ability to adapt to the embargo and output restrictions than did the governments of the importing states. Robert Stobaugh's analysis of the distribution of crude oil supplies during the embargo period indicates that the companies rearranged their worldwide production and distribution of oil to equalize the shortages in the consuming nations according to an "equal-suffering" rule. It is doubtful that following chauvinistic national government guidance would have led to an oil allocation which would have been better when longrun political and economic interdependence are considered.

Readers of this journal will be interested in Klaus Knorr's essay, "The Limits of Economic and Military Power." In response to the question "Why this reluctance to resort to force [by the oil-importing nations]?" Knorr says that the magnitude of the military effort against the Arab oil producers would have had to have been far in excess of a modest show of force or small expeditionary force given the

capacity for resistance by the potential targets. With the exception of the United States, the size and configuration of the armed forces of the Western industrial nations and Japan make them incapable of any sustained, large-scale, overseas military operation. The United States may have had sufficient military strength, but a number of domestic and international political factors constrained its use against the oil-producing states.

Is the world likely to see other successful employments of economic coercion based on the model of the oil crisis? Most of the authors of *The Oil Crisis* do not think so. The special conditions that enabled oil to be used as a political and economic lever do not exist for other commodities and manufactured goods. This means that other Third World raw material producers are unlikely to be able to repeat the oil crisis, but it also means that industrial nations are not likely to be able to exert effective economic counterpressure on oil producers.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
Wheaton College

Vigor, P.H. **The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality.** London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. 256pp.

The debate in progress in the United States over Soviet military capabilities and intentions requires some basic understanding of Soviet attitudes toward war and their readiness to use warfare as a means of attaining various political goals. This is a complex area to explore since it involves examining the history of Soviet and pre-Soviet Communist statements on this subject, traditional Russian attitudes and the examples of Soviet use of force since the Bolsheviks came to power. Professor Vigor, who is Head of the Soviet Studies Center at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, has met the challenge admirably in his study of Soviet views on war, peace and neutrality. His book is documented, analytic and concise. It discusses in turn each of the three basic elements contained in its title and closes with a chapter that attempts to relate the theories developed to actual practice as evidenced by selected cases. The book also contains a bibliography with a brief description of the more important sources.

The key section of the book is the chapter that discusses Soviet views on war. Soviet attitudes toward war are developed from their beginnings in the writings by Marx and Engels through Lenin's contributions, Stalin's statements, and the pronouncements by the more recent Soviet political and military leaders. One of the most useful sections of this chapter summarizes the different types of war as seen through Soviet eyes, and attempts to explain why the Soviets make these distinctions. This section is particulary useful as an introduction for the beginner attempting to understand Soviet viewpoints on the different types of wars and also as a timely review for the more advanced reader.

In several paragraphs that relate to the Soviet Navy, Professor Vigor indicates that the Soviet Navy is a "staunch proponent" of the concept that a future world war might not necessarily be nuclear. He also states that the idea of a limited war between capitalism and communism appears to have originated with the Soviet Navy which recognizes that operating at close quarters with NATO navies could precipitate a conflict that would not necessarily be nuclear. With regard to power projection overseas, Professor Vigor states that there are not sufficient landing craft and supply ships in the Soviet Navy to deliver large numbers of Soviet troops abroad and keep them supplied. He does not place much credence in the capability of Soviet ships to practice gunboat diplomacy. He sees the Soviet

Navy, except for strategic missile submarines, as essentially defensive in nature, but he suggests a close watch on shipbuilding programs for evidence of changing trends. Unfortunately, the capability of the Soviet Navy to attack the U.S. Navy at sea is not explored in any great depth.

In the discussion of these limited types of wars, however, he is careful to point out that the Soviets have continually maintained that such "limited" wars could very easily escalate to nuclear wars once issues and participants are broadened. As the Soviets put it, "fundamental" issues demand "fundamental means" of warfare, i.e., nuclear rockets.

Professor Vigor states that the Soviets will probably not engage in a nuclear war if it can be avoided, nor will they engage in a war of conventional weapons that is likely to escalate because of the damage they would suffer as long as the West retains a second strike capability. He sees two exceptions to this, however. The first would be an attack upon the Soviet Union or one of its "satellites" which he believes the Soviets would resist to the utmost. The second would be if the West's second strike capability could be neutralized, in which case the Soviet leaders might consider preventive or preemptive strikes.

Summarizing current Soviet attitudes on war, Professor Vigor asserts that the Soviets have no objection to starting a war to achieve political objectives, if war is the appropriate means. Military strategy is clearly seen as the tool of policy. The Soviets see any future world war as being nuclear, since it will deal with fundamental issues requiring "fundamental" (nuclear) weapons. There is some evidence that the Soviets may not see a world war as likely in the near future. The Soviets assume, of course, that the demise of Western capitalism is inevitable and that therefore a world war might not be essential. There is the possibility that the Soviets may now envision a conflict between U.S. and Soviet forces over nonfundamental issues as possibly being nonnuclear. Again, the point is made that the Soviet Union will not embark lightly upon war and will want to be certain that it can win. The Soviets place high value upon economic and morale factors in evaluating success in war. Noteworthy is the attention paid to their military technology and defense industries, and Soviet emphasis upon surprise, speed and overwhelming force to overcome the advantage of advanced Western economies. The Soviets also believe that morale in the U.S.S.R. is much better than that in the West.

The two chapters that follow the chapter on war discuss Soviet attitudes regarding peace and neutrality. Here again, the views are discouraging for the long term since peace and neutrality are seen in Soviet perception as either part of the continuing class conflict at a less violent level or as a tool that may be useful in contributing to the eventual victory of communism. The Soviet view of peace is that it is an effective means to gain a breathing space in the event that a war might be going badly, or to solidify gains during periodic warfare. In Soviet eyes there can be no true peace until the final victory of communism.

To Soviet theoreticians neutrality is an unnatural state, since every nation must play some role in the continuing class struggle. Neutrality is a means of preventing certain states from falling into the capitalist camp or as a way station for progressive countries on their road to socialism.

The final chapter of the book tests the theories outlined in the previous chapters against the facts of Soviet history. Professor Vigor summarizes the theories as follows:

(1) War will continue to be regarded as a useful tool of Soviet policy, but will only be used when it is the best means of gaining a particular political objective, and if victory seems certain. The

Soviet Union will avoid nuclear war because of unacceptable damage unless a way could be found to avoid this damage. If the U.S.S.R. were attacked, the Soviets would defend themselves with everything available, including nuclear weapons.

(2) Peace is an absence of fighting and is used as a means to obtain a respite to regroup and replenish. Peace is accepted by the Soviets when it seems the best means of attaining long-term goals at any particular time.

(3) Neutrality is a concept generally rejected by the Soviets. Neutrality is only useful when it suits long-term Soviet goals or when it is useful to prevent another country from falling under capitalist influence.

Professor Vigor cites numerous examples of Soviet military operations, political maneuvers and policy pronouncements to support his theories. In general, the facts of past Soviet history seem to support his theories. This is particularly disquieting when viewed in the context of the continuing increase in Soviet military capabilities.

Professor Vigor has produced a book that would serve very well as a textbook for students engaged in a study of Soviet attitudes toward war and defense decisionmaking. The only criticism that this reviewer would make is that there is not enough discussion of more recent Soviet attitudes, recognizing that the book was published in 1975. It is hoped that follow-on chapters will be produced with discussions of Soviet attitudes as exemplified by continued strategic weapons development, a navy with a global capability and continued improvement of tactical ground/air weapons systems.

There is considerable evidence available upon which to make judgments regarding Soviet military capabilities. It is within the area of Soviet intentions that the evidence is meager, conflicting and difficult to understand. Professor Vigor's book contributes to our understanding of Soviet intentions by recounting past history and providing theories that have remained fairly constant. The message is clear and disturbing. While the Soviets are not likely to start a war they cannot win, they are building their military and economic strength for use at some appropriate time in the future.

RALPH N. CHANNELL
Captain, U.S. Navy

Wilt, Alan F. **The Atlantic Wall.** Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1975. 244pp.

Alan Wilt not only details the fortifications of the Atlantic Wall, but he also examines the entire German defensive system in the west. He describes the construction of the coastal defenses, and also includes the manpower and firepower factors that formed the essential components of the Atlantic Wall concept. In addition, he analyzes the major strategic decisions made by the Germans and how these decisions affected the construction of the barrier in the western theater, an area that was left behind until 1944 by the larger events of World War II.

The greatest problem with the development of the Atlantic Wall was the German involvement in a prolonged war on several fronts. Because the Germans did not perceive a threat in the west until 1943, they did not give any priority of men or materials to the western theater for the construction of the "wall." These men and materials were desperately needed elsewhere.

However, with the growing allied threat in the west, the major work on the coastal defenses began in 1943. Massive construction efforts were completed, with the port cities receiving the major fortifications. The Germans believed that the allies would attempt to seize a major port with the initial invasion, and, therefore, they heavily defended these cities. Since the entire

coast could not be fortified, the key to the German defense rested in the mobile armor formations.

The real controversy between the German commanders began on how to deploy these formations. Rommel, because of his appreciation of allied airpower, wanted the armor deployed as close to the coast as possible. He believed that if the armor were not close to the coast, the formations would be destroyed before they moved very far. Von Rundstedt, on the other hand, wanted a defense-in-depth with the armor formations under his personal control. This heated debate led to so many problems that the completion of the Atlantic Wall suffered. Finally, Hitler solved the problem by taking control of the armor himself. The results of this decision are well known.

Professor Wilt has done an excellent job of covering a long neglected theater of World War II. He has approached the strategic aspects of the western theater during the period other writers have ignored and has greatly added to the understanding of the critical decisions made by the German High Command in building Hitler's Atlantic Wall.

ROBERT E. WOLFF
Captain, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Academy

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Akindele, R.A. **The Organization and Promotion of World Peace: a Study of Universal-Regional Relationships.** Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976. 209pp. $15.00.

A survey of the legal and political problems which have arisen in the international community during the last 50 years as a result of the conflicting interests of global and regional agencies organized to promote world peace and security.

Bell, Daniel. **The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.** New York: Basic Books, 1976. 301pp. $12.95

This lucid and thought-provoking philosophical interdisciplinary discussion, which is basic to understanding the author's previous and projected works, holds that the three areas in contemporary society—the economy, polity, and culture—are disjunctive ("ruled by contrary axial principles") and consequently exert a disintegrative effect on the amorphous state of modernism. Bell supports a restoration of moral and religious values, improvement in social equity, and a distinction between social needs and wants.

Bloodworth, Dennis and Bloodworth, Ching Ping. **The Chinese Machiavelli: 3,000 Years of Chinese Statecraft.** New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976. 346pp. $10.00

The authors seek to explain China's political and foreign policy through chronological review of the philosophical thought and the principles of

warfare and of government exercised in China throughout its history; it is held that the Chinese accommodate to the Machiavellian pragmatic propositions wherein morality is irrelevant to expediency.

Bozeman, Adda Bruemer. **Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 430pp. $12.50
A study of patterns of conflict within the cultures of Africa south of the Sahara, and the implications these have for Western concepts of conflict management.

Clough, Ralph N. **Deterrence and Defense in Korea: the Role of U.S. Forces.** Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976. 61pp. paper $2.50
The author proposes that the United States and Korea develop a long-range plan to strengthen South Korean forces, while gradually withdrawing U.S. ground troops and tactical nuclear weapons. Withdrawal of U.S. air forces would probably not be included in this plan.

Clough, Ralph N. **East Asia and U.S. Security.** Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975. 248pp. $8.95; paper $3.50
Reconsidering U.S. interests in the Far East, the author stresses the importance of relations with Japan in future American East Asian policy and addresses the prospects of stabilizing the balance of power among the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. It is recommended that the United States concentrate on dealing with Northeast Asia and keep free of entanglements in the less relevant problems of Southeast Asian countries.

Cox, Thomas S. **Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: a Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics.** Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 271pp. $14.00
Theory and academic research mark this analysis of civilian-military and interelite interactions in *coups d'état*, using Sierra Leone as an example. Cox examines the involvement of civilians in coups, and how the military can contribute to political development or disintegration.

Danchenko, A.M. and Vydrin, I.F., eds. **Military Pedagogy: a Soviet View.** Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 1973. 363pp. $3.35 (from Supt. of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.)
A translation of a Soviet military textbook covering the general problems of Soviet military pedagogy: its tasks, development, and features; military training—principles and methods; the theory of Communist indoctrination and how it is conducted; and the role of political workers as military pedagogues. The objective of such pedagogy is given as the improvement of constant combat readiness.

Dangerfield, George. **The Damnable Question: a Study in Anglo-Irish Relations.** Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. 400pp. $14.95
The 1916 Dublin Easter Rising is basic to an understanding of the long-term strained relations between England and Ireland, and it is on this vital event, its background, its leaders, and its continuing significance and ramifications that the eminent historian and Pulitzer-Prize winning author concentrates in this beautifully written book.

Davis, Richard W. **Disraeli.** Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. 231pp. $8.95
Laying no claim to the unearthing of new material, Davis nevertheless presents an interesting biographical study of the Victorian British statesman and author who applied his natural gifts of improvisation, instinct, social charm, rhetoric, and timing to achieve a brilliant political career and a reputation that still exerts international influence in party politics today.

Deitchman, Seymour J. **The Best-Laid Schemes: a Tale of Social Research and Bureaucracy.** Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976. 483pp. $14.95
Deitchman, formerly in charge of counterinsurgency programs for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, has written a probing study of the interrelationship between the Department of Defense (bureaucracy) and the defense-sponsored social science projects conducted by nonprofit groups and universities during the Vietnamese War.

Dull, Jonathan R. **The French Navy and American Independence.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. 437pp. $20.00
Wartime diplomacy, rather than battle tactics, is the focus of this study which analyzes the strategic setting and consequences of French naval participation in the American Revolutionary War.

Eckholm, Erik P. **Losing Ground.** New York: Norton, 1976. 223pp. $7.95
The loss of the earth's productive soil through the shortsighted use of land is studied in this analysis of how ecologically unsound attempts to increase food production are seriously undermining the world's ability to feed itself.

Field, Daniel. **The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861.** Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 471pp. $17.50
In this study of what led to the demise of serfdom in Russia, the author examines the nature and behavior of the elite class in Tsarist Russia, finding it strangely lacking in bureaucratic skills and even sociopolitical ideology; a picture of dissimulation and equivocation involving both the nobility and the "reformers" emerges.

Fox, J. Ronald. **Arming America; How the U.S. Buys Weapons.** Boston: Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research, 1974. 484pp. $15.00
A comprehensive examination of the manner in which the United States acquires its weapons systems, following their development from the original concept through Congressional authorization, appropriation, defense marketing, source selection, contracting, program management, and program control. The discussion also involves other peripheral defense problems.

Heath, G. Louis, ed. **Vandals in the Bomb Factory: the History and Literature of the Students for a Democratic Society.** Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1976. 485pp. $17.50
This historical chronology of the Students for a Democratic Society from its origin in 1905 through 1971 is based on massive documentation from primary source and other material; there is a critique of the organization, and the texts of 40 items selected from the literature of the SDS are included. The bibliography is impressive in its extent and detail.

Holzman, Franklyn D. **International Trade under Communism—Politics and Economics.** New York: Basic Books, 1976. 239pp. $10.00
Using the international economic system of the Communist bloc as a case in point, this study examines the interaction between economic and political forces in international relations.

Jain, Jagdish P. **After Mao What? Army Party and Group Rivalries in China.** Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976. 276pp. $13.95
The complexities of China's internal military-civil relationships are examined here in light of the past and the major upheavals which occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Tables and charts showing Army, Party, and government structure and leadership are appended.

Janowitz, Morris. **Military Conflict: Essays in the Institutional Analysis of War and Peace.** Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975. 319pp. $16.50
This collection of essays is a sociological and historical study of the military and its uses in the conduct or avoidance of conflict.

Kahn, Herman, et al. **The Next 200 Years; a Scenario for America and the World.** New York: Morrow, 1976. $8.95; paper $3.95
The futurists this time offer a bicentennial projection in contrast to the prevalent dire predictions regarding mankind's losing battle with the shortage of natural resources, population growth, pollution, and scientific and technological threats; they consider transition to, and direction of, life in a postindustrial society anticipated by the quadricentennial period.

Kiernan, Thomas. **Arafat: the Man and the Myth.** New York: Norton, 1976. 281pp. $9.95
The publicized ruthlessness and sensationalism of Arafat and the convolutions and international involvements of Arab politics are stressed in this biography of the Palestine Liberation Organization leader, which deals preponderantly with Arafat's youth and is based largely on interviews with him and his associates—sources rendered questionable by reason of language barriers, personal and political pressures, and preference for heroic myth over less romantic fact.

Ladd, J.D. **Assault from the Sea, 1939-1945.** New York: Hippocrene, 1976. 256pp. $12.50
A chronicle of amphibious operations in World War II which gives detailed background on the planning and execution of the landings, the types of landing craft and assault ships used, and how the assault forces were created.

Legault, Albert and Lindsey, George. **The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance.** Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974. 283pp. $14.50
Two men with differing academic perspectives, one in the physical sciences and the other in political science, collaborated to produce an objective introductory study of both the scientific and political aspects of nuclear energy and weapons systems.

Lukacs, John. **The Last European War, September 1939/December 1941.** Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1976. 562pp. $15.00
After presenting a brief survey of the events during the first half of World War II, Lukacs, a noted historian, focuses on the impact of the war on the social, economic, political, and intellectual life of Europe.

MacPherson, Fergus. **Kenneth Kuanda of Zambia; the Times and the Man.** Lusaka, Zambia: Oxford University Press, 1974. 478pp. $10.95
Written by a former minister and longtime friend of President Kuanda, this biography focuses on his role as leader in Zambia's struggle for independence from the early 1950's until the establishment of the Republic of Zambia in 1964.

Potter, David M. **The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861.** New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 638pp. $15.00
Published 5 years after the author's death, this scholarly posthumous volume reflects in its scope the extent of Potter's involvement with his subject—recounting the history of America in the 1850's, the period which was notable for the development of the diverse causes of the Civil War; the exposition is philosophical, nonpartisan, and critical of all factions.

Quade, Edward S. **Analysis for Public Decisions.** New York: American Elsevier, 1975. 322pp. $15.00
Those involved in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions in the public sector will find that this work demonstrates that analytic help for public policy decisions is not confined to questions that can be quantified. It recognizes the place of political realities, considered judgment, and intuition in developing public decisions.

Rappaport, Armin. **A History of American Diplomacy.** New York: Macmillan, 1975. 496pp. $7.95
A history of American foreign policy from Washington's administration to the present. Emphasis is upon post-World War II American policies which have evolved from interventionism to the more cautious attitude of the Nixon doctrine.

Richardson, Elliott. **The Creative Balance: Government, Politics and the Individual in America's Third Century.** New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976. 390pp. $7.95
Richardson's concept is of a creative balance of moderation between the political and social processes of a dynamic society as the means to accomplishing needed changes while maintaining the values that are still relevant to Americans living in an age of transition.

Ridley, Jaspar. **Garibaldi.** New York: Viking, 1974. 718pp. $15.00
The first biography of Garibaldi to have been written in English, this is a comprehensive study which incorporates both primary sources and extensive evaluation of previous works on the Italian hero.

Rubinstein, Moshe F. **Patterns of Problem Solving.** Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975. 544pp. $15.95

This interesting treatment of the process of problem solving in complex and uncertain environments is very readable, with a low level of mathematical rigor.

Stilwell, Joseph W. **Stilwell's Personal File.** Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1976. 5v. $26.00

This five-volume reproduction of General Joseph W. Stilwell's file from 1942-1944, during operations in the China-Burma-India Theater, includes radio messages, letters, and the papers dealing with Stilwell's recall in October 1944.

Villiers, Gerard de. **The Imperial Shah; an Informal Biography.** Boston: Little, Brown, 1976. 305pp. $8.95

A contradictory and many faceted personality, the Shah of Iran is an interesting subject for biography, but secrecy and police power pose a problem for researchers. This author settles for a chatty, popular-style, undocumented account that rambles along the familiar paths of the personal romantic and public political realms of the Shah's life—with few turnings into fresh byways.

Warren, Donald I. **The Radical Center: Middle Americans and the Politics of Alienation.** Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976. 260pp. $12.95; paper $4.95

Middle America, the radical (in this semantic sense "rudimentary") U.S. social group that conforms to neither traditional right nor left, is examined in depth through a study and analysis of detailed national surveys conducted in 1972 and 1975; highly subjective positions on national policies are reviewed, with an eye to the future effects on the political and social structure of the country.

CUMULATIVE INDEX
Volume XXIX

(This index includes the articles in volume XXIX. For earlier articles see *Naval War College Review Index: 1948-73,* May-June issues of 1974 and 1975 and the Spring issue of 1976.)